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Summary 
Vietnam is one of about 70 countries to develop a 
PRSP (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper) since 
1999, when this new instrument was introduced; 
and it was one of 12 countries that had completed 
a ‘full’ or ‘comprehensive’ PRSP by mid-2002. 
Vietnam had prepared an Interim-PRSP (I-PRSP) 
in early 2001 to gain access to the concessional 
lending facilities of the World Bank (Poverty Re-
duction Strategy Credits, PRSC) and the IMF 
(Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, PRGF). 
As Vietnam is ne ither a HIPC-country nor has it 
been facing a severe balance-of-payments gap, it 
was not a typical candidate for a PRSP. It has 
shown an impressive record of poverty reduction 
and a high degree of macroeconomic stability in 
the 1990s. Thus, it can be regarded as a good ex-
ample for the new approach to support for poverty 
reduction, with the own strategy of the country as 
the basis for concerted donor support – as opposed 
to the old-style adjustment lending based on donor 
conditionality. 
This study analyses the PRSP approach of Vie t-
nam and attempts to answer the question whether 
the PRSP will improve the prospects for further 
poverty reduction in Vietnam. It gives a detailed 
description of the drafting process and focuses on 
a range of factors that may be critical for the im-
plementation of the PRSP. 
The study is structured in the following way: Af-
ter an introduction in Chapter 1, in Chapter 2 the 
concept of the PRSP is presented as the analytical 
background for the case study. Chapter 3 summa-
rises the poverty situation of Vietnam and the 
challenges for further poverty reduction. Chapters 
4 to 6 analyse the PRSP by focusing on its drafting 
process (Chapter 4), its contents (Chapter 5), and the 
prospects for its implementation, including rec-
ommendations on aligning development assis-
tance to the PRSP (Chapter 6). The study ends 
with conclusions on the lessons learned from the 
case of Vietnam (Chapter 7). 
The Concept of PRSPs  
A PRSP is a comprehensive and strategic ap-
proach to reducing poverty in a developing coun-
try. It is designed by the developing country itself 
in co-ordination with development partners. 
PRSPs first served as a precondition for debt relief 
under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
initiative and then became the basis for all conces-
sional lending by the World Bank and the IMF. 
Furthermore, they are supposed to become the 
basis for the country assistance programmes of 
bilateral, multilateral and non-governmental do-
nors. The PRSP approach is guided by seven core 
principles that reflect the current convictions of 
the development community: 
The drafting process should be 
?? participatory, involving broad-based partic i-
pation of the poor, of civil society organisa-
tions, of governmental institutions at national 
and sub-national levels and by the private sec-
tor at all operational stages, 
?? partnership -oriented, involving co-ordinated 
participation of donors, and 
?? country-driven, that is, owned by the develop-
ing country. 
The strategies' contents should be 
?? comprehensive in recognising the multidi-
mensional nature of poverty, embracing all 
relevant policies and providing a coherent 
framework for them,  
?? based on a long-term perspective for poverty 
reduction, 
?? results-oriented and focused on outcomes that 
would benefit the poor, and 
?? prioritised in such a way as to make imple-
mentation feasible, in both fiscal and institu-
tional terms. 
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First experiences with some countries’ Interim or 
Comprehensive PRSPs – as discussed at a PRSP 
Review conference in January 2002 – reveal the 
following critical issues regarding the drafting 
process, contents and policy implementation: 
?? To receive concessional loans and/or debt 
relief, I-PRSP timetables often have been too 
ambitious. This has led to time pressure dur-
ing the drafting process and hence unsatisfac-
tory results. 
?? Both PRSP countries and donors have ex-
pressed the importance of broad-based par-
ticipation during the drafting and implementa-
tion processes. But often ambitious expecta-
tions have not been met.  
?? While ownership is a core principle of the 
PRSP approach, donors, and especially the 
World Bank and the IMF, still apply too in-
flexible conditionalities for their credit facili-
ties. 
?? Many (I-)PRSPs lack clear priorities for pol-
icy measures or given sectors; they rather look 
like 'shopping lists'. In some cases, achieve-
ments in terms of poverty reduction are diffi-
cult to measure due to a lack of suitable indi-
cators and sufficient capacities to measure 
progress.  
?? Developing countries are sometimes simply 
overburdened by the PRSP requirements. A 
country's capacities for planning and imple-
mentation, especially at the regional and local 
level, are often overestimated by national 
governments and donors alike. 
?? Drafting and implementing a comprehensive 
strategy like a PRSP requires more efficient 
and effective co-operation among donors.  
The seven core principles of the PRSP and the 
critical issues identified at the Review conference 
provide the analytical framework for the Vietnam 
case study. 
Poverty Situation of Vietnam  
Absolute poverty in Vietnam declined from over 
70 % in the mid-1980s to 37 % in 1998. Poverty 
reduction is indicated quantitatively by rising rural 
and urban incomes and improving social indica-
tors. It is also reflected by the perception of poor 
households that overall well-being has improved.  
This sharp decline in poverty was made possible 
by policies of fundamental renovation (doi moi) 
since the late 1980s that have transformed the 
socialist economy in the direction of market struc-
tures. Doi moi policies have dissolved agricultural 
production co-operatives, started restructuring 
state-owned enterprises, and promoted private 
sector development as well as international eco-
nomic integration. These reforms led to growth 
rates of over 7.5 % annually between 1990 and 
2000. 
Some key characteristics of poverty in Vietnam 
are: 90 % of the poor live in rural areas, the poor 
are predominantly farmers. Remote and upland 
areas are the poorest regions. Poor households 
typically have small landholdings or are landless. 
Ethnic minorities and children are more than pro-
portionally exposed to poverty. Deep poverty 
persists among unregistered migrants in urban 
areas. 
With only US$ 400 annual per capita income and 
more than one third of the population living in 
absolute poverty, poverty reduction is still a major 
issue for Vietnam. After more than a decade of 
successful poverty reduction, Vietnam is facing 
new challenges: 
First, there are limits to agricultural employment, 
given the shortage of arable land in Vietnam and 
the low productivity in the agricultural sector. 
Therefore, increased yields, a more diversified 
agricultural production, and rural off-farm em-
ployment will be the main pillars for rural poverty 
reduction. Underemployed agricultural labour will 
either have to be absorbed in rural off-farm activ i-
ties or it will migrate to the cities. 
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Second, growth in the non-agricultural sector 
faces increasing competition due to Vietnam’s 
deepening integration into regional and global 
markets. In consequence, further market-oriented 
reforms are needed to raise the competitiveness of 
Vietnamese products. 
Third, disadvantaged groups and regions have 
benefited less from doi moi reforms and overall 
poverty reduction. In order to prevent a further 
widening of the social gap, targeted poverty re-
duction programmes have to be more focused. 
The PRSP Drafting Process in Vietnam  
It is mainly due to the influence of the donor 
community, which wanted to enhance the poverty 
focus of Vietnamese policy and development co-
operation, that analytical and diagnostic work on 
poverty has been conducted on a larger scale even 
prior to the PRSP process. For that purpose, a 
Poverty Working Group of the Government of 
Vietnam (GoV), donors and international NGOs 
was established in 1999. The Attacking Poverty 
Report (published in 2000) constituted a common 
analytical base for Vietnam and the donors. 
To gain access to concessional credits from the 
World Bank and the IMF, Vietnam drafted an 
Interim PRSP within a few months in 2000. Ex-
cept for inclusion of the poor in the context of 
four Participatory Poverty Assessments, which 
served to establish an analytical basis for the 
PRSP, participation in the drafting process of the 
I-PRSP was limited. The I-PRSP mainly focused 
on sustainable economic growth as the key to 
poverty reduction. It lacks prioritisation and cost-
ing of programmes as well as indicators and 
mechanisms for poverty monitoring. These weak-
nesses were pointed out in the World Bank and 
IMF Joint Staff Assessment. Nevertheless, the 
PRSC and PRGF credits were approved in April 
2001. 
There was about one year available for the devel-
opment of a Comprehensive PRSP – the Vietnam-
ese Government renamed it into the Comprehen-
sive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy 
(CPRGS). Following distribution of the first draft 
in early February 2002, an intensive consultation 
process with Vietnamese stakeholders and donors 
took place over a period of three months, until the 
CPRGS was completed in May 2002. 
Participation: Various Vietnamese stakeholders 
participated in the drafting process of the CPRGS, 
but their involvement, contribution and impact 
varied. The formulation of the CPRGS was a task 
of the central government. Local authorities and 
people at the local level were heard during consul-
tations that provided valuable inputs for the paper. 
In this sense, the process was participatory. How-
ever, participation of the local level was neither 
broad nor institutionalised. Although the govern-
ment of Vietnam made efforts to organise a par-
ticipatory drafting process, and although recent 
activities to institutionalise participation in terms 
of implementing poverty alleviation programmes 
(particularly at the local level) are promising, 
there remains the challenge of getting lower ad-
ministrative levels involved in the implementation 
of the CPRGS. 
Partnership -orientation: The inputs of the donors 
to the CPRGS drafting process were considerable. 
There is a multitude of more or less formalised 
institutions in Vietnam (partnership groups) that 
facilitate the interaction between Vietnamese and 
donor agencies. The Vietnamese Government and 
the donors used these institutions to co-ordinate 
their work on the CPRGS. The Poverty Task 
Force provided the most important forum for gov-
ernment-donor-NGO interaction. 
Country-ownership : There is strong ownership 
among Vietnamese stakeholders at the central 
level, but this is limited at the local level, due to a 
lack of information and participation. The  com-
prehensiveness of the PRSP approach is still not 
widely recognized in Vietnam. Poverty alleviation 
is still widely regarded as a sectoral issue. The 
CPRGS is both a strategy designed to satisfy do-
nor requirements and attract more ODA and an 
internal action plan for implementing existing 
government strategies. It is to be expected that the 
upcoming annual plans and the next Five-year 
Socio-economic Development Plan (2006-2010) 
  Peter Wolff et al. IV
will specify and incorporate the actions laid out in 
the CPRGS. However, it remains to be seen 
whether the CPRGS will become the official basis 
for the planning and budgeting process in the 
coming years. 
The Contents of the Vietnamese PRSP  
The CPRGS targets continuing high growth linked 
to social progress and equity. The overarching 
growth and poverty reduction targets are: Double 
the GDP between 2000 and 2010, and reduce 
poverty in the same period by 40 %. Altogether 12 
development goals are formulated, most of them 
related to the Millenium Development Goals (see 
Annex 1). There is a particular focus on reducing 
the development gap between different regions 
and population groups. The strategy seeks to re-
concile the tension between economic growth and 
social equity that had become apparent in the I-
PRSP. It creates a closer link between growth and 
poverty alleviation by adapting the Millenium 
Development Goals to the Vietnamese context. 
The CPRGS is a comprehensive strategy. It rec-
ognises the multidimensional nature of poverty in 
that it formulates policies that are related to the 
three dimensions of poverty: opportunity, em-
powerment and security. The cross-cutting issues 
gender and environment are considered in the 
CPRGS; specific sections are devoted to both 
issues. However, only gender empowerment, em-
bodied in specific gender indicators, is an integral 
part of sectoral policies. 
Given that the CPRGS is linked to the Socio-
Economic Development Strategy and the Poverty 
Alleviation Strategy, which cover a ten year pe-
riod, it can be concluded that the CPRGS is based 
on a long-term perspective. The analysis shows 
that all strategies are linked, but that within strate-
gies tensions exist that are also reflected between 
the strategies. The CPRGS aims at high growth of 
GDP and employment, but the driving force of 
‘industrialisation and modernisation’ is supposed 
to be the state sector. On the other hand it is ac-
knowledged, that only the private sector can pro-
vide the employment needed for urban and rural 
poverty reduction. Furthermore, the benefits of 
international economic integration will only be 
reaped, if competitiveness of enterprises will in-
crease rapidly, which is difficult to imagine in an 
economy driven by the state sector. Most donors 
do not agree with the underlying concept of a 
‘socialist market economy’. That they – and par-
ticularly the World Bank and the IMF – support 
the CPRGS may be taken as a sign that ownership 
is regarded to be more important than full consen-
sus on economic and political concepts. 
The CPRGS is results-oriented. It sets out clear 
goals and indicators that refer to economic and 
social development. A monitoring and evaluation 
system has to be established, and responsibilities 
have been defined for it. However, policies are not 
always fully reflected in indicators, particularly in 
the areas of environment and good governance. 
Weaknesses are visible in the prioritisation of 
policies. The relevant chapter uses two different 
sources for calculating the demand for and alloca-
tion of resources to implement the strategy: the 
Five-year Development Plan 2001-2005, covering 
public and private investment, and projections of 
budget expenditure data for the years 2003-2005, 
including recurrent expenditures. Due to an in-
complete Medium-term Expenditure Framework 
for the overall budget and for specific sectors, the 
data cannot be linked sufficiently. Much more 
systematic work on public expenditure planning is 
required to achieve a consistent and prioritised 
expenditure framework. 
Challenges for Implementing the CPRGS 
Four critical areas have been identified in which 
strategy implementation bottlenecks are obvious: 
?? Implementation of structural reforms, 
?? Institutionalisation of participation, 
?? monitoring of and feedback on results, 
?? harmonisation of donor contributions. 
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All four areas are covered in the CPRGS. How-
ever, it appears that more work has to be done to 
clarify the concrete steps to be taken in these ar-
eas, both by the GoV and by the donors, to 
achieve the ambitious targets for growth and pov-
erty reduction. 
Implementing Structural Reforms 
The ongoing structural reforms in the second 
phase of doi moi are setting the framework for 
growth and poverty reduction. They cover a large 
part of the Policy Matrix in the CPRGS. Their 
implementation will crit ically influence the scope 
for resource mobilisation and resource allocation 
in Vietnam. 
SOE Reform and Private Sector Promotion: This 
area is critical for the achievement of growth and 
employment targets, because of its close link to 
the further integration of Vietnam into the world 
economy, i.e. to trade and FDI policies. The ques-
tion of the competitiveness of Vietnamese goods 
and services in both local and the export markets 
is pivotal. In view of its planned WTO accession, 
Vietnam has little time left to adjust its legal and 
political framework as well as the structure of 
enterprises. More international competition will 
pose a severe threat to the existence of enterprises 
and thus to employment creation. 
SOE reform, as outlined in the CPRGS and in the 
more detailed action plan of the government, as 
well as the government’s recent activities in pr i-
vate-sector promotion, do not fully grasp the chal-
lenges ahead. The government’s drive for mod-
ernisation concentrates on investments in state 
enterprises which are supposed to play a leading 
role in core sectors of the economy. However, 
there are no clear targets as to when these enter-
prises are to achieve competitiveness. In the pri-
vate sector there is a severe lack of resources to 
finance modernisation. It will not be sufficient to 
multiply the number of SME and household en-
terprises for the sake of employment creation as in 
the past, because the environment in which these 
enterprises will have to operate will be more com-
petitive than in the past. 
Banking Reform: Modernisation of enterprises, 
growth and employment generation requires a 
smoothly functioning financial sector capable if 
mobilising private savings and providing enter-
prises with short- and long-term funds. Due to a 
large amount of non-performing loans and an 
under-developed culture of commercial lending in 
the banking sector, it is as yet unable to fulfil this 
role. 
Furthermore, despite advances made in the rural 
finance system in recent years, rural areas are still 
not yet sufficiently supplied with banking ser-
vices, which is an urgent prerequisite for the de-
velopment of disadvantaged rural areas, and par-
ticularly for the establishment of rural SMEs. 
Public Expenditure Reform: An important bottle-
neck for the implementation of the CPRGS, and 
more generally for further poverty reduction in 
Vietnam, is the lack of transparency and account-
ability of the Vie tnamese fiscal system. Budget 
data are still in a highly aggregated form and do 
not contain several off-budget accounts. There are 
estimates that at best 75 % of de facto budgetary 
transactions are covered in the budget. 
The Vietnamese public revenue system lacks ade-
quate fiscal decentralisation. Sub-national admin-
istrative levels have de facto no revenue-raising 
power of their own. The centre determines the rate 
structure of all taxes, and collects them. Poor 
provinces, districts and communes have negligible 
amounts of own resources at their disposal. Their 
power to influence the allocation of resources is 
limited, while National Programmes and support 
from international donors play an important role 
for poverty alleviation activities. Communal ad-
ministrations, especially from poor provinces, 
depend to a large extent on local fees and contri-
butions for local services. Often levied per head, 
these fees and contributions are a disproportion-
ately heavy burden for poor people. The Grass-
roots Democracy Decree requires fiscal transpar-
ency and accountability at the commune level. 
However, implementation is still in its early 
stages, because government employees at the 
commune level mostly lack specific training to 
provide detailed budgetary information. 
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A system of redistribution between poor and bet-
ter-off provinces is in place, but criteria for re-
source allocation are unclear. A formula -based 
system would avoid lengthy and non-transparent 
negotiation processes between the centre and the 
provinces. 
Public  Administration Reform: Reform of public 
administration is an important contribution to 
removing bottlenecks for the implementation of 
the CPRGS, because it will primarily be the gov-
ernment and the public administration that have to 
implement the strategy. Despite some achieve-
ments of Vietnam's Public Administrative Re-
form, many shortcomings remain. 
?? Due to the dominant role of the Communist 
Party of Vietnam, decision-making processes 
within administrations often depend on power 
relations within the Party, instead of following 
official rules of procedure. This hampers pre-
dictability of administrative procedures. 
?? Often, a sufficient legal framework is in place, 
but law-enforcement is weak. More emphasis 
should be placed on law enforcement and im-
plementation. 
?? Responsibilities are clearly defined neither at 
the national level nor at sub-national levels. 
Co-operation between ministries is weak, al-
though the PRSP process has already im-
proved the way in which involved ministries 
co-operate. At sub-national levels, there are 
initiatives to institutionalise co-operation, but 
they remain sporadic. Clear rules of procedure 
would improve the ability to plan and imple-
ment poverty alleviation activities, especially 
more comprehensive programs such as the 
CPRGS. 
Institutionalising Participation  
Implementing the CPRGS requires institutionalised 
participation for three reasons. First, to make it 
possible to gather information, second, to develop 
ownership and, third, to increase transparency and 
improve governance. Vietnam has institutiona l-
ised participation at the local level by issuing the 
Grassroots Democracy Decree; however, partic i-
patory processes are weak at the provincial and 
central level. The analysis revealed the following 
shortcomings: 
Gaps in the System of Representation – the Lim-
ited Number of Stakeholders: The government, 
closely intertwined with the Party, dominates de-
velopment activities – followed by donors and 
international NGOs. The private sector, Vietnam-
ese NGOs, the parliament and target groups are 
underrepresented. 
Differing Notions of Participation: Before partic i-
pation can be institutionalised, stakeholders need 
to agree on the level of participation they want to 
institutionalise. The interviews revealed that eve-
rybody agrees on the importance of participation 
for implementing the CPRGS. However, the ways 
in which this is understood differ, and as a result 
the level of participation sought remains unclear. 
In a consensus-based society like Vietnam's there 
is a danger that the only consensus that may be 
reached is the least common denominator. Indeed, 
the CPRGS limits participation to the local level. 
Varying Levels of Participation: Intra-govern-
mental participation and civic engagement at the 
national level are very weak. In contrast, civic 
engagement at the local level has been increasing 
significantly thanks to the Grassroots Democracy 
Decree. Although provincial governments have 
implemented the Decree in different ways, com-
mon strengths can be grouped in three areas: first, 
empowering people to take their own initiatives to 
overcome poverty, second, achieving sustainable 
poverty alleviation activities through local contri-
butions to communal projects and, third, better 
governance through an improved working rela-
tionship between government officials and the 
population as well as through increased manage-
ment capacities of local officials. 
Despite the impressive achievements made re-
garding participatory processes at the local level, 
the following weaknesses may prove to be bottle-
necks for implementing the CPRGS: 
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?? The flow of information is hindered by a lack 
of knowledge in local administrations as to 
what information needs to be provided to 
whom, by a lack of the funds needed to dis-
tribute information, by the remoteness of cer-
tain villages, by the fact that travel costs to 
remote villages are not reimbursed and by 
language barriers in ethnic minority areas. 
?? Participation varies according to geographical 
remoteness and levels of knowledge. Espe-
cially in certain ethnic minority areas, women 
are underrepresented. Some local officials are 
not trained to facilitate participatory work-
shops. As a result, the population lacks the 
knowledge needed to take informed decis ions. 
Intransparent budgeting procedures at the dis-
trict and province level deprive communes of 
a basis for planning. The lack of political will 
has further limited participation. 
?? The contributions of people are limited due to 
their lack of capacity to implement projects 
and a lack of resources in poor communes. 
Poor vocational skills prevent them from find-
ing jobs in poverty reduction projects. 
?? People’s supervisory competencies are limited 
to the local level, and for this reason corrup-
tion is less likely to be uncovered at higher 
administrative levels. 
Monitoring of and Feedback on Results 
The third critical area for implementing the 
CPRGS is the establishment of a monitoring and 
evaluation system. Monitoring comprises tracking 
the implementation of the PRSP, evaluating the 
impact on poverty reduction and finally feeding 
the results back into the decision-making process. 
Hence, monitoring and evaluation is an integral 
part of the PRSP cycle, one that ensures an orie n-
tation towards results. Feedback of results will 
improve the implementation of the strategy and 
provide the basis for a reformulation of poverty 
reduction policies. In consequence, monitoring 
supports good governance for poverty reduction, 
because it facilitates priority setting and increases 
transparency. 
As outlined in the CPRGS, a monitoring and 
evaluation system has to be developed to track the 
indicators listed in the strategy. In the process of 
drafting the CPRGS, the section on monitoring 
and evaluation has improved considerably. Never-
theless, three main problems for the future imple-
mentation of the CPRGS monitoring system were 
identified. They relate to the quality of the indica-
tor framework, data collection methods and insti-
tutional arrangements. In summary, limited moni-
toring capacity and co-ordination of the different 
agencies involved in monitoring, evaluating and 
feeding back results are major challenges ahead. 
Harmonising Donor Contributions  
One main outcome of the PRSP process will be a 
better harmonisation of donor activities. Both the 
GoV and the donor community recognise the need 
for country-wide harmonisation. Considerable 
progress in harmonisation has already been 
achieved, but challenges remain, including stan-
dardisation of aid delivery procedures, achieve-
ment of programme-orientation in aid delivery, 
increased efficiency and effectiveness of partner-
ship groups, and enlarged fund pooling. 
The need for harmonisation stems mainly from 
the significant increase of ODA inflows to Vie t-
nam in the last decade, which is still continuing. 
Because ODA was rarely co-ordinated, it led to 
duplication and gaps in aid activities as well as 
major burdens for the administration of the GoV. 
Harmonisation therefore envisages reducing the 
transaction costs of aid delivery and raising the 
effectiveness of ODA. 
Many donors are willing to align their assistance 
to the CPRGS. They want to use the CPRGS as a 
guide for their Country Assistance Strategies 
(CAS), provided it meets their expectations in 
terms of quality (priorisation, costing, action or i-
entation). 
Four dimensions of harmonisation can be distin-
guished. First, harmonisation of procedures and 
practices among donors in order to adapt them to 
the GoV system over time. A group of like-
minded European countries is particularly willing 
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to harmonise donor procedures and could pave the 
way for other donors.  
Second, increasing the programme orientation of 
aid, i.e. donors move their aid activities away 
from isolated projects with a view to aligning their 
assistance to a common recipient country pro-
gramme. Project-oriented aid is still widespread in 
Vietnam, but many donors want to improve the 
programme orientation of their aid, e.g. through 
Sector-Wide Approaches (SWAp). There are 
forms of SWAps in which donors deliver aid in a 
co-ordinated though financially individual way 
(see Annex 2 for the forestry sector).  
Third, partnership groups (PGs) are GoV–donor–
NGO fora that have already led to increased har-
monisation, but challenges remain. PGs vary sig-
nificantly regarding their formalisation, their 
goals, and the quality of their work. There is no 
prescription for a successful PG. To work effi-
ciently, PGs should be small to be operational and 
need results-oriented commitment on the part of 
their members. Therefore, each donor should fo-
cus its capacity on a few PGs. One possible 
enlargement of the partnership approach would be 
to establish PGs at the provincial level. 
Fourth, fund pooling is the most critical element 
of harmonisation for many donors. Many donors 
oppose fund pooling and particularly budget fund-
ing because of the lack of accountability and 
transparency of the Vietnamese budgetary system. 
Thus, forms of fund pooling that allow sufficient 
control over expenditures will be the only accept-
able way of programme-based aid for many do-
nors as long as public  expenditure management is 
not improved considerably in Vietnam. 
There are several challenges for German devel-
opment cooperation, taking into account a rela-
tively well-developed culture of donor co-
operation in Vietnam. First, decision-making 
powers and capacities should be enlarged at the 
country level to make the implementing institu-
tions more flexible and to enable them to cope 
with an increased workload. Second, the German 
engagement in partnerships should be selected 
strategically to create comparative advantages for 
German expertise in prioritised areas. Third, the 
management of the participation of German insti-
tutions in partnerships should be improved. 
Fourth, project experiences should be communi-
cated more effectively in partnerships as well as in 
the policy dialogue. Fifth, participation of German 
technical and financial co-operation in SWAps 
should be co-ordinated and existing projects of 
GTZ and KfW should be integrated into evolving 
SWAps. 
Conclusion 
It is still too early to give a definitive answer to 
the question whether the Vietnamese PRSP will 
improve the prospects of poverty reduction. The 
final draft of the Vietnamese CPRGS of May 
2002 is broader in scope than the existing strate-
gies in that it attempts to integrate macroeconomic 
and sectoral policies, giving them a stronger pro-
poor orientation than has been the case in the past. 
It is also more outcome-oriented than previous 
strategies in that it contains a broad set of targets 
and indicators that can form a basis for policy 
evaluation. However, how this strategy will be 
implemented and what role it will play in the 
Vietnamese policy process is still an open ques-
tion. 
Taking into account the potential bottlenecks for 
implementation mentioned above, completion of 
the CPRGS can be seen as the first phase in a 
process that will have to continue. This first phase 
has improved the quality of the policy dialogue 
between Vietnam and the donors and thus set the 
stage for aligning donor contributions to the Pov-
erty Reduction Strategy. 
Against this background, the concept of owner-
ship , central to the prospects for the implementa-
tion of the strategy, has to be put into perspective. 
In the early stages of the PRSP process, only a 
small group of bureaucrats and donor representa-
tives was involved in the discussions related to the 
strategy. During the completion phase of the strat-
egy paper a wider group of government, non-
governmental and donor representatives became 
involved, widening the scope of discussion and 
leading the way into a process of ‘mainstreaming’ 
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the poverty focus of the strategy within the Vie t-
namese administration. 
It will be imperative, however, to develop an im-
plementation concept for the CPRGS that includes 
the provincial, district and communal levels as 
well as the emerging civil society in Vietnam. The 
CPRGS should not be misunderstood as yet an-
other plan to be implemented on the orders of the 
Hanoi authorities. It appears that the PRSP proc-
ess in Vietnam has contributed to developing the 
awareness needed for a more de-centralised ap-
proach. 
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1 Introduction 
Poverty reduction strategies have become one of 
the major issues in development co-operation in 
recent years. The fight against absolute poverty 
has always been the overarching goal of develop-
ment co-operation. However, the development 
debate in the last decade has seen a major revision 
of both concepts of poverty reduction and the 
ways in which development partners (“donors and 
recipients”) interact. The revision was triggered 
by the widespread disappointment over the dismal 
results of poverty reduction policies in the past. 
The policies of most developing countries, it was 
argued, were not focused and comprehensive e-
nough to have a major impact on poverty. They 
lacked a clear concept of “pro-poor growth.” The 
interventions of the donor community, on the 
other hand, were criticised as ineffective due to 
their insufficient orientation to support anti-
poverty policies in developing countries and the 
lack of co-ordinated donor interventions. 
The critique of the weaknesses of past approaches 
has been reflected in a new concept of co-
ordinated poverty reduction which was introduced 
in the late 1990s. The background was the com-
mon aim, as laid out in the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals, to reduce world-wide poverty by half 
by 2015. To reach this ambit ious goal, it was ar-
gued, a new approach had to be defined, encom-
passing well-defined poverty reduction policies in 
the developing countries on the one hand and co-
ordinated support of these policies by the donor 
community on the other. As part of the HIPC ini-
tiative towards debt relief in the poorest countries, 
the new concept introduced in 1999 centred 
around the development of Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers (PRSP) in an interactive and par-
ticipatory process, involving the major stake-
holders in developing countries as well as the 
developing partners. The PRSPs are to be the ba-
sis for the policies of developing countries as well 
as of future donor interventions.  
Vietnam is one of about 70 countries to embark 
on the PRSP-approach. It showed remarkable 
successes in reducing poverty in the 1990s; how-
ever, more than one third of the population are 
still living in absolute poverty. The donor com-
munity has thus far shown considerable support 
for Vietnam and seems to be willing to support an 
even more comprehensive approach to poverty 
reduction based on the PRSP approach. BMZ has 
declared Vietnam to be one of four “focus coun-
tries” in the framework of its Action Plan for Pov-
erty Reduction by 2015. 
The present study takes Vietnam as an example 
for the implementation of the PRSP approach. It 
attempts to answer the question whether this ap-
proach will improve the prospects for poverty 
reduction in Vietnam. In order to answer this 
question, the study will  
– discuss the PRSP-concept as it has been de-
veloped in recent years, taking into account 
the lessons learned in the countries in which 
it has been implemented thus far (Chapter 2); 
– give an overview on the actual poverty situa-
tion in Vietnam, analyse the impact of eco-
nomic reforms on poverty reduction and iden-
tify the major challenges ahead (Chapter 3); 
– assess the process of the drafting of the PRSP 
in Vietnam, as it has evolved in the years 
1999-2002, with regard to the major concep-
tual principles (Chapter 4); 
– analyse the contents of the draft PRSP with 
regard to the ma jor principles to be consid-
ered (Chapter 5); 
– assess possible bottlenecks for the implemen-
tation of the PRSP and outline possible needs 
for adjustment which the PRSP might entail 
for donors, particularly for German develop-
ment co-operation (Chapter 6). 
The study assumes that compliance with the six 
stated principles of the PRSP (country-driven, 
partnership-oriented, long-term, comprehensive, 
results-oriented, prioritised), will mean improved 
prospects for poverty reduction in Vietnam. The 
methodological approach used to answer the lead 
question consists of interviews with the stake-
holders in the Vietnamese PRSP process: the per-
sons and institutions involved in the drafting of 
the PRSP, both on the Vietnamese and on the 
donor side, and the stakeholders at the local levels 
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who are to implement the PRSP on the ground. 
The study analyses the perceptions of stakeholders 
with regard to the process and the contents of the 
PRSP as well as with regard to possible bottle-
necks to its implementation. 
The GDI team had the opportunity to participate 
in the consultation process in the final stage of the 
drafting of the PRSP: After a preparation process 
of about one year the final draft of the full PRSP 
was presented by the Vietnamese government in 
early February 2002, to be discussed in a series of 
countrywide consultations with local stakeholders 
and donors until the end of April 2002. The team 
has participated in one of the workshops (in 
Quang Binh province, central region) and spent 
about three weeks conducting interviews with 
stakeholders and experts at the central level in 
Hanoi and three weeks at the local level in Son La 
(northern region) and Ha Tinh province (north-
central). The provinces were selected by the Vie t-
namese partner institution, the Central Institute for 
Economic Management (CIEM), which is carry-
ing out a long-term research project on the 
“Renovation of the Planning Mechanism,” focus-
ing on innovative participation mechanisms at the 
local level.  
The Vietnamese PRSP is regarded with great in-
terest, but also with some scepticism. As in other 
PRSP processes, the major question is whether the 
Vietnamese PRSP is really “owned” by the Vie t-
namese side; not only by the government, but also 
by groups in society that are not yet formally rep-
resented in the political process in Vietnam, since 
the country still has no civil society  in the true 
sense of the word. If this question can be an-
swered affirmatively, and the PRSP is well re-
ceived by all development partners, the result 
could be major adjustments to the focus and the 
delivery mechanism of development co-operation, 
since the PRSP is supposed to be the basis for the 
Vietnamese policies in all major political areas 
and, inter alia, for all contributions of develop-
ment partners. 
2 The Concept of Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers  
A PRSP is a comprehensive and strategic ap-
proach to reduce poverty in a developing country. 
It is designed by the concerned developing coun-
try in co-ordination with development partners. 
The PRSP concept has been designed by the 
World Bank. PRSPs first served as a precondition 
for debt relief under the HIPC initiative and then 
became the basis for all concessional lending by 
the World Bank and the IMF. PRSPs may thus be 
seen as having taken the place of the former 
World Bank/IMF Structural Adjustment Pro-
grammes for Least Developed Countries.  
The PRSP approach is guided by seven core prin-
ciples that reflect the current convictions of the 
development community. According to these 
principles, the drafting process should be partici-
patory, partnership-oriented and country-driven. 
The contents of strategies should be comprehen-
sive, based on a long-term perspective, results-
oriented, and prioritised. 
2.1 The PRSP Principles 
The PRSP principles reflect the current convic-
tions of the development community. Among 
others, documents like the Guidelines on Poverty 
Reduction and Shaping the 21st Century by the 
OECD/DAC as well as the UN Millennium Dec-
laration reflect these convictions1. In the late 
1990s, the World Bank developed the Compre-
hensive Development Framework (CDF) to im-
prove the efficiency and effectiveness of devel-
opment co-operation. The principles that guide the 
CDF2 served as basis for the seven core principles 
guiding the PRSP concept:  
                                                 
1 See OECD / DAC (1996); OECD / DAC (2001); UN 
General Assembly (2000). 
2 The CDF is guided by the principles: long-term vision 
and strategy, enhanced country ownership of develop-
ment goals and actions, more strategic partnership among 
stakeholders, accountability for development goals. 
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The drafting process for the strategies should be 
– participatory, involving broad-based partic i-
pation of the poor, of civil society organisa-
tions, of the private sector and of governmen-
tal and administrative institutions at the na-
tional and sub-national levels at all opera-
tional stages,  
– partnership -oriented, involving co-ordinated 
participation of development partners, and 
– country-driven, which means that the country 
concerned, not the donors, should be the driv-
ing force in the drafting of the strategies. 
In terms of their contents, the strategies should be 
– comprehensive in recognising the multid i-
mensional nature of poverty, embracing all 
relevant policies aimed at reducing poverty 
and providing a coherent framework for these 
policies,  
– based on a long-term perspective for poverty 
reduction, 
– results-oriented, i.e. focused on outcomes 
that would benefit the poor, and 
– prioritised, to ensure that implementation is 
feasible, in both fiscal and institutional terms. 
The requirements of a PRSP, as explained in this 
chapter, are taken from the PRSP Sourcebook of 
the World Bank.3 
2.1.1 Process Principles 
Principle 1: Participatory 
The primary responsibility for formulating a 
PRSP lies with the central government. Assuming 
full leadership of the PRSP process means not 
only designing policies but also organising a 
framework for broad-based participation. Partic i-
pation helps to identify the real needs and prob-
                                                 
3 See World Bank (2001b). 
lems of the poor and the various stakeholders and 
therefore enriches a strategy's contents. Participa-
tion also enhances identification with the policies 
associated with the strategy, which should lead to 
better results in implementation. A participatory 
drafting process demands the exchange of infor-
mation and thereby increases the transparency of 
decision-making. This should, ideally, improve 
government accountability and, as a result, im-
prove the overall governance and economic effi-
ciency of development activities.  
The central government should involve sectoral 
ministries and parliaments. Participation and ap-
proval by national and local parliaments are im-
portant indicators with regard to ownership and 
the strategy's significance. The contributions of 
local governments are particularly important be-
cause in many cases they have to deal with the 
implementation of adopted policies on the ground. 
Besides public institutions, civil society organisa-
tions (CSOs) and the private sector should also 
contribute to the formulation of a PRSP. CSOs 
sometimes express people's concerns more di-
rectly than central or local administrations. Fur-
thermore, CSOs can provide specialist and local 
knowledge. However, some interest groups may 
be more influential than others. It is therefore 
important to verify whether geographic regions, 
gender aspects, ethnic minorities, etc., are ac-
corded equal consideration. Private sector associa-
tions should also be heard, so that they can pro-
pose measures to improve the business environ-
ment and promote economic growth.  
Poor and vulnerable groups are empowered by 
bringing their analysis, priorities, and voice into 
the decision-making process. The result is that the 
policy framework becomes more relevant and 
responsive to their needs. Participatory poverty 
assessments are a helpful instrument to take into 
account specific needs and demands of the poor. 
Principle 2: Partnership-oriented 
Bilateral, multilateral and non-governmental de-
velopment partners should be involved in the 
drafting process from the outset. Their participa-
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tion contributes to a strategy in which every part-
ner can find his own role. Once the various pro-
jects and programmes of development partners are 
aligned to the overall poverty reduction strategy, 
overall co-ordination will be enhanced and effi-
ciency in implementation will be improved. 
There is an inherent dilemma between partnership 
and ownership. The more the development part-
ners are involved in the drafting process, the more 
they may tend to dominate the process as well as 
the contents of the strategy. Since PRSPs were 
invented by donors and are developed on donor 
demand, the partnership principle might simply be 
interpreted as a euphemism for donor domination. 
However, particularly in countries where a con-
siderable part of the public budget is funded by 
development assistance, development partners are 
a natural stakeholder in the process, and the fi-
nancing of the poverty reduction strategy will 
require their consent to the PRSP. 
Principle 3: Country-driven 
The first two principles, participatory and part-
nership-oriented, can be seen as indicators to as-
sess the extent to which the process is country-
driven. First, broad-based participation can only 
be successful if the central government is willing 
to listen to the various national stakeholders and 
to take their voices into account. Serious partic i-
pation, in turn, increases ownership of the strategy 
both within society and government at the na-
tional and sub-national levels. Second, co-
operation with donors can only be fruitful if the 
developing country itself is convinced of the ne-
cessity to reduce poverty and the utility of a com-
prehensive poverty reduction strategy to do so. If 
donors decide what a country has to implement, 
the result will not be satisfactory. Thus, a drafting 
process that is not dominated but supported by 
donors is a useful indicator for assessing whether 
a country is in the driver's seat. 
2.1.2 Content Principles 
One challenging requirement for PRSPs is to inte-
grate all policies relevant for poverty reduction in 
a coherent framework. This is an essential differ-
ence to many previous poverty reduction pro-
grammes. In most cases, they involve a sectoral 
and targeted approach. The World Bank stresses 
that a PRSP does not need to be an entirely new 
national blueprint; on the contrary, national au-
thorities should draw upon existing national plans 
and sectoral programs as far as possible. There is 
no standard table of contents for a PRSP. Each 
national poverty reduction strategy must focus on 
its particular problems and tailor the solutions 
accordingly. Nevertheless, according to the World 
Bank, there are some general elements regarding 
contents that need to be considered:4 
Principle 4 and 5: Comprehensive and 
Based on a Long-term Perspective 
Comprehensiveness means recognising the mult i-
dimensional nature of poverty and embracing all 
relevant policies aimed at reducing poverty.  
Poverty is multidimensional in that it entails a 
lack of economic wealth, exclusion of soc ially 
disadvantaged groups or individuals, and vulner-
ability to external and uncontrollable events. A 
comprehensive strategy to reduce poverty should 
therefore promote opportunity, support empower-
ment and enhance security.5 The multidimensional 
nature of poverty also embraces the different cha-
racteristics of urban and rural poverty that need to 
be taken into account. 
A PRSP is not a targeted approach to reducing 
poverty in a certain area or of a certain nature. 
Being a comprehensive strategy, it should cover 
all relevant sectors and policies, including an as-
                                                 
4 See World Bank (2001b). 
5 This broad perception of poverty is also reflected in the 
Millennium Declaration and the MDGs. See UN General 
Assembly (2000). 
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sessment of how these policies could contribute to 
poverty reduction. Macroeconomic and structural 
policies, private sector development and infra-
structure interventions are intended to promote 
pro-poor growth and create employment. The 
various spheres of human development may re-
duce vulnerability and increase social welfare, e.g. 
through health-care, education and social safety 
nets. Cross-cutting issues such as environmental 
protection, gender equality and good governance 
are intended to ensure sustainable and equitable 
poverty reduction.  
All policies have to be embedded in a long-term 
perspective or a development vision for the coun-
try in question. The short-term policies should be 
compatible with the long-term goals of sustainable 
poverty reduction. 
Principles 6 and 7: Results-oriented and 
Prioritised 
To be results-oriented, a PRSP must formulate 
targets and indicators for poverty reduction and 
other related goals of sustainable development. It 
has to explain how to monitor and evaluate policy 
implementation. To be able to measure progress in 
poverty reduction, PRSPs must build on reliable 
data disaggregated by regions, social groups, and 
gender. Furthermore, the impact of past and pro-
posed policies must be assessed to provide an 
analytical base for the choice of policies. 
PRSPs have to define, cost, and prioritise public 
actions that have been chosen to implement the 
strategy. Policies have to correspond to institu-
tional capacities. Where these capacities are lack-
ing, capacity-building measures for have to be 
included in the PRSP. 
Key Steps in the PRSP Process 
As country circumstances vary and national 
stakeholders are to be the driving force in the 
process, there can be no standard procedural re-
quirements. According to the World Bank, the 
following five steps outline very generally a path 
for formulating a PRSP: 
– First, analytical and diagnostic work is called 
for to deepen the understanding of poverty 
and reflect the diversity of experiences ac-
cording to gender, age, ethnic or regional 
groups. In this stage, Participatory Poverty 
Assessments can provide helpful information. 
– Second, the various national stakeholders and 
international development partners engage in 
a participatory drafting process. The result  
should be an analysis of the impact and re-
lated costs of the proposed policies including 
a prioritisation of policies. 
– Third, the strategy has to be approved at the 
country level. If key stakeholders of the draft-
ing process agree upon the strategy presented, 
the PRSP is truly country-owned. Afterwards, 
the PRSP – or I-PRSP – has to be approved 
by the World Bank and IMF Boards before 
debt relief and/or concessional loans can be 
made available. 
– Fourth, the policies outlined in the PRSP 
have to be implemented. Since a PRSP nor-
mally includes existing projects and pro-
grammes, implementation is in some parts al-
ready on track. Agreement on roles and re-
sponsibilities of government or the national 
and sub-national level as well as private or-
ganisations and civil soc iety is crucial. Fur-
thermore, policy measures have to be moni-
tored and regular feedback assured. 
– Fifth, the impact of the PRSP implemented 
should be assessed and lessons for subsequent 
phases should be drawn. At this stage partic i-
patory evaluations are as important as partic i-
pation in the drafting process to ensure that 
the assessment is based on the view of the 
stakeholders, and especially on the percep-
tions of the poor. 
If a PRSP is combined with PRSG/PRGF credits 
from IMF and World Bank or with debt relief in 
the framework of the HIPC initiative, an annual 
report on implementation is required and 
IMF/World Bank propose a complete update of 
the strategy after 2-5 years. 
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Thus, a PRSP is not a one-time operation. It is a 
continuous process of policy formulation, imple-
mentation and feedback in a participative setting. 
The drafting of a PRSP is only the first step in a 
long-term process. 
IMF and World Bank have stressed, however, that 
the timing of the annual PRSP Progress Report is 
flexible, and may change over time in order to 
become consistent with national reporting and 
decision-making processes. 
2.2 Early Experiences: The PRSP Review 
A comprehensive review of experiences with 
PRSP began in September 2001. The World Bank 
and the IMF organised a review meeting in Janu-
ary 2002 which was attended by stakeholders 
from countries engaging in the PRSP process as 
well as more than 30 multilateral, bilateral and 
non-governmental organisations. Statements made 
during the conference6 and reports from various 
development institutions 7 as well as the latest 
review of the PRSP approach by the World Bank 
and the IMF, published in March 20028, serve as 
basis for this section. The review was based on 42 
I-PRSPs and ten full PRSPs. 
2.2.1 Issues Regarding the PRSP Drafting 
Process 
Time Pressure  
An important lesson that has emerged is that the 
initial country timetables for developing full 
                                                 
6 The opinions and findings presented at the review meet-
ing mentioned in this chapter are based on IMF / World 
Bank (2002a). 
7 All comments on PRSPs from multilateral, bilateral and 
non-governmental development institutions as well as re-
search institutes are available at: www. worldbank.org/ 
poverty/strategies/review. 
8 IMF / World Bank (2002b). 
PRSPs have proved to be overly ambitious. In 
addition, some PRSP timetables have been af-
fected by delays in implementing key policies. 
Many countries are expected to need longer than 
twelve months after finalising their I-PRSP to 
develop a full PRSP. Since debt relief based on an 
I-PRSP has been the priority for many countries, 
pressure imposed by HIPC and/or PRGF timeta-
bles has led to "hasty”, "ad hoc" and "perfunctory" 
consultation of stakeholders, even within govern-
ment. 
Participation: Undisputed overall Recogni-
tion, but Insufficient Realisation 
There is overall agreement on the importance of 
participation in the PRSP process. The participa-
tion requirement has opened up new opportunities 
for civil society organisations and clearly influ-
enced the strategies' contents in several develop-
ing countries. 
However, most reports come to the conclusion 
that participation has not been taken seriously 
enough by governments. Furthermore, consulta-
tions with stakeholders have not automatically led 
to consideration of their opinions. As a result, the 
PRSP process entails, paradoxically, the danger 
that policy control may be even further central-
ised. There is an important difference between 
government ownership and country ownership. In 
particular, the finance ministries seem to have 
taken the lead in several cases – not least because 
donors concentrate on these ministries as their 
primary contact institutions. Local governments, 
and especially parliaments, have not been suffi-
ciently involved in the preparation, approval and 
monitoring of country strategies. In some cases, 
independent civil society institutions have hardly 
been involved at all because they are poorly or-
ganised, at an early stage of development, and/or 
non-existent. 
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Too Tight Donor Requirements Lead to 
Lack of Ownership 
Whereas donors demand more (and more effec-
tive) participation to achieve country ownership, 
some developing countries have argued that na-
tional ownership is compromised because PRSPs 
are mainly donor-driven instruments of condition-
ality, a critique especially addressed to the World 
Bank and the IMF. PRSPs are conceived in Wash-
ington and are accompanied by extensive guide-
lines. They are subject to appraisal and scrutiny 
by World Bank and IMF staff. Indeed, real owner-
ship would require a open PRS concept adapted to 
country situations. Donors should review their 
instruments on a country-to-country basis rather 
than prescribing dogmatically their standard set of 
instruments, and the World Bank and the IMF 
should involve other development partners in 
PRSP appraisals. Especially Latin American 
countries have stressed that World Bank and IMF 
conditions should be linked more closely to the 
PRSPs. Some donors and NGOs have demanded 
more flexibility, transparency, consultations and 
presentation of alternatives regarding macroeco-
nomic policies and conditionalities of PRGF and 
PRSC. 
Necessity of Enhanced Donor Co-operation 
The PRSP process has had a mobilising effect on 
donors, and donor co-ordination has ranged higher 
on the agenda since PRSP processes began. How-
ever, co-ordination between bilateral and multila t-
eral donors must be improved, as both sides have 
stressed. Bilateral institutions find it difficult to 
make their positions heard. World Bank and IMF 
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are accused of poor information management and 
lack of collaboration with other development 
partners. 
2.2.2 Issues Regarding the Contents of 
PRSPs 
Insufficient Poverty Analysis 
Some countries have been able to draw on exist-
ing poverty reduction strategies and adjust them 
successfully to the comprehensive PRSP frame-
work. Some have taken advantage of prior poverty 
assessments that helped them to establish reliable 
data. Nevertheless, most countries lack ex ante 
poverty analysis, or their poverty data are not 
reliable or outdated. This lack of data has im-
pacted negatively the strategic foci and target 
setting of the papers and  reduced the ability to 
analyse trends. Also, poverty and social impact 
analysis of major policies and programmes has 
often not been undertaken as part of PRSPs. 
Lack of Priorities and Results Orientation 
In many cases, (I-)PRSPs have no clear priorities 
for policy measures or certain sectors, they rather 
look like "shopping lists,"9 All reports underline 
that an important problem is a lack of precision 
when it comes to the indicators and benchmarks 
needed to monitor progress in implementation. 
Strategies are often not focused on results, and 
they remain at a high level of abstraction. Even 
though it is encouraging that national interpreta-
tions of the Millennium Development Goals have 
often been used as a long-term vision, they are too 
highly aggregated. Some donors propose not only 
more precision but also more selectivity as re-
gards indicators and goals. 
More quality and less quantity of targets and indi-
cators would also lead to better costing of pro-
                                                 
9 IMF / World Bank (2002a): Synopsis 12: European Com-
mission. 
posed policies. There is a general tendency to 
focus on expenditure in public budgets such as 
basic social services, instead of generating reve-
nues in productive, employment-generating sec-
tors. This brings about a reliance on long-term 
donor-financed programmes, whereas necessary 
tax reforms are sometimes neglected. Donors 
stress the importance of realistic and precise 
budgetary planning, effective targeting of expen-
ditures towards poverty reduction, and efficient 
mobilisation of domestic resources to finance 
these expenditures in the long run. PRSP time-
planning should be adjusted to political and budg-
etary cycles. 
Furthermore, the growth scenarios on which pro-
gress in poverty reduction or revenue for public 
budgets are based often appear to be too optimis-
tic. Hence, envisaged goals become unrealistic. 
Instead of being a realistic and sustainable strat-
egy to reduce poverty, PRSPs run the risk of be-
coming an "all-embracing government planning 
exercise like in the 50s."10 
Cross-cutting Issues not Sufficiently Taken 
into Account 
In many cases, cross-cutting issues such as gen-
der, environmental sustainability, human rights or 
other aspects of governance are not sufficiently 
integrated into the PRSPs. Often, links between 
these issues and poverty reduction are neglected. 
Whenever gender aspects are mentioned, we find 
that strategies mostly go no further than just refer-
ring to classic sectors such as basic education and 
health. Although improving governance and re-
ducing corruption are often mentioned as impor-
tant objectives within PRSPs, most strategies fail 
to present a systematic analysis, intermediate in-
dicators, and measures to tackle these challenges. 
                                                 
10 IMF / World Bank (2002a): Synopsis 15: OECD. 
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Insufficient Harmonisation with other  
National Development Strategies 
Naturally, in many countries other national deve l-
opment plans already exist or are about to be 
drafted. However, in some countries little effort 
has been made to harmonise these different plan-
ning strategies. As a result, government policy is 
sometimes ineffective or even contradictory, es-
pecially if budgetary questions remain open. 
2.2.3 Issues Regarding the 
Implementation of PRSPs  
Institutionalisation of Participation 
Even in cases where participation has played an 
important role, continued stakeholder involvement 
during implementation is not guaranteed, because 
often the participatory process lacks institutions 
and regularity. Closely linked to the problem of 
institutionalisation is the challenge of effective 
decision-making involving many stakeholders. 
Cumbersome political processes and participation 
of powerful interest groups may lead to compro-
mises at the lowest common denominator. 
Weak Implementation Capacity  
Capacity problems in implementing, monitoring 
and evaluating PRSP are becoming an increas-
ingly important issue as many developing coun-
tries now enter the implementation phase. Espe-
cially capacities at sub-national levels are often 
overestimated by national governments and by 
donors. The comprehensive approach of PRSP 
calls for managerial skills to identify inter-sectoral 
links and decide on priorities that fit the local 
context, and this calls for participatory planning 
and implementation methods. These requirements 
often already turn out to be difficult to meet in the 
drafting process, and they may, in consequence, 
be too complex when it comes to implementing a 
PRSP. Participants at the Review Meeting put the 
main emphasis on the need to strengthen capaci-
ties with regard to budgetary management, pov-
erty tracking, impact analysis, and monitoring and 
evaluation. 
Donor Alignment and Collaboration 
Some developing countries have stressed that 
donor support should be aligned to each country's 
PRSP, if the goals set are to be achieved. Donor 
policies should be oriented more towards inte-
grated programs to increase their effectiveness. 
Improved co-operation among donors would re-
duce the administrative burden of recipient coun-
tries. As a result, donors would make gains in 
reducing their transaction costs. Many donors 
remain cautious about untied or non-earmarked 
programmatic lending due to weak and/or non-
transparent public expenditure systems within the 
recipient countries. But even without fund pooling 
or general budget support, there remains consider-
able scope for improving the coherence and effi-
ciency of donor support. 
2.3 Analytical Framework for the 
Vietnam Case Study  
The present study undertakes a comprehensive 
analysis of the Vietnamese PRSP. The lead ques-
tion of the study is:  
“Does the PRSP improve the prospects for pov-
erty reduction in Vietnam?” 
Thus, it is assumed that the preparation of the 
PRSP is not an end in itself or merely a fund-
raising instrument. To be worthwhile, the PRSP 
should provide a clear value added in terms of 
poverty alleviation in Vietnam. This value added 
is, however, not easy to measure. The implicit 
assumption here is that a well-conceived and  
– implemented PRSP will have a positive effect 
on poverty reduction.  
The analytical framework of the case study is 
based on the general concept of the PRSP, in par-
ticular on the seven PRSP principles (2.1), and the 
critical issues identified in the PRSP review (2.2). 
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Against this background, the study will address 
the following questions: 
– Has the drafting process been participatory, 
partnership -oriented, and country-driven? 
– Is the strategy comprehensive, based on a long 
term perspective, results-oriented and priori-
tised? 
It is argued that if the Vietnamese PRSP complies 
to these seven principles, it can be regarded as 
well-conceived. 
With regard to the prospects for its implementa-
tion the issues to be addressed are chosen from the 
list of critical implementation issues identified in 
the PRSP review (2.2.3): 
– Institutionalisation of participation at national 
and sub-national levels, 
– establishment of a comprehensive monitoring 
and evaluation system, and  
– co-operation and harmonisation of donor con-
tributions. 
Furthermore, some key areas of reform in the 
Vietnamese PRSP are taken as examples to assess 
the challenges for implementation. Reforms in 
these areas – the banking sector, state-owned en-
terprises, public expenditure management and 
public administration – have already been carried 
out prior to the PRSP and there is already some 
experience with regard to their implementation. 
Research Design 
Four main steps were undertaken to develop this 
report:  
– First, an in-depth analysis was conducted of 
primary and secondary sources related to 
Vietnam’s PRSP. Initial results were summed 
up in a preliminary report.  
– Second, a stakeholder analysis was under-
taken. Documents published during the pro- 
cess of drafting the PRSP helped to identify 
the main groups of stakeholders. These are 
persons and institutions involved in the draft-
ing process and stakeholders at the local level 
who will implement the PRSP on the ground. 
Interviews with stakeholders were conducted 
at the national level in Hanoi and at the local 
level in the provinces Son La (in the northern 
part of the country) and Ha Tinh (in the 
north-central region of Vietnam). The prov-
inces were selected by the Vietnamese part-
ner institution, the Central Institute for Eco-
nomic Management (CIEM). Using semi-
structured interviews, data were collected on 
stakeholders’ perception and judgement of 
the PRSP drafting process, its contents and 
potential bottlenecks for its implementation in 
Vietnam (see the interview guideline in An-
nex 3). 
– Third, national and foreign experts were in-
terviewed. Some of these were representa-
tives of the Vietnamese administration, scien-
tists, or donor representatives who have an 
overview over the entire CPRGS or specia l-
ised knowledge about certain sectors. The ex-
pert interviews were mainly conducted to 
support the content analysis and the assess-
ment of implementation problems at the na-
tional and local level.  
– Fourth, the research team collected informa-
tion by taking part in one of four workshops 
in which local stakeholders had the opportu-
nity to comment on the PRSP. It was organ-
ised in Quang Binh province (Central Viet-
nam). Information was gathered about per-
ceived implementation problems at the local 
level to complete findings concerning Vie t-
nam's PRSP process and its contents. 
These steps made it possible to use triangulation 
based on different sources and means of informa-
tion collection. 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy in Vietnam  11 
3 Poverty Situation in Vietnam11 
Poverty in Vietnam declined from over 70 % in 
the mid 1980s to 37 % in 1998, but major chal-
lenges for poverty reduction remain. The main 
cause for this outstanding record of poverty reduc-
tion has been economic growth, enabled by the 
ongoing Vietnamese policy of renovation (doi 
moi) since the late 1980s. This policy, aiming to 
create an open market economy in Vietnam led to 
impressive growth rates of 7.5 % annually in the 
last decade.  
But poverty reduction gains are unevenly distrib-
uted among groups and regions. Poverty in Vie t-
nam remains widespread, especially in rural areas. 
With an annual per capita income of US$ 400 , 
Vietnam is still a poor country, far behind other 
countries in the dynamic East Asian Region. 
To secure poverty reduction in the future, a huge 
number of jobs will have to be created, the private 
sector has to become more competitive interna-
tionally, and anti-poverty programs have to be 
focused more on disadvantaged groups and re-
gions. 
                                                 
11 The poverty analysis is mainly based on the Vietnam 
Living Standard Surveys (VLSSs) of 1992/1993 and 
1997/1998 and four Participatory Poverty Assessments 
(PPAs). The VLSSs are nationally representative sample 
surveys and were carried out by the General Statistics Of-
fice (GSO). Some 4,800 households were included in the 
first VLSS and about 6,000 households were covered in 
the most recent survey. The location for the four PPAs 
were chosen to represent the diversity of geographic, 
physical, and social circumstances which poor house-
holds face. They were conducted in the Provinces of Lao 
Cai, Ha Tinh, Tra Vinh, and in Ho Chi Minh City. 
 This chapter is mainly based on the three following do-
cuments that refer to the findings of the VLSSs and the 
PPAs: National Centre for Social Sciences and Humani-
ties / UNDP (2001); PWG (1999); PTF (2001d). 
3.1 Reform Process and Poverty 
Reduction in the 1990s 
The “doi moi” Reform Process  
Before the fundamental renovation programme 
(“doi moi”) was launched, Vietnam was a country 
with a low level of development, heavily damaged 
by the war. Both its economy and its society were 
dominated by agriculture. The socialist principles 
of central planning and collective ownership gui-
ded the state's development policies. Despite its 
low level of economic development, Vietnam has 
made good achievements in social areas like edu-
cation and health. 
In the early 1980s, weaknesses in the central 
planning model began to become obvious. Eco-
nomic growth stagnated, inflation rose rapidly, 
and chronic shortages in basic consumer goods 
occurred. People had very limited opportunities to 
choose employment and to earn decent incomes. 
The collectivisation in agriculture which had be-
gun in the 1950s in the North and the late 1970s in 
the South led to a sharp decline in agricultural 
production. 
In response to these economic and social prob-
lems, the government introduced some market-
oriented reforms, mostly at the micro-level. The 
most important measures gave enterprises and 
farmers the autonomy to buy and sell through free 
market transactions. But the microeconomic re-
forms turned out to be insuffic ient. Although the 
economy started to grow again, high inflation 
persisted, and people’s living standards remained 
very low. In the mid-1980s, over 70 % of the po-
pulation were considered poor as measured by the 
international poverty line.12 The failure of the 
reforms proved that successful macroeconomic 
reforms were impossible unless the central plan-
ning model itself was transformed. 
The Sixth Party Congress held in December 1986 
officially endorsed the programme of renovation 
(doi moi). This programme is a comprehensive 
                                                 
12 See the definitions of poverty lines in Box 1, p. 16. 
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reform agenda that aims at transforming the cen-
tral planning system into a market economy with a 
socialist orientation (“leading role of the state”). It 
further envisages integrating Vietnam’s economy 
regionally and globally. Implementation of the 
reforms started out in 1987 and were accelerated 
in 1989. 
Agricultural Sector Reform 
The agricultural sector reform is especially impor-
tant for broad poverty reduction and for the Vie t-
namese economy as a whole. 75 % of all Viet-
namese and 90 % of the poor live in rural areas, 
and the share of agriculture in GDP was 24 % in 
2000. Two main developments can be distin-
guished. First, agricultural sector reform increased 
agricultural productivity, and second, it diversi-
fied production. The reform improved the in-
comes and the living standards of rural house-
holds dramatically. 
As early as 1981, de-collectivisation policies be-
gan with the adoption of the product contracting 
system that gave farmers more autonomy in pro-
ducing and selling their products. Together with 
Decree 10, which defined farm households as 
autonomous economic units, and other reform 
measures such as price liberalisation and unifica-
tion of the multiple exchange rate in 1989, 
framework conditions were set to dissolve collec-
tives. Land (land use rights) was distributed 
among farming households.  
The Land Law of 1993 gave land users the right to 
transfer, exchange, lease, inherit and mortgage 
their land use rights. The strengthening of prop-
erty rights to land gave farmers the opportunity to 
use and manage their land in a self-responsible 
way. Hence, reforms increased productivity and 
diversified agricultural production.  
The output of rice, which accounted for 45 % of 
all agricultural revenues and provided two-thirds 
of the country’s food supply in 1998, has more 
than doubled over the last 15 years. Vietnam has 
developed from a food importer to the second 
largest rice exporter in the world.  
The decollectivisation policies encouraged farm-
ers to work more efficiently and increase yields. 
But compared to countries which use more capi-
tal-intensive methods, Vietnam still has scope for 
further increasing paddy yields. At present, 29 % 
of annual crop land is not irrigated, and only 
three-quarters of paddy land is planted with high-
yielding varieties. 
According to the VLSS, average rice revenues 
increased by more than 20 % between 1993 and 
1998. In the same period, rice prices have in-
creased due to increased international prices and 
the unification of the exchange rate. Therefore, it 
is the rice price that accounted for the majority of 
the increase in rice revenues, though increased 
yields per hectare as well as an expansion of the 
cultivated area were also important factors here.  
Increased revenues are not limited to rice produc-
tion and have affected the overall agricultural 
sector. Between 1993 and 1998, agricultural in-
comes grew by 61 % on average, and agricultural 
GDP grew between 4 % and 5 % annually during 
the last decade. These annual agricultural growth 
rates are among the highest in the world and are 
equal to those for China and higher than those for 
Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines 
during similar periods of rapid growth and deve l-
opment.  
One important reason for these impressive growth 
rates is the transformation of Vietnam’s agricul-
ture from rice mono-cropping into diversified 
agricultural production during the 1990s. Starting 
from a low share of agricultural production in 
1993, revenues from perennial crops (coffee, tea, 
rubber, among others) and fruit trees more than 
doubled by 1998. Livestock (especially pigs, poul-
try) and aquaculture, particularly in coastal areas, 
now account for over 30 % of all agricultural 
revenues.  
In addition, diversification of off-farm activities 
also played an important role. From 1993 to 1998, 
incomes from non-farm activities grew by 30.5 % 
and are now the second main income source in 
rural Vietnam. The Participatory Poverty Assess-
ments have shown that agricultural diversification 
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is among the most important factors for increasing 
rural living standards.  
The increase in agricultural output also reduced 
hunger substantially. Prior to doi moi, Vietnam 
had to import food, despite the fact that it was an 
economy based on agriculture. On average, Vie t-
nam imported one million tons of rice annually. 
Since the implementation of doi moi reforms, food 
production has grown at a rate 2.5 to 3 times that 
of the population rate, which raised the average 
annual food production per capita from 281 kg to 
400 kg in 1997. Even in years of natural disasters 
like in 1999, food security was largely main-
tained. 
Taken together, the agricultural reforms have led 
to agricultural diversification and augmentation of 
agricultural incomes that played a critical role in 
reducing poverty in the 1990s. 
Agriculture remains the largest sector in terms of 
employment; but the share of agriculture in output 
and employment is declining. It is industry and 
services that are expected to be the main source of 
growth and employment in the future. Between 
1993 and 1998, the structure of the economy was 
already changing. The share of agriculture in GDP 
fell by over 6 percentage points to about a quarter 
of GDP, while the share of industry expanded 
from 27 % to 33 %. Compared to the average 
annual growth rate of 8.4 % between 1993 and 
1998, the industrial sector expanded most rapidly, 
at 13.0 % annually. 
Private Sector Development 
Macroeconomic reforms started in 1989 and eli-
minated production and consumption subsidies. A 
price reform abolished controlled prices for most 
goods and services. The budget was no longer 
financed by credits, and interest rates on loans to 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were raised above 
the level of inflation. 
In addition, reforms of the financial sector eased 
collateral requirements and gave more autonomy 
to commercial banks. The reforms improved ac-
cess to formal credits for the rural population as 
well as for enterprises. More than half of all far-
mer households now have access to credit. 
A fundamental policy shift regarding state -owned 
enterprises began to take shape at the end of the 
1980s. Direct fiscal subsidies for SOEs were eli-
minated, and loans to SOEs were controlled more 
carefully. Furthermore, market pricing was intro-
duced for inputs and outputs of SOEs. The re-
forms were successful inasmuch as profitability 
and performance have improved. The number of 
SOEs reporting losses has decreased. About 500 
smaller SOEs have been “equitised,” i.e. their 
shares have been distributed among employees, 
the state, and external investors.  
But adjustments have had high social costs. About 
800,000 employees – one third of the state-
enterprise labour force – left the sector between 
1988 and 1992, the period that experienced most 
lay-offs, and the number of firms declined from 
12,000 to 7,000.  
Overall, the importance of SOEs for Vietnam’s 
economy is still high, especially in capital-
intensive sectors. The state sector, including gov-
ernment administration, accounts for around 40 % 
of GDP. SOEs absorb half of all credits, while 
their contribution to employment is small: they 
account for only 9 % of total employment.  
On the other hand, doi moi has made it possible to 
create new jobs, nearly all in the private sector, 
during the last 10 years. These new jobs have 
compensated for the lay-offs in the state sector. 
Between 1993 and 1998, overall employment 
grew by about 1.8 % annually. The engine of em-
ployment growth has been the service sector. Al-
though the output of the service sector grew only 
at 8.3 % annually between 1992 and 1998, com-
pared to industrial GDP growth of 13 %, the ser-
vice sector accounts for 43 % of all wage jobs and 
was the fastest-growing creator of jobs between 
1993-1998. Annual employment growth rates 
were 6 % in the service sector, compared to 4 % 
in the industrial sector and only 0.4 % in agricul-
ture. 
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The new Enterprise Law that came into effect in 
January 2000 significantly lowered the costs and 
efforts involved in registering a private enterprise 
by simplifying and removing licensing require-
ments. On average, 1,200 new small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) have registered each month 
since then, considerably more than beforehand. 
70 % of these new registrations are start-ups and 
are adding to domestic investment. 
The private sector, including private agricultural 
activities, now accounts for more than 90 % of all 
employment in Vietnam. Private firms have more 
incentives to invest in labour-intensive activities 
than SOEs and foreign investors, given the en-
dowment of productive factors in Vietnam. The 
labour-intensive growth generated by the private 
sector will be crucial to creating new jobs in the 
future. 
Another reason why the government has promoted 
the private sector and launched market-oriented 
reforms since the 1990s is the envisaged integra-
tion into the international economy, i.e. increas-
ing international trade and attracting foreign in-
vestments. The trade regime has opened up gradu-
ally. Private enterprises were allowed to engage in 
foreign trade, first by obtaining a license, and 
since 1998 without any restrictions. Export taxes 
were reduced on many products and export quotas 
were removed. On the import side, quantitative 
restrictions were removed on seven commodity 
groups and the maximum tariff was reduced to 
50 % (with some exceptions). But import restric-
tions remain high in areas dominated by state-
owned enterprises. Vie tnam is now a member of 
both ASEAN and AFTA, has signed a Bilateral 
Trade Agreement with the USA, and envisages 
joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 
the near future. 
This process of liberalisation and opening up has 
increased the participation of private firms in for-
eign trade and attracted foreign investment. The  
 
domestic private sector’s share in the value of 
non-oil exports rose from 12 % in 1997 to 22 % in 
2000, and the value of imports increased from 4 % 
to 16 %. Exports rose at 20 % annually, and for-
eign direct investments accounted for up to 30 % 
of gross investments in Vietnam in the mid-1990s. 
Taken together, the doi moi policies initiated in 
the late 1980s have led to rapid economic growth 
and a structural shift towards the private sector 
and export-oriented production. With a delay of 
two decades, Vietnam is now seeking to catch up 
with the group of high-growth Asian countries 
that also have recorded impressive gains in pov-
erty reduction in the past (see Table 1). 
Effects of doi moi on Poverty Reduction 
Poverty has decreased substantially in Vietnam dur-
ing the doi moi reforms due to impressive output 
figures and income growth. In the mid-1980s, aver-
age per capita income was around US$ 170. Over 
70 % of the population were considered poor as 
measured by the international poverty line (see 
Box 1). During doi moi, poverty fell to 37 % in 1998 
and GDP per capita increased to US$ 400. The 
Table 1: Annual Growth Rates in Selected Asian Countries 
 Vietnam Republic of Korea China Thailand 
Period 1991-1997 1970-1992 1970-1992 1970-1992 
GDP Total (%) 9.0 9.5 9.1 7.7 
– Agriculture 5.0 3.1 5.4 4.2 
– Industry  13.0 13.2 11.2 7.7 
– Services 10.0 9.4 11.0 7.5 
Source: World Bank et. al. (1998), p.7 
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number of people below a “food poverty line” which 
is lower, also declined from 25 % to 15 %, indicat-
ing that even the very poorest segments of the popu-
lation experienced improvements in their living 
standards between 1993-1998. While poverty inci-
dence is still high in Vietnam, almost no other coun-
try has recorded such a sharp decline in poverty in 
such a short period of time.  
The diversified economic structure as well as in-
creased competition between the SOE sector, the 
private sector and the FDI sector in attracting skilled 
workers have increased income levels substantially. 
Income has more than doubled over the last 15 years 
and average monthly per capita income grew by 
75 % between 1994 and 1999.  
The outcomes of doi moi in terms of reduced income 
poverty and improved food security have paved the 
way for progress in various aspects of well-being: 
– Ownership of consumer durables – such as 
radios, television, and bicycles – have gone 
up. In 1998, 47 % of households owned a ra-
dio, 58 % a television, and 76 % a bicycle. 
– Malnutrition has declined from about half the 
population to a third, but it remains high among 
girls and boys below the age of 5 years. 
– Research suggests that there have been addi-
tional benefits. Households report a greater 
sense of control over their livelihoods, reduced 
stress, fewer domestic and community disputes. 
They express optimism that life will continue to 
get easier in the future. 
These improvements in material and non-material 
aspects have been widespread. All regions and all 
groups have benefited, though at different rates. 
Both the incidence and the depth of poverty have 
declined in rural and urban areas as well as in all 
seven geographic regions of Vietnam. 
But the gains in poverty reduction remain fragile. 
Because many individuals were positioned close to 
the poverty line in 1993, modest improvements have 
been sufficient to pull them over the poverty line. A 
relatively small deterioration in living standards 
would be sufficient to push them back below the 
poverty line. 
Apart from reducing material poverty, Vietnam 
has made impressive gains regarding the social 
dimension of poverty in recent years. According 
to the commonly used social indicators, Vietnam 
has a better performance than countries with simi-
lar income levels. Two reasons typical for socia l-
ist countries can explain this phenomenon. First, 
income inequality, at least up until recent years, 
was less signif icant than in other poor countries. 
Second, the government places high priority on 
social sectors. Public expenditures on social ser-
vices, including health and education, rose to over 
6 % of GDP in 2000, which is more than a third of 
all public spending. Efforts to improve broad edu-
cation were reinforced during doi moi. Even in the 
early 1990s, when overall public expenditures 
were reduced, expenditures for education re-
mained stable. 
As a consequence, many education indicators have 
improved. School enrolment rates have improved for 
both girls and boys. Primary school enrolment rates 
were already high and have increased further to 
around 90 %. Lower secondary rates have doubled 
and are now around 60 %. Upper secondary enrol-
ment has increased dramatically, from 6 % to 27 % 
for girls and from 8 % to 30 % for boys, reversing 
the downturn in upper secondary enrolment seen in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
But some challenges in education persist. In spite 
of the recent improvements, the gender gap is still 
significant at higher levels of education and is 
wider among the poor and in rural areas. The na-
tional completion rate is less than 70 %, with sig-
nificant regional variations. The drop-out rate for 
children belonging to poorer households is 40 %. 
This can be explained by increased private school 
fees and other related costs, which are too high for 
the poor. 
Like the education sector, the health sector has 
always been a high priority for the government. 
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Therefore, Vietnam’s performance in terms of 
health is better than that of countries with similar 
income levels. The health system has been further 
expanded and improved during doi moi, and has 
also been partially liberalised. The number of 
private pharmacies has grown rapidly, and to-
gether with the introduction of user fees, liberali-
sation has resulted in high private spending on 
health. Inequality in access to health services and 
in health outcomes are widening. The dominant 
use of public hospitals by rich segments of the 
population and the greater representation of the 
top quintile among health insurance members are 
examples of uneven opportunities in the health 
sector. Therefore, one of the key challenges for 
public health is to improve accessibility to health 
services, particularly for the poor and for people 
living in remote areas. 
3.2 Characteristics of Poverty 
Most recent information on poverty is based on 
four participatory poverty assessments which 
formulated by the World Bank and DFID in part-
nership with Action Aid Vietnam, Oxfam, and  
 
Vietnam-Sweden Mountain Rural Development 
Programme.13 
Poverty remains largely a rural phenomenon, but 
the vast majority of poor households report that 
living conditions have improved in recent years. 
90 % of the poor live in rural areas, and 80 % of 
the poor work in agriculture. An important cause 
for the reduction in poverty  appears to be the 
ability of poor people to diversify their incomes 
and become less vulnerable to shocks and crises. 
Only few households report deterioration in their 
livelihoods. However, in the remote highland 
areas improvements appear to be taking place 
more slowly. The three poorest regions are the 
Northern Uplands, the Central Highlands, and the 
North Central Coast.14 
The poor are predominantly farmers with low 
levels of education and limited access to informa-
tion and functional skills. The highest incidence of 
poverty (57 %) is among those who have not even 
completed primary education. Poor households 
have small landholdings and landlessness is be-
                                                 
13 See World Bank, et. al. (1999). 
14 See Annex 7. 
Box 1: Poverty Lines Used in Vietnam 
Two poverty lines are used in Vietnam; each for a different purpose: 
1. The international poverty line is based on the Vietnam Living Standard Survey (VLSS) that was conducted in 1992/1993 
and 1997/1998 by the General Statistical Office (GSO). This poverty line is based on the minimum consumption level of both 
food (70 %) and non-food items (30 %). Taken together, the general poverty line amounts to VND 1,789,871 (US$ 128, 
using nominal exchange rates) in 1998. This poverty line is not directly comparable to the more common poverty line of 
US$ 1 per person per day (Purchasing Power Parity). Also defined by the GSO, the food poverty line is lower than the inter-
national poverty line because it is oriented to the minimum expenditure required to satisfy a minimum nutritional need of 
2,100 calories per person per day. 1997/98 it was fixed at VND 1,286,833 per person per year. 
2. The national poverty line is determined by the Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA), and is differen-
tiated per region. For the period 1996 - 2000 it was set at the income equivalent of buying 15 kg of rice per month in moun-
tainous and remote areas, 20 kg in rural and 25 kg in urban areas. MOLISA recently decided to increase the poverty line to 
allow more people to benefit from anti-poverty programmes and to broaden the definition of poverty beyond the focus on 
food supply. The new line is based on per capita income of VND 80,000 (US$ 5.50) per month for island and rural remote 
areas, VND 100,000 (US$ 6.90) for plains rural areas, and VND 150,000 (US$ 10.30) in urban areas. Poor communes are 
defined as those having an incidence of poverty exceeding 40% and lacking basic infrastructure. 
Source: United Nations Country Team (2001), p. 8 
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coming more widespread. These households are 
vulnerable to seasonal, household-specific, and 
community-wide shocks. Households that are 
unable to make a living from the land find few 
opportunities for stable income generation off the 
farm. 
The rural-urban income poverty gap is widening 
as a consequence of the uneven growth in differ-
ent sectors. Between 1993 and 1998, incomes 
increased by 130 % in urban and 60 % in rural 
areas. In the same period, rural income poverty 
decreased from 66 % to 45 %, while poverty in 
urban areas decreased from 25 % to 9 %. Even in 
rural areas poverty is decreasing; but as a conse-
quence of lower agricultural growth rates, rural 
income poverty is declining at a slower pace. 
Migration to urban areas, mainly to Ho Chi Minh 
City and Hanoi, is therefore on the increase. Be-
tween 1989 and 1999, the share of the population 
living in urban areas rose from 19.4 % to 23.5 %. 
Although the incidence of poverty in urban areas 
is less than 10 %, deep poverty persists in urban 
areas. Especially migrants to urban areas who 
have not secured permanent registration face dif-
ficulties in accessing public services and may also 
be socially marginalized. 
Poverty among ethnic groups has declined, but not 
as rapidly as for the majority of the population. In 
1998, poverty among the ethnic Vietnamese, the 
Kinh, decreased to 31 %, while 75 % of all mem-
bers of ethnic minorities are still income-poor. 
Ethnic minorities face many specific disadvan-
tages. These can be summarised as difficulties 
related to remoteness, inadequate infrastructure 
and physical and social isolation. Ethnic minor i-
ties also participate less in public decision-
making, since they are underrepresented in local 
administrations.  
One underlying cause of these disadvantages is 
the alienating effect of being unable to speak the 
national language fluently. In addition, one group 
in the PPAs raised the problem of negative ethnic 
stereotypes held by ethnic Vietnamese. By con-
trast, offic ial policy emphasises the need to re-
spect cultural differences. 
Households with many children or few labourers 
are disproportionately poor and particularly vul-
nerable to high and variable health and education 
costs. The poor tend to have disproportionately 
many children. Poor children are less able to at-
tend school and are trapped in a cycle of inherited 
poverty. 
3.3 Challenges for Further Poverty 
Reduction 
Future poverty reduction efforts will have to cope 
with new challenges. Compared to the 1990s, the 
situation has changed: there are severe limits to 
further increase in agricultural employment, inter-
national competition for Vietnamese enterprises is 
rising, and social and regional disparities are more 
difficult to tackle. 
Limits to Agricultural Employment 
During 1993-1998, agricultural diversification 
was one of the main sources of poverty reduction. 
Even though the agricultural sector continues to 
grow (4.0 % estimated for 2000) 15, it may not be 
able to grow as fast in the future, because the a-
vailability of arable land is limited. Landlessness 
has already become a problem in certain regions. 
Therefore, increased yields, more diversified agr i-
cultural production, and off-farm employment in 
rural areas will need to play a more important role 
in rural poverty reduction. 
To increase yields , more capital and more tech-
nology are needed. Rural finance therefore needs 
to be overhauled as a key part of overall banking 
reform. The PPAs show that most rural house-
holds still rely on informal credit sources. To im-
prove technology, scientific advances in the rural 
sector are needed. In consequence, spending on 
agricultural research and extension services will 
have to be increased. Vietnam only spends 1.7 % 
of its agriculture budget on research and extension 
                                                 
15 See CIEM (2001), p. 110. 
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compared to 6 % in China and around 10 % in 
Thailand and Malaysia. 
A more diversified crop mix  is also crucial for 
rural income and output growth. While, in princ i-
ple, farmers are nowadays free to produce crops 
of their choice, they face restrictions from local 
officials if they try to switch from paddy cultiva-
tion to other crops, because a there continues to be 
a strong political will that Vietnam must be self-
sufficient in food production. These restrictions 
prevent farmers from choosing crops with higher 
returns and from spreading their risk across a 
number of income sources. 
Table 2: Social and Economic Indicators of Vietnam 
Social Indicators Value Year 
Population size 77.7 m 2000 
Population growth rate 1.42 % 2000 
Life expectancy at birth 68.3 years 1999 
Real GDP per capita US$ 400 2000 
Poverty headcount ratio 
(percentage of population below international poverty line) 
37 % 1998 
Poverty headcount ratio 
(percentage of population below national poverty line) 
17 % 2001 
Human Development Index (out of 174) 108 2000 
Estimated HIV prevalence rate among adults 15-49 years 0.22 % 2000 
Population with access to safe water supplies 51.8 % 2000 
Ratio of social service to public expenditures 34 % 1999 
Proportion of underweight children (under 5 years) 33.8 % 2000 
Illiteracy rate among adults 7 % 1998 
Illiteracy rate among women 9 % 1998 
Net primary enrolment rate 94.8 % 1999 
Ratio of girls to boys in primary education 98.1 % 1998 
Ratio of education expenditures to GDP 2.0 % 1999 
Under-five mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 42 2000 
Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births) 100 1999 
Economic Indicators Value Year 
Ratio of Budget Deficit to GDP -1,8 % 2000 
Inflation rate (consumer Prices) -1,8 % 2000 
Export growth 25.2 % 2000 
Ratio of debt service to export revenues 7.1 % 2000 
Foreign debt (US$) 12.8 billion 2000 
Foreign currency reserves in monthly imports 2.3 2000 
Sources: BMZ (2001c); United Nations Country Team (2001), p. 6; World Bank (2001c) 
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Increased off-farm employment will have to 
absorb surplus labour if labour productivity in 
agriculture is to be increased. However, adminis-
trative constraints and shortage of capital are im-
peding the development of the rural non-farm 
sector. First, the influence of agricultural SOEs on 
input, output, and export marketing is still high. 
Second, the land law has not been implemented 
fully. The mechanisms for administering land 
transactions at the provincial level are still not in 
place. Third, improved access to loans is particu-
larly important for increasing yields, but also for 
the development of the rural off-farm sector. 
Without the development of rural off-farm em-
ployment, high rural underemployment, migration 
to the cities and urban poverty are bound to in-
crease.  
The Private Sector Faces Increased Inter-
national Competition 
Even if rural development continues successfully, 
migration to urban areas can be anticipated. 
Therefore, the private sector, both in rural and in 
urban areas, has to be the main source of em-
ployment generation in future. Employment 
growth in the state sector is limited due to the 
ongoing reforms mentioned above. Even if state 
enterprises were to grow, they are unlikely to be a 
great source of employment because they focus on 
capital-intensive activities. 
But private sector development faces new chal-
lenges due to increased international competition 
for enterprises. As mentioned above, Vietnam is 
already a member of regional trade agreements 
and is aiming at further integration into interna-
tional trade regimes. 
The World Bank estimates that recently adopted 
trade reforms will increase employment, incomes 
and consumption of all income groups over the 
medium term, even though some households will 
suffer from short-term unemployment when la-
bour is reallocated across sub-sectors. On average, 
the increases in labour for expanding sectors 
would compensate for contractions in highly pro-
tected, import-competing sectors. However, this 
optimistic scenario will only materialise if further 
market-oriented reforms are implemented that 
enhance the domestic and international competi-
tiveness of Vietnamese products.  
The necessary reforms include: improving private 
sector access to land and credit, simplifying mar-
ket entry for new enterprises by reforming bus i-
ness licensing practices, facilitating the formation 
of business associations for private sector enter-
prises, and fully lifting limits on the use of agri-
cultural land for industrial purposes. All this re-
quires a more complex policy mix than the lais-
sez-faire approach of the 90s, which unlocked 
private initiative but did not lead to the formation 
of many internationally competitive enterprises. 
Targeting Disadvantaged Groups and Re-
gions 
Even with high growth, there will be some groups 
of the poor that will not benefit as much as others. 
In the past, the achievements of poverty reduction 
due to high growth rates were unevenly distrib-
uted among groups and regions. As a result, the 
social gap is widening. Given that resources for 
social transfers are limited, improved targeting of 
scarce resources for poverty alleviation is crucial. 
The PPAs and the VLSS 1998 indicate that gov-
ernment programmes are not necessarily reaching 
the poor and have weak coverage, because Vie t-
nam’s social welfare system is dominated by so-
cial insurance payments to public employees. The 
poorest quintile of the Vietnamese population has 
the lowest ratio of social welfare income to 
household income. In addition, fewer than 7 % of 
the poorest quintile receive transfers from public 
poverty programs. Thus, to improve targeting and 
better reach the poor, it is essential to revise the 
institutional structures and processes for transfer 
and safety net provision. Furthermore, programme 
co-ordination can be improved by institutionalis-
ing universal rules for the implementation of ex-
isting programmes at the local level. 
In addition, the safety-net function of social wel-
fare spending must be strengthened. The trans-
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formation of Vietnam’s economy towards a mar-
ket economy is increasing self-responsibility re-
garding economic and natural risks. There is the-
refore a need for a safety net system that serves as 
insurance in cases of household-level and com-
munity-level shocks. Especially for the latter case, 
risk pooling at the national level is needed. 
In sum, the new challenges of high non-
agricultural employment growth, increasing inter-
national competition and widening social and 
regional gaps require an approach to poverty re-
duction which differs from the successful strategy 
of the 1990s. It was appropriate, therefore, that 
Vietnam and the donor community embarked on a 
dialogue on poverty reduction even prior to the 
PRSP. The following chapter outlines how this 
dialogue eventually led to the CPRGS of May 
2002. 
4 The PRSP Drafting Process in Vietnam  
This chapter is divided into three parts: First, stra-
tegic approaches to reduce poverty prior to the 
PRSP process are described. Second, an overview 
of the drafting process and content of the Interim 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) is 
given. Third, the drafting process of the Compre-
hensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy 
(CPRGS) is assessed according to the three proc-
ess principles. 
4.1 Strategic Approaches to Reducing 
Poverty Prior to the PRSP Process 
4.1.1 Participatory Poverty Assessments 
and the Poverty Working Group 
During the 1990s, international development pa-
radigms converged on poverty reduction as the 
predominant goal. This convergence gave rise to a 
stronger need for sufficient poverty analysis. 
In early 1998, a new Poverty Assessment (PA) for 
Vietnam was launched by the World Bank. The 
first PA for Vietnam had been carried out on the 
basis of the 1992/1993 Vietnam Living Standard 
Survey (VLSS). Data for the second VLSS were 
collected during 1997 and 1998, and the survey 
results were available in early 1999. The new PA 
was to be carried out in partnership with central 
and local governments as well as with donors and 
NGOs. The aim was to have a joint PA which 
could serve all these groups. According to stan-
dard practices, the PA was to based on both quan-
titative (VLSS) and qualitative information (Par-
ticipatory Poverty Assessments). 
The two VLSS were carried out with financial 
support from UNDP and SIDA. The World Bank 
and DFID provided technical support for the joint-
ly produced PA. Four international NGOs which 
were already involved in certain PPA-related ac-
tivities in Vietnam were identified as PPA part-
ners. In February 1999, the World Bank proposed 
to the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) 
the establishment of a joint government-donor-
NGO Poverty Working Group (PWG).16 It was to 
be a platform for the joint dialogue on poverty 
issues (see Table 3). 
In early 1999, the planning stage of the PA was 
complete: one year after the initial discussion 
concerning the need for a new PA, all key players 
at the national level had been engaged. The re-
quired resources were available and a mechanism 
for collaboration was in place. The PA was sup-
posed to be a report of the PWG (not only of the 
World Bank), to be presented and debated at the 
December 1999 Consultative Group (CG) Meet-
ing in Hanoi. 
                                                 
16 The PWG was one of over 20 government-donor-NGO 
groups that have been founded in Vietnam since 1998. 
Partly, they are a result of Vietnam being a pilot country 
for the World Bank’s Comprehensive Development Fra-
mework (CDF). The aim of the partnership groups is to 
enhance co-ordination between the different stakeholders 
and thus to achieve a more efficient allocation of internal 
and donor funds. For further information on the partner-
ship groups see Chapter 6.4. 
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The four PPAs were carried out in different prov-
inces (Lao Cai, Ha Tinh, Tra Vinh, Ho Chi Minh 
City) and were supported by the four PPA partner 
agencies. The Voices of the Poor report is a syn-
thesis of the four PPAs.17 The subsequent report 
Attacking Poverty 18 goes one step further, estab-
lishing a framework for poverty reduction on the 
basis of the four PPAs. This framework corre-
sponds to the three main dimensions of poverty 
reduction of the World Bank’s World Develop-
ment Report 2000/200119. According to the report, 
opportunities must be created, equity ensured and 
vulnerability reduced to achieve sustainable pov-
erty reduction. Finally, the third part of Attacking 
Poverty sets out the main challenges on the way 
towards a Comprehensive Poverty Reduction 
Strategy. The intention of the report was to pre-
sent the critical issues involved in attacking pov-
erty and to generate a policy debate. It did not 
conclude with policy prescriptions but raised 
questions to be discussed between all of the par-
                                                 
17 See World Bank, et. al. (1999). 
18 See PWG (1999). 
19 See World Bank (2000). 
ties involved in the economic and social develop-
ment process in Vietnam. 
In December 1999 Attacking Poverty  was pre-
sented at the Consultative Group (CG) meeting in 
Hanoi. 20 local NGOs were invited to participate 
in the opening session and to contribute to the 
discussion of the report. The CG meeting en-
dorsed the PA.  
4.1.2 The Development of the Poverty 
Alleviation Strategy 
Even prior to the PRSP process, Vietnam already 
had a targeted poverty reduction strategy, the 
Hunger Eradication and Poverty Reduction Strat-
egy (HEPR), administered by the Ministry of La-
bour, Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA) since 
the mid-1990s. 
After the December 1999 CG meeting, the Prime 
Minister asked MOLISA and the PWG to jointly 
develop a new poverty reduction strategy for 
Vietnam. This strategy was meant to support 
Vietnam’s Five Year Plan and the Ten-year So- 
 
 
Table 3: Members of the PWG in February 1999 
Government and Mass Organisations PPA Partner Agencies Donors 
– Ministry of Planning and Investment 
(MPI) 
– Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
– State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) 
– Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Devel-
opment (MARD) 
– Ministry of Labour, Invalids and  
Social Affairs (MOLISA) 
– General Statistics Office (GSO) 
– Committee on Ethnic Minorities and 
Mountainous Areas (CEMMA) 
– Women’s Union 
– Oxfam Great Britain (OGB) 
– Action Aid Vietnam (AAV) 
– Save the Children United 
Kingdom (SC UK) 
– Vietnam-Sweden Mountain 
Rural Development Pro-
gramme (MRDP) 
– United Kingdom  
Department for  
International Development 
(DFID) 
– Swedish International Devel-
opment Agency  
(SIDA) 
– United Nations  
Development Programme 
(UNDP) 
– World Bank 
Source: World Bank (2001d) 
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cio-Economic Development Strategy 2001-2010, 
which were prepared in parallel in the course of 
the year 2000. 
For the development of the Poverty Alleviation 
Strategy, the PWG was expanded to form an in-
formation-sharing group including more donors 
and NGOs. The Poverty Task Force (PTF) was 
established as a smaller working group. The com-
position of the PTF is altered from time to time to 
reflect changes in its function. The PTF meetings  
are co-chaired by Government and a representa-
tive of the donor community. 
Together with the new Ten-year Socio-Economic 
Development Strategy 2001-2010, the Poverty 
Alleviation Strategy 2001-2010 was discussed and 
adopted at the ninth Party congress in April 2001. 
This strategy was, like its predecessor, the HEPR, 
a targeted strategy focusing on specific programs 
for poor and vulnerable groups. As one of the 
sector strategies under the Ten-year development 
Strategy, it did not have the broad policy coverage 
proposed in the Attacking Poverty report. 
4.2 The Interim Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) 
4.2.1 The Drafting Process of the I-PRSP 
Due to the new requirements for concessional 
lending by the World Bank and the IMF, the Gov-
ernment of Vietnam had to draft an I-PRSP in 
parallel to the development of the Poverty Alle-
viation Strategy. The I-PRSP relied on the same 
analytical base,  but it was broader in scope since 
it had to contain a macroeconomic framework as 
well as a programme for the major structural poli-
cies to be carried out by Vietnam as the basis for 
the PRSP/PRGF loans. 
In May 2000, the World Bank and the IMF in-
formed Vietnam’s authorities about the I-PRSP 
requirements. Thereupon, the government ap-
pointed the MPI, and not MOLISA, to be the lead 
agency for drafting the I-PRSP. In September and 
October 2000, consultations on the I-PRSP took 
place and a draft was distributed to the donor 
community. In March 2001, the I-PRSP was pre-
sented to the boards of the World Bank and the 
IMF. This cleared the way for the first PRSC 
(US$ 250 million) and PRGF (US$ 368 million) 
credits for Vietnam to be signed. 
4.2.2 The Contents of the I-PRSP 
The I-PRSP20 focuses on sustainable economic 
growth as the key to poverty reduction. It states: 
“The Government of Vietnam […] believes that a 
strategy to achieve high and sustainable growth 
will narrow the economic development gap be-
tween Vietnam and other countries in the region 
and the world, generate resources to raise the 
welfare and living standards of the people, and 
reduce poverty.”  
The growth and poverty reduction objectives are 
the following: 
– Doubling the country’s GDP between 2000-
2010 (average GDP growth of 7 %). 
– Maintaining macroeconomic stability; creat-
ing a sound international balance of payments 
position; increasing the export growth rate to 
over twice the GDP growth rate; augmenting 
foreign exchange reserves; controlling the 
budget deficit, inflation and foreign debt; 
raising domestic savings. 
– Modernising the country’s economic struc-
ture; promoting balanced growth between the 
country's regions; continuing to increase food 
production; contributing to socio-economic 
stabilisation; improving rural people’s living 
standard; eradicating hunger and reducing 
poverty. 
                                                 
20 See Socialist Republic of Vietnam (2001). 
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Box 2: Timetable of the PRSP Process in Vietnam 







14-15 Dec. 1999 
01 2000 
22-23 June 2000 
04-06 July 2000 
First Meeting of Poverty Working Group (PWG) 
Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPA) training, fieldwork, analysis and drafting; 
national synthesis report based on PPAs: Voices of the Poor 
Mid-term Consultative Group (CG) Meeting (Hai Phong) 
PWG reviewed findings of both VLSSs and PPAs; the two types of poverty assessments (quantitative 
and qualitative) were integrated in the Attacking Poverty report 
Seventh CG Meeting (Hanoi): PWG presented the Attacking Poverty report 
PWG was considerably enlarged and Poverty Task Force created 
Mid-term CG Meeting (Da Lat) 
MOLISA and World Bank Planning Workshop (Sa Pa): Development of a poverty reduction strategy  
The I-PRSP Process 
08-10 2000 
14-15 Dec. 2000 
14 March 2001 
Work on I-PRSP initiated; Poverty Task Force review workshop of the draft I-PRSP 
Eighth CG Meeting (Hanoi) 
Completion of I-PRSP 
The CPRGS Process 
22 March 2001 
06 April 2001 
19-22 April 2001 
 
06 June 2001 




17-19 Sept. 2001 
 
04-06 Dec. 2001 




15 March 2002 
23 April 2002 
02-04 2002 
05 2002 
IMF and World Bank Joint Staff Assessment of the I-PRSP 
IMF approved US$ 368 Million PRGF Arrangement for Vietnam 
Ninth Party Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam: Approval of Socio-Economic Development 
Strategy 2001-2010 
World Bank approved US$ 250 Million PRSC Arrangement for Vietnam 
Mid-term CG Meeting (Hoi An) 
Government of Vietnam established the inter-agency drafting unit led by MPI 
Research themes to support the CPRGS were identified; eight thematic studies were carried out, semi-
nars were conducted 
Poverty Task Force (PTF) Workshop (Hai Phong): Adaptation of the Millennium Development Goals 
to the Vietnamese context  
Regional Conference on National Poverty Reduction Strategies (Hanoi) 
Ninth CG Meeting (Hanoi): Government of Vietnam/MPI presented the outline of the CPRGS 
 
Commune Consultations on the I-PRSP 
Completion of the first draft of the CPRGS   Submission of the draft 
Completion of the second draft of the CPRGS   CPRGS to the 
Completion of the fourth draft of the CPRGS   stakeholders for comments 
National consultation workshops on the draft CPRGS 
Completion of the CPRGS 
Source: Own database 
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– Continuing to implement the hunger eradica-
tion and poverty reduction programme by 
means of programmes targeting the poor and 
based on essential infrastructure projects and 
major transport links. 
– Creating a favourable environment to achieve 
economic well-being by strengthening pro-
ductive capacities. 
– Providing a social allowance to those living 
under especially difficult circumstances; con-
solidating the gains in hunger eradication and 
poverty reduction. 
– Reducing the incidence of poverty to less 
than 10 % (national poverty line) by 2005. 
4.2.3 The Joint Staff Assessment of the 
I-PRSP 
The Joint Staff Assessment21 of World Bank and 
IMF served as a basis for the boards of the World 
Bank and the IMF to approve the concessional 
credits. According to the Joint Staff Assessment, 
the Vietnamese I-PRSP met the requirements for 
an I-PRSP and provided a good basis for the de-
velopment of a full PRSP and for World Bank and 
IMF concessional assistance. 
The Assessment identified strengths of the I-PRSP 
and stated necessary steps towards a full PRSP. 
Strengths 
– The I-PRSP was developed as part of the 
government’s overall strategic planning proc-
ess. 
– Ownership during the drafting process was 
strong due to the fact that the document was 
written entirely by the government in Vie t-
namese. 
– The process took place in a largely participa-
tory way, including the consultation of 
NGOs, donors, and other organisations. 
                                                 
21 See IMF / IDA (2001c). 
– The I-PRSP contains the results of analytical 
and diagnostic work concerning the poverty 
situation in Vietnam and identifies the chal-
lenges ahead. 
– The paper describes the government’s pov-
erty reduction strategy and Vietnam’s central 
aim of fostering structural reforms to promote 
employment, exports and broad-based eco-
nomic growth. 
– The paper specifies the direction of sector-
specific interventions aimed at supporting the 
structural programme. 
Necessary steps 
– Indicators and mechanisms for poverty moni-
toring have to be identified. 
– Gaps in poverty-related data and analysis 
have to be filled to be able to link proposed 
policy measures to poverty outcomes. 
– Specific sector strategies have to be elabo-
rated to promote the delivery of high-quality 
services and to ensure a strong poverty focus. 
– Programmes have to be prioritised and costed 
to ensure affordability. 
– The participatory process pursued thus far has 
to be strengthened to achieve broad owner-
ship of the strategy and to ensure active con-
sultations with the poor on programme devel-
opment and implementation. 
– Questions of government organisation and 
accountability have to be addressed by pre-
paring the full PRSP and addressing a broad-
ened scope of poverty reduction activities. 
– It is necessary to ensure that adequate atten-
tion is paid to vulnerable groups that may not 
benefit automatically from structural reforms. 
The challenges that the Joint Staff Assessment 
identified were to be addressed in a full, or com-
prehensive PRSP (CPRSP). The task of the 
CPRSP process was to make the government’s 
broad policies and general directions more con-
crete and to find solutions that would fit into a 
specific implementation schedule. 
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As indicated in the timetable in Box 2, the 
CPRSP, named Comprehensive Poverty Reduc-
tion and Growth Strategy (CPRGS) by the Vie t-
namese government, was developed within about 
a year's time, from June 2001 to May 2002. Figure 
2 (p. 26) gives an overview over the CPRGS 
drafting process and its linkages. 
4.3.1 Participatory: Vietnamese 
Stakeholders in the Drafting Process 
Various Vietnamese stakeholders participated in the 
drafting process of the CPRGS, but their involve-
ment, contribution and impact varied. The formula-
tion of the CPRGS was the task of the central gov-
ernment. Local authorities and people at the local 
level were heard during consultations that provided 
the paper with valuable inputs. In that sense, the 
process was participatory. However, participation of 
the local level was neither broad nor institutional-
ised. Although the Government made efforts to or-
ganise a participatory drafting process, and although 
recent activities aimed at institutionalising participa-
tion in the implementation of poverty alleviation 
programmes (particularly at the local level) are 
promising, there remains the challenge of getting the 
lower administrative levels involved in the imple-
mentation of the CPRGS. 
Participation at the Central Level 
The first decision concerning the CPRGS drafting 
process was about which line ministry should be 
the lead agency: MOLISA, which was in charge 
for targeted poverty reduction prior to the PRSP 
process, or the MPI, which, as the central plan-
ning institution, had drafted the I-PRSP. The 
World Bank favoured upgrading the targeted Pov-
erty Alleviation Strategy to a PRSP, but since the 
capacities of MOLISA were insufficient to de-
velop a comprehensive strategy, the Government 
appointed the MPI to lead the CPRGS-drafting 
unit. The MPI organised the overall drafting pro-
cess and took on the challenge of incorporating 
existing strategies and adjusting them to the pov-
erty focus of PRSP as well as to additional targets 
(the MDGs). 
Inter-ministerial co-ordination took place in three 
steps: First, information of those who had not yet 
been involved, and discussion of the new aspects 
of PRSP. Second, research by ministries in their 
respective sectors aimed at filling in data gaps. 
Third, summary of the results and discussion, in 
the course of which consensus was to be reached. 
The participation of the different line ministries 
varied from ministry to ministry as well as in 
terms of time. The staff members from the differ-
ent line ministries delegated to work in the 
CPRGS drafting unit were initially not in rapport 
with their respective ministrie s. Hence, the 
CPRGS was from the beginning not very closely 
connected to the line ministries’ strategies. The 
limited contributions of the line ministries at this 
stage imply that the respective officials did not 
consider the CPRGS as very important. It appears 
that during the drafting process they recognised 
the importance of the CPRGS and thus the parti-
cipation of the line ministries increased. One rea-
son for their increased involvement may be the 
pressure of the MPI and the donors to include 
more detailed sectror-specific content in the pa-
per. During the last weeks of the drafting process, 
the line ministries commend on the draft CPRGS 
and made suggestions for improvement. 
One important task of the line ministries (espe-
cially following and in response to the comments 
on the first draft of the CPRGS) was the costing of 
the proposed actions. A World Bank “costing 
mission” supported several line ministries in en-
suring that the CPRGS included estimates of the 
resource requirements of implementing the strat-
egy, and it provided advice to the MPI on prior i-
tising investments within the Public Investment 
Programme (PIP) to ensure consistency with the 
CPRGS and to make the PIP more poverty-
focused. 
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Sources: Socialist Republic of Vietnam (2002c), p.2; Vietnam Development Information Centre (2002) 
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Participation of the provincial, district, communal, and village level 
through local level consultations and workshops. 
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However, several donors criticised the fact that 
the involvement of the line-ministries was not 
broad enough and that co-operation between Vie t-
namese agencies was a weak spot during the 
CPRGS drafting process. 
Participation of non-governmental organisations 
at the central level was limited: 
– The National Assembly was not involved in 
the CPRGS drafting process. Drafting was the 
sole task of the Government. 
– Mass organisations are not part of the Gov-
ernment and thus did not participate in the 
drafting process. The Women’s Union par-
ticipated in the PRSP drafting process as a 
member of the PWG. When the various drafts 
of the CPRGS were finalised, the mass or-
ganisations had the opportunity to comment 
on them. 
– The private sector, represented by the Vie t-
nam Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(VCCI), was also invited to comment on the 
CPRGS. 
Participation at the Local Level 
The voices of the local population, particularly 
the poor, were heard during the PPAs of 1999 and 
the communal consultations of December 2001, 
which were conducted by international NGOs in 
collaboration with local authorities in the four 
provinces in which the PPAs were carried out in 
1999. The consultations were conducted by the 
same organisations as in 1999. Two more com-
munal consultations took place in Quang Tri and 
Vinh Long provinces. Like the PPAs, the commu-
nal consultations were conducted with massive 
support from the donors. 
For the communal consultations, an adapted ver-
sion of the I-PRSP was worked out to gain appro-
priate feedback from the local level. The purpose 
of the communal consultations was to identify the 
most urgent needs of the local population. 
Box 3: Members of the Drafting Unit of the CPRGS of Vietnam 
Macroeconomic management ministries and agencies 
– Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) 
– Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
– State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) 
– Committee for the Reform of SOEs  
Sector ministries and agencies 
– Ministry of Trade (MOT) 
– Ministry of Industry (MOI) 
– Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 
(MARD) 
– Ministry of Construction (MOC) 
– Ministry of Transportation and Communication 
– Electricity of Vietnam (EVN) 
Social affairs ministries and agencies 
– Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs 
(MOLISA) 
– Ministry of Education and Training (MOET) 
– Ministry of Health (MOH) 
– Committee on Ethnic Minorities and Mountainous Areas 
(CEMMA) 
Other related ministries and agencies 
– Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) 
– Government Committee on Organisation and Personnel 
(GCOP) 
– General Statistics Office (GSO) 
Source: Socialist Republic of Vietnam (2002a), pp. 63-64 
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Five broad issues were discussed:22 
1. Poverty background and trends 
Living conditions have continued to improve 
over the past years. Although people were op-
timistic that policy measures and public ac-
tions set out in the I-PRSP are leading to fur-
ther poverty reduction, they were sceptical 
about whether the proposed measures would 
actually be implemented as intended. 
Although people were optimistic about the 
Government’s general direction, they were 
concerned that the policies would generate 
more benefits for the better-off than for the 
poorest people. Improved targeting and closer 
investigation of the needs of the poorest 
groups were emphasised to ensure that the 
broad strategic direction is flexible enough to 
accommodate particular needs that this group 
may have. 
Issues of gender inequity were not recognised 
as priority concerns. People generally felt that 
women were likely to benefit as much as men 
if the proposed actions were implemented as 
described. 
                                                 
22 See Northern Mountains Poverty Reduction Project / 
World Bank (2002). 
2. Creating opportunities for poor people and 
supporting livelihoods 
Measures to create opportunities for poor 
people to improve their livelihoods were iden-
tified and discussed; these included: 
– Improving basic infrastructure 
– Intensifying and diversifying agricultural 
production 
– Improving participation of poor house-
holds in markets 
– Developing SMEs and household enter-
prises 
– Improving access to credit 
– Training and information 
3. Improving access to quality basic social ser-
vices 
The total costs of education threaten to under-
mine progress in achieving the education univer-
salisation targets and have particular implications 
for the equity of access to education. 
Curative healthcare is unaffordable for poor 
households, leading to real hardship and plac-
ing livelihoods under severe stress. 
Current mechanisms for providing exemptions 
to or reducing the costs of both education and 
healthcare for poor households have not been 
broadly successful in addressing these prob-
lems and need rethinking. 
 
Table 4: Participatory Poverty Assessments of 1999 and Communal Consultations of December 2001 
Province Region Organisation(s) PPAs of 1999 CCs of 2001 
Lao Cai North Vietnam-Sweden Mountain Rural Development Pro-
gramme; World Bank, Voice of Vietnam, Northern 
Mountains Poverty Reduction Project 
X X 
Ha Tinh Centre Action Aid Vietnam X X 
Tra Vinh South Oxfam Great Britain X X 
Ho Chi Minh City South Safe the Children X X 
Quang Tri Centre Plan International – X 
Vinh Long South Catholic Relief Services – X 
Source: Poverty Task Force 
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4. Reducing vulnerability 
Measures to help poor households to manage 
risk should be clear and transparent, so that 
poor households know what their entitlements 
are and how to go about claiming them. 
Local initiatives to help the poor to deal with 
shocks should be based upon a better under-
standing of the differences between the needs 
of the poor and the needs of the better-off. 
5. Institutional arrangements for implementing 
the CPRGS 
Concerns about the implementation of what was 
generally recognised as good poverty alleviation 
policies came up throughout the consultations in 
all of the sites. Poor people consistently requested 
more information, more participation, and more 
equality as well as more accountability and trans-
parency on the part of decision-makers and ser-
vice-providing institutions. 
The results of the communal consultations were 
presented to the PTF and the MPI and considered 
in the CPRGS, particularly with regard to the 
costs of basic social services as well as transpar-
ency and participation issues. The results were 
also fed into consultation workshops, which were 
organised at the provincial level. 
Consultation Workshops  
From January to March 2002, the MPI organised 
level to gain inputs from local stakeholders to 
improve the draft CPRGS. 
The stakeholders represented at the four consulta-
tion workshops included provincial and district 
officials, representatives of mass organisations 
and international donor organisations. Emerging 
local NGOs were not heard during the communal 
consultations; however, some of them did attend 
the consultation workshops. 
All consultation workshops were organised and 
conducted by the MPI but financed by interna-
tional donors. Hence, it is not certain whether the 
consultations would have taken place without the 
support of international donors. 
One participant at the first consultative workshop 
at Tuyen Quang province criticised the limited 
participation. He gave the following reasons for 
his assessment: 
– A high number of participants, the majority 
of which came from Hanoi, 
– participants presented their own opinions, but 
not those of their institutions, 
– the local population was only represented 
through the presentation of PPAs, 
– the basis for discussion (i. e. the CPRGS 
draft) was not distributed until the first day of 
the workshop, 
– the methods of discussion were not adapted to 
participant needs, 
– the workshops lacked experts for all sectors, 
and thus the contribution of the workshops 
was restricted. 
All in all, there was participation at the local level, 
but only to a limited extent. Communal consulta- 
tions and regional workshops convey the impres-
sion of being ad hoc activities. However, the 
PRSP process has contributed to introducing con-
sultative mechanisms which were new in the 
Vietnamese context. It remains to be seen whether 
these mechanisms will be sustained during the 
implementation of the CPRGS (Chapter 6.2). 
Table 5: Consultation Workshops for the CPRGS  
Date Province Participants’ origin 
05./06.01.2002 Tuyen Quang Northern provinces 
28 Feb./01.03.2002 Quang Binh Central provinces 
19./20.03.2002 Ho Chi Minh City Urban centres 
21./22.03.2002 Can Tho Southern provinces 
Source: Poverty Task Force 
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4.3.2 Partnership-oriented: The Role of 
External Development Partners  
Participation of the Donors in General 
Donor involvement in the CPRGS drafting pro-
cess was manifold in nature: Donors participated 
in the bi-annual CG meetings at which PRSP is-
sues were raised; they were involved in partner-
ship groups (sectoral partnership groups, PWG, 
and PTF), supported PPAs and consultations, 
participated in thematic studies to localise the 
MDGs in the Vietnamese context and commented 
on the draft CPRGS. The different qualities of 
donor involvement and their impact on the draft-
ing process were as manifold as the various means 
of participation. 
Only a few donors participated in the process from 
the outset. The World Bank was always the driving 
force, with UNDP and ADB acting as regular sup-
porters of the PWG. The IMF, represented only by 
one person in Hanoi, was involved mainly in the 
framework of the CG-meetings, but also indirectly 
through its control over the macroeconomic devel-
opments and economic reform issues which were 
tied to conditions under the PRGF. 
Among the bilateral donors, DFID played the 
strongest role, mainly because it worked in close 
collaboration with the World Bank and had early 
in the process seconded one poverty expert to the 
World Bank office in Hanoi. DFID was also 
 
Box 4: The Consultation Workshop in Quang Binh Province 
The agenda of the consultation workshop in Quang Binh province included presentations and discussions on PRSP related 
topics. 
First, the CPRGS was presented by a representative of MPI. The results of the communal consultations in Ha Tinh Province 
were presented by a representative of Action Aid Vietnam. 
Second, group discussions took place on the following seven topics: 
1. Education and Health 
2. Agriculture and Enterprise Development in Rural Areas 
3. Infrastructure 
4. Public Expenditure Management and Community Participation 
5. Governance and Participation 
6. Natural Disaster Prevention, Hunger Alleviation and Poverty Reduction 
7. CPRGS Implementation Monitoring and Assessment 
The group discussions were supposed to find answers to three main questions: 
1. Are the goals and targets selected for each sector appropriate to reducing poverty in Vietnam from the point of view of 
sector contributions? 
2. What are the challenges involved in realising these goals? 
3. What are concrete policies that need to be adopted and implemented to ensure the achievement of these goals and tar-
gets? 
Third, the findings of the group discussions were presented and discussed at the plenary session. 
People used the opportunity to feed back their concerns to the central government. One participant of the consultation work-
shop noted that this was the first time that the central government had come down to the provincial level to consider local 
opinions. 
Source: GDI survey  
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among the few bilateral donors which set aside 
funds for the support of activities of the PWG. 
SIDA, AusAID and CIDA were also active col-
laborators in the PWG. Their engagement was 
facilitated by the facts that they are represented in 
Hanoi by specialised staff and their country pro-
gramming is carried out to a large extent in a de-
centralised way, giving them some leeway to react 
quickly to changing demands in the local policy 
process. 
Japan, by far the largest bilateral donor in Vie t-
nam, joined the PWG and the PTF at an early 
stage but was not very actively involved in its 
activities. Germany, France and the EU were not 
particularly involved in the process. Germany, 
however, was represented in the PWG through a 
capacity-building project at MOLISA (“Capacity 
building for self-help oriented poverty allevia-
tion”) which supported the ministry in its repre-
sentation in the PWG. Only in December 2001, 
following the CG meeting at which the first draft 
of the PRSP was presented, did Germany (repre-
sented by GTZ) join the PTF, replacing SIDA, 
which had left the PTF due to capacity con-
straints. 
The Partnership Groups, the Poverty Work-
ing Group and the Poverty Task Force 
Most participants in the thematic or sectoral part-
nership groups characterised their work as a “use-
ful exercise” that provided a platform for con-
structive policy dialogue. Differing in the scope 
and depth of their work, the partnership groups 
supported some of the line ministries with concep-
tual inputs before the line ministries themselves 
provided their sectoral chapters to the CPRGS 
drafting unit. The role of the donors in these 
groups was mixed. According to the personal 
assessment of one donor agency official, about 
20 % of the partnership groups are mainly driven 
by Vietnamese stakeholders, for 30 % of the part-
Box 5: Members of the Poverty Task Force as of January 2002 
Vietnamese ministries and agencies 
– Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) 
– Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 
(MARD) 
– Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs 
(MOLISA) 
– Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
– Ministry of Construction (MOC) 
– Ministry of Industry (MOI) 
– Ministry of Justice (MOJ) 
– State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) 
– Institute of Economics 
Multilateral donor agencies 
– United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
– Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
– International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
– World Bank 
– Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) 
Bilateral donor agencies  
– Japan Bank for International Co-operation (JBIC) 
– Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA) 
– United Kingdom Department for International Devel-
opment (DFID) 
– Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit 
(GTZ) 
 
International Non-governmental Organisations (INGOs) 
– Action Aid Vietnam (AAV) 
– Catholic Relief Services (CRS) 
– Oxfam Great Britain (OGB) 
– Oxfam Hong Kong (OHK) 
– Plan International Vietnam 
– Save the Children United Kingdom (SC UK) 
Source: PTF (2002) 
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nership groups no distinction can be drawn, and 
50 % of the partnership groups are mainly driven 
by donors. 
The Poverty Working Group (PWG), and particu-
larly the Poverty Task Force (PTF), played a 
high-profile role. As the PFT was the main part-
nership group to support the CPRGS, the mem-
bers of the PTF had the largest impact on the 
CPRGS drafting process, with the MPI on the 
Vietnamese side and the World Bank and DFID 
on the donor’s side acting as the driving forces, 
mainly due to their continuous and high-ranking 
representation and their conceptual inputs to the 
PWG and PTF. 
Adaptation of the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals to the Vietnamese Context 
To support the CPRGS process, the PTF commis-
sioned eight thematic studies to adapt the Millen-
nium Development Goals to the Vietnamese con-
text. This series of papers reflects a collective 
effort of the Government and the donors to pro-
pose a set of goals and outcome targets for pov-
erty reduction in Vietnam. 
The eight thematic studies, prepared by consult-
ants under the guidance of donors and Vietnamese 
stakeholders, dealt with the following topics:23 
– Eradicating poverty and hunger (World Bank, 
PWG) 
– Reducing vulnerability and providing social 
protection (World Bank, ILO, ODI) 
– Providing quality basic education for all 
(DFID, MOET) 
– Improving health status and reducing ine-
qualities (ADB, WHO) 
– Ensuring environmental sustainability (WWF 
with donor – Government – NGO group) 
– Promoting ethnic minority development 
(UNDP) 
                                                 
23 See PTF (2001a-h). 
– Enhancing access to basic infrastructure 
(JICA/JBIC with infrastructure sub-group) 
– Ensuring good governance for poverty reduc-
tion (ADB with a donor – Government –  
NGO sub-group on governance and public 
management indicators) 
The studies served as a basis for discussions dur-
ing a workshop on Vietnam’s poverty reduction 
goals in Haiphong in September 2001. At this 
workshop, the MDGs were adapted to the Vie t-
namese context. The adapted MDGs (‘Vietnam 
Development Goals’) form the basis of the targets 
and indicators in the CPRGS. 
Comments on the Draft CPRGS 
Between November 2002 (first draft) and April 
2002 (fourth draft), the drafting unit distributed 
the drafts to stakeholders for comment. 
A large number of donors took this opportunity to 
comment on the draft. Vietnamese stakeholders 
also commented, e.g. the Vietnam Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (VCCI) on private sector 
promotion, or the Women’s Union on gender is-
sues. Their contribution can in part be traced 
through the drafts (see, for example, Boxes 7 and 8). 
Some donors submitted joint statements to the 
drafting team. A like-minded group around DFID 
(Great Britain, Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, 
Norway, Switzerland and Finland) pointed out the 
following positive aspects and made some sugges-
tions for the improvement of the first draft. 24 
Positive aspects 
– The CPRGS is more comprehensive than the 
I-PRSP. 
– The incorporated poverty analysis enriches 
the CPRGS. 
                                                 
24 See DFID, et. al. (2002), pp. 1-2. 
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– The underlying CPRGS process was consid-
ered to be very fruitful, although the strength 
of the process was seen as not well-reflected 
in the paper itself.  
– Ownership  of the Government of Vietnam 
was considered to be strong. 
Suggestions for improvement 
– The first draft of the CPRGS concentrated on 
the economic and the business sector. The 
need of the people – especially of the poor –  
has to be put at the core of the strategy to 
shift the emphasis specifically to pro-poor 
growth. 
– The monitoring section needs more develop-
ment, with sufficient attention paid to quality 
aspects and outcomes. Ways to reach and to 
measure the Vietnam Development Goals 
need to be elaborated. 
– Objectives were not sufficiently prioritised. 
– A credible costing practice was still not in 
place. 
– Institutional and governance issues were 
overlooked throughout the first draft of the 
paper. 
– Many of the grassroots consultations pointed 
to a ‘gap’ between central policies and local 
level reality. Issues regarding this and the 
quality of services actually delivered need to 
be addressed. 
– Many of the proposed actions were at a very 
high level of generality; more specified ac-
tions would improve the document. 
If the paper were improved along these lines, the 
donor group indicates that “… we would not need 
to write down our own donor Country Strategy 
Papers if the CPRGS is strong enough. Instead we 
– and others – could accept the CPRGS as the 
Vietnam Poverty Reduction Strategy and write a 
“country plan” setting out which parts of the 
CPRGS we would support and how we would 
provide this support”.25 
The French and German governments also sub-
mitted a joint statement on the first draft, with a 
wide range of suggestions and critical remarks, 
but without indicating the far-reaching conse-
quences for their future support as expressed by 
the group around DFID. 
All in all, there were a great number of comments 
from different stakeholders on the CPRGS drafts. 
Some recommendations found their way into the 
final version, others did not. It is difficult to judge 
which stakeholders exerted more influence than 
others in this process. It is remarkable, however, 
that the process was open enough to provide all 
stakeholders with an  opportunity to comment, in 
contrast to the usual secrecy of the Vietnamese 
policy-making process. 
4.3.3 Country-driven: Ownership of the 
PRSP 
Throughout the interviews with donors and Vie t-
namese stakeholders, the widely held opinion was 
expressed that the Vietnamese PRSP was primar-
ily donor-driven (especially by the World Bank), 
due to its nature as precondition for concessional 
loans. The PRSP finally has to be approved by the 
boards of IMF and World Bank and hence is not a 
strategy approved by a sovereign country without 
external influence. 
During the drafting process, however, the Vie t-
namese side showed strong ownership of the 
process and the strategy itself. The MPI in par-
ticular was in the driver’s seat during the drafting 
process. It had proposed the time schedule and the 
procedures for drafting and it kept to the schedule, 
working under tremendous pressure at times. The 
head of the drafting unit, Mr. Cao Viet Sinh of 
MPI, stated publicly with great confidence that 
Vietnam would be the first country to write a full 
PRSP by itself. The naming of the PRSP as the 
CPRGS, with the G standing for the strong growth 
                                                 
25 ibid., pp. 1-2. 
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orientation of the Vietnamese government, under-
lined this independent and self-confident position. 
It was the ownership of the Vietnamese govern-
ment that encouraged more donors to participate 
in the PRSP process. The commitment of the 
Vietnamese government, the fact that it has its 
own priorities and a favourable constellation of 
personalities were recognised as reasons for a 
good climate of co-operation. 
Relationship of the CPRGS to Other Na-
tional Strategies 
The relation of the CPRGS to other strategies is 
characterised in the fina l version as follows: 
“The Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Strategy (CPRGS) is an action plan that 
translates the Government’s Ten-year Socio-
economic Development Strategy, Five-year Socio -
economic Development Plan as well as other sec-
toral development plans into concrete measures 
with well-defined road maps for implementation. 
This is an action plan for realising economic 
growth and poverty reduction objectives. The 
Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Strategy is closely related to the national annual 
socio-economic development plans and the plans 
developed by different ministries, agencies and 
sectors. The national socio-economic development 
plan that is passed by the National Assembly 
serves as a tool for bringing the policies and 
measures contained in the CPRGS into practice”26 
Thus, the CPRGS is both a strategy written to 
satisfy donor requirements and attract more ODA 
and an internal action plan for implementing the 
government’s existing policies. 
However, at least at the central level, ownership 
of the CPRGS cannot be as broad as the owner-
ship of the Ten-year Socio-economic Develop-
ment Strategy and the related sector strategies and 
annual plans, because the CPRGS – like the 
                                                 
26 See Socialist Republic of Vietnam (2002c), p. 2. 
I-PRSP – will be approved only by the Govern-
ment of Vietnam, whereas the Ten-year Socio-
economic Development Strategy and the Five-
year Socio-economic Development Plan as well as 
the annual plans are endorsed by the government, 
the Communist Party of Vietnam and the National 
Assembly. An endorsement of the CPRGS by the 
National Assembly would surely enhance the 
relevance of the strategy. 
It is to be expected that the upcoming annual 
plans and the next Five-year Socio-economic De-
velopment Plan (2006-2010) will specify and 
incorporate the actions laid out in the CPRGS. 
This would require, however, that both the struc-
ture and the character of the annual plans, particu-
larly the provincial plans, would have to be al-
tered: They would have to incorporate a broader 
range of targets, and their focus would have to be 
more on policies and less on the achievement of 
quantitative production targets. 
Pressure and Influence of Donors  
The continuous support of the PRSP drafting 
process and the comments on the CPRGS pro-
vided by the international donor community can 
be interpreted as a permanent insistence on the 
progress of the paper and on the nature of its con-
tents. This support improved the quality of the 
paper on the one hand, though on the other hand it 
may have led to a decline of the involvement of 
Vietnamese stakeholders or a decline of enthus i-
asm concerning the formulation of the strategy on 
the Vietnamese side. 
One multilateral donor representative stated that 
the drafting process had been a good effort, but 
that national ownership of the CPRGS, especially 
in comparison to the Ten-year Socio-economic 
Development Strategy, which was widely pub-
lished and country-driven, was doubtful. His rea-
sons: 
– ministries were not well informed about the 
CPRGS at the outset, 
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– it was not clear to everybody why the country 
needs another three-year action plan in addi-
tion to the ten-year, five-year, etc. plans, 
– the CPRGS has to be approved not only by 
the Government but also by the World Bank 
and the IMF, 
– CPRGS meetings were not attended by the 
highest-ranking government officials, the 
head of the drafting unit being a deputy de-
partment head of MPI. 
Some stakeholders stated that the World Bank had 
put the Vietnamese side under pressure concern-
ing the schedule of the PRSP. Hence, there was 
not enough time to agree on contents, especially 
in the Vietnamese consensus-building processes. 
They argued that as long as the World Bank sets 
deadlines for loan disbursements, it could be diffi-
cult to support processes that are really country-
driven, and this could take more time. The World 
Bank on the other hand argued that it had never 
put Vietnam under time pressure. If the govern-
ment decided to set deadlines for the finalisation 
of the I-PRSP and the CPRGS to obtain conces-
sional credits in good time, this was its own deci-
sion. 
According to a representative of an INGO, there 
was a neo-liberal “Washington Push” in all round-
table discussions such as the CG Meetings and the 
PTF. The NGOs sought to get back to the poor. 
But the Vietnamese side finally took its own deci-
sions, after having listened to everybody. For the 
NGO representative, “it was clear who was in the 
driver’s seat.” 
In the end, there is no clear-cut answer to the 
question of ownership. Obviously, the process 
was init iated and strongly influenced by donors, 
but the Vietnamese side kept it under control and 
made it clear from the outset that the existing na-
tional strategies would have to be the basis of the 
PRSP. However, as the next chapter will show, 
the CPRGS is considerably broader, more detailed 
and more outcome oriented than the existing na-
tional strategies. This was mainly the result of 
donor influence. The new philosophy of a com-
prehensive poverty orientation embracing all poli-
cies has still not been ‘mainstreamed’ into the 
Vietnamese policy process. Recognition of the 
comprehensiveness of the PRSP approach is still 
not widespread in Vietnam. Poverty alleviation is 
still widely regarded as a sectoral issue. Thus, 
limited participation by national stakeholders at 
the central level and particularly at the local level 
may result in limited ownership throughout the 
process of implementation. 
5 The Contents of the Vietnamese 
CPRGS 
The analysis of prospects for poverty reduction 
cannot concentrate solely on the drafting process 
of the CPRGS. It must include an analysis of the 
strategy itself. It is, though, impossible to assess 
every policy and sector in this report, because 
such an analysis would demand specific experi-
ence and knowledge about specific sectors. Nev-
ertheless, an assessment of contents is possible in 
accordance with the analytical framework out-
lined in Chapter 2. Four core principles refer to 
contents: comprehensiveness, long-term perspec-
tive, results orientation and prioritisation. 
5.1 Overview of Contents 
The CPRGS of May 2002 targets continuing high 
growth linked to social progress and equity, with a 
particular focus on reducing the development gap 
between different regions and population groups. 
It seeks to reconcile the tension between eco-
nomic growth and social equity that had become 
apparent in the I-PRSP. The I-PRSP was biased 
toward creating economic opportunities for the 
poor through high economic growth. The CPRGS 
creates a closer link between growth and poverty 
alleviation by adapting the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals to the Vietnamese context and inte-
grating them into the strategy. They provide clear 
and quantifiable poverty alleviation targets on the 
basis of which Vietnam’s development will be 
monitored. 
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The strategy consists of six parts: 
Part I: Socio-economic Setting, Current 
Poverty Situation, Achievements and Chal-
lenges 
This section describes recent economic develop-
ments and the status of poverty in Vietnam. It 
highlights the high economic growth rate resulting 
from private sector development, agricultural 
diversif ication and commercialisation, improved 
financial systems and economic liberalisation. 
Increased resources financed infrastructure devel-
opment and improved living standards, thereby 
halving poverty. However, challenges remain due 
to rising inequalities, continuing widespread pov-
erty, high vulnerability of people living just above 
the poverty line, and fierce economic competition 
as a result of world-market integration. 
Part II: Objectives and Tasks of Socio-
economic Development and Poverty Re-
duction 
This section shapes the vision and the basic phi-
losophy of the strategy, which is described as 
follows: 27 
1. Poverty reduction serves as a fundamental 
factor for ensuring social equality and sus-
tainable growth. 
2. Progress in poverty reduction must be based 
on broad-based, high-quality and sustainable 
economic growth and must create favourable 
conditions for poor people and poor commu-
nities to access opportunities to develop and 
expand their production and businesses and to 
enjoy the fruits of growth. 
3. Poverty reduction is structured as a compo-
nent of the Ten-Year Socio-Economic Devel-
opment Strategy and Five-Year and Annual 
                                                 
27 See Socialist Republic of Vietnam (2002d), pp. 43-45. 
Socio-Economic Development Plans from the 
central to the grassroots level. 
4. Poverty reduction is not only the task of the 
Government and the whole society, but it is 
first of all the responsibility of the poor them-
selves to develop the capacity to escape from 
poverty. 
The chapter defines economic and social deve l-
opment targets derived from the existing national 
strategies and the adapted Millennium Develop-
ment Goals (see Annex 1). Whereas the overall 
economic objectives are based on the Ten-year 
Strategy (“...lay foundations for transforming the 
country into a basically modern-oriented industri-
alised country by 2020”), the social objectives are 
more based on the MDGs (poverty reduction, 
education universalization, birth-rate reduction, 
reduction of maternal mortality, sustainable de-
velopment, reduction of vulnerability of the poor, 
gender equality). 
Part III: Create an Environment for 
Rapid, Sustainable Development and Pov-
erty Reduction 
This chapter outlines the major structural reforms 
which have to be carried out to create a frame-
work conducive to growth and poverty reduction: 
?? Legal environment for fair and competitive 
businesses 
?? SOE reform 
?? Private sector and FDI promotion 
?? Public administration reform, legal reform 
and pro-poor good governance. 
The maintenance of macroeconomic stability is 
stressed, along with related policy measures to be 
taken in fiscal, monetary and trade policy. 
Furthermore, empowerment and governance is-
sues are highlighted as elements of the framework 
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conditions conducive to growth and poverty re-
duction: 
1. Create the conditions needed for people to 
fully participate in the development process 
and to have equal opportunities. 
2. Enhance grassroots democracy and strengthen 
dialogue between local governments and poor 
communities. 
3. Provision of legal support to the poor. 
Box 6 (p. 39) gives an overview on how issues 
related to governance and public administration 
reform have been dealt with throughout the draft-
ing process. 
Part IV: Major Policies and Measures to 
Develop Sectors and Industries to Promote 
Sustainable Growth and Poverty Reduc-
tion 
This section extracts and reformulates poverty-
related sections of national sector strategies. 
Measures in the sector agriculture and rural de-
velopment centre on ensuring food security, inten-
sifying agriculture, diversifying production, build-
ing processing facilities, providing demand-driven 
extension services, accessing capital and develop-
ing a disaster prevention strategy. Activities in the 
industry and urban development sector concen-
trate on exploiting the comparative advantage of 
labour-intensive consumer goods and agricultural 
engineering. Urban poverty is to be reduced by 
providing credit, creating supportive legal, institu-
tional and physical infrastructures, increasing 
skills, creating jobs and resolving problems of 
urban migration. Measures in the education and 
training sector target the quality and universalisa-
tion of education. Health  measures focus on pro-
viding basic health care services that are accessi-
ble to the poor. Cultural activities emphasise fa-
cilitating the dissemination of information and 
preserving the cultural heritage. The section on 
environmental protection focuses on the imple-
mentation of the respective national strategy, 
though without fully embracing the concept of 
‘sustainable development’. One section focuses on 
reducing the gap between different regions and 
population groups, including the factors of ethnic-
ity and gender, and the last section deals with the 
development of social safety nets. 
Box 7 (p. 40) shows, how the cross-cutting issue 
gender has been dealt with throughout the drafts 
of the CPRGS. 
Part V: Mobilising and Allocating Re-
sources for Economic Growth and Poverty 
Reduction  
This chapter allocates resources to the measures 
suggested in the CPRGS. It is projected that in the 
period 2001-2005 about $60 – 70 billion in in-
vestment funds will have to be mobilised, one 
third of which will be accounted for by foreign 
capital (FDI and ODA). Two thirds will come 
from domestic sources, with the private sector 
accounting for only 26 %. The proposed invest-
ment allocation reads as follows in the fourth draft 
of the strategy: 
In the final version of the strategy, the link be-
tween planned overall capital allocation – which 
can only partly be influenced by the government – 
and state budget expenditure is reinforced by add-
ing estimates for recurrent expenditures (which 
are not part of the Five-year Plan) from the state 
budget. 
Furthermore, as a result of the ‘costing mission’ 
of the World Bank, which supported the Govern-
ment in the development of a medium-term ex-
penditure framework (MTEF), a projection on 
state spending priorities covering investment and 
recurrent expenditures for core poverty-related 
objectives for the years 2003-2005 was added in 
the final version. It has to be noted, however, that 
this MTEF covers less than 20% of projected 
budget expenditures for 2001-2005, in this way 
revealing that only a small part of the budget is 
clearly prioritised and related to the CPRGS tar-
gets. 
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Part VI: Implementation, Monitoring and 
Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Strategy 
A Steering Committee will guide the Prime Min-
ister in implementing the CPRGS. Furthermore, 
an Inter-ministerial Working Unit under the lead-
ership of the MPI will be responsible for co-
ordinating implementation, integrating the 
CPRGS into the national development plans, as 
well as for the monitoring and evaluation of the 
CPRGS. Indicators (see Annex 1) will be used to 
measure progress towards the objectives; on this 
basis the Steering Committee and the Inter-
ministerial Working Unit will recommend correc-
tive measures when necessary. 
It is stated that the following implementation steps 
are to be pursued: 
?? Line ministries, government agencies and 
provinces will, within their sphere of func-
tions, concretise and incorporate the objec-
tives of the CPRGS into their annual plans for 
implementation.  
?? Every year, based on the funding capacity of 
the state budget and the progress made in im-
plementing the CPRGS, the MPI, the MoF, 
government agencies and provinces must ar-
range for expenditures to implement the strat-
egy. 
?? There should be a duty assignment to relating 
line ministries, provincial and local authorities 
in the monitoring and evaluation of CPRGS im-
plementation and other activities of their respec-
tive sectors within the strategy framework. 
?? Institutionalisation of the consultation process 
for CPRGS in line ministries, poor communi-
ties, enterprises, domestic and international 
social organisations and local community- 
based organisations, etc. in order to improve  
 
Table 6: Estimated Allocation of Resources in the Period 2001-2005 According to the Five-year Investment Plan 
 Investment capital allocation State Budget Expenditure (excluding 
debt payment) 
 Billion US$ Percent Billion US$ Percent 
Total 60 100 45.1 100 
Of which:     
Agriculture, forestry, fishery and irriga-
tion 
7.8 13 4.7 10.4 
Industry and construction 26.4 44 n. d. n. d. 
Transportation and post 9.0 15 5.2 11.5 
Housing, water, public infrastructure 
and services 
8.4 14 2.0 4.4 
Science, technology  and environment 0.4 0.6 1.0 2.2 
Training and education 2.2 3.7 8.2 18.2 
Health  1.2 2.0 8.5 18.8 
Culture, sports 1.0 1.7 n. d. n. d. 
Public administration 1.9 3.2 n. d. n. d. 
Others 1.7 2.8 n. d. n. d. 
Source: Socialist Republic of Vietnam (2002c), pp.75-80 
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 the quality of the monitoring and evaluation 
of the CPRGS. 
?? Independent research organisations (NGOs, 
universities etc.) are to organise consultations 
with the people, collect and analyse data as a 
means of assessing the present situation as  
 
well as trends with respect to economic 
growth and poverty. 
Box 6: Public Administration Reform and Governance in the PRSP Process 
In the I-PRSP, administrative reform has a sub-chapter dealing specifically with roles and responsibilities of the public and  
private sectors, decentralisation and capacity-building, simplifying administrative procedures and improving efficiency, trans-
parency and accountability, increasingly ensuring participation, and implementing the Grassroots Democracy Decree (GDD). 
However, the attached I-PRSP Policy Matrix does not explicitly mention administrative reform. Regarding sectoral policies 
aimed at ensuring equity, the Matrix calls for improving access to legal support services and knowledge of legal rights and 
obligations. Furthermore, it calls for full implementation of the GDD and improvement of participation at the local level. Access 
to basic social services for the poor, such as education and basic health care, is also mentioned. 
In November 2001, the Poverty Task Force (PTF) proposed eight indicators for good governance  that localise the Interna-
tional Development Targets (IDTs) in the Vietnamese context: First, the level of information publicly available; second, the 
extent of access of the poor to basic government services; third, the level of budget transparency at the provincial and local 
levels; fourth, national expenditure targeted to pro-poor purposes; fifth, public availability of decisions and verdicts of courts 
and tribunals; sixth, responsiveness of local governments; seventh, implementation of the Grassroots Democracy Decree; eighth, 
effective laws aimed at combating corruption. 
The CPRGS First Draft extends the set of policies regarding governance issues as compared with the I-PRSP. It calls for a 
reform of the legal system (including law enforcement) as well as  for participation in the process of law- and policy-making. 
One of its demands is to "bring democracy into play." The local level is dealt with in an sub-chapter of its own calling for im-
plementation of the GDD, enhanced participation and information dissemination. Another sub-chapter concerns legal support to 
the poor and deals with legal information, compliance with the law, law-making, legal education, and access to the judicial 
system. The Output and Outcome Indicators of the First Draft, however, are not very detailed. Regarding governance issues, 
indicators are rather input-oriented, in that they call for the implementation of decrees and action plans like the GDD, the Legal 
Needs Assessment, the Action Plan for Public Administration Reform, the Action Plan for Public Expenditure Reform, and the 
anti-corruption strategy. These decrees and action plans refer to areas mentioned in the PTF list of indicators, but they are no 
more than means to achieve outcomes. The desired results are not specified with reference to precise targets and indicators.  
The policies mentioned in the Second Draft are the same as those  in the First Draft. But the Second Draft has a more detailed 
list of Development Objectives. However, the objectives regarding governance are limited to ensuring the GDD and budget 
transparency. Indicators exclusively refer to the communal level. The draft contains no assignment of responsibilities or time 
frame. 
The policies mentioned in the final version of the CPRGS are basically the same as in the Second Draft. The list of Develop-
ment Objectives regarding governance is also incomplete, in that it is limited exclusively to the commune level (including one 
indicator for budget transparency - at the commune level). Annual revisions are provided for and responsibilities are defined, but 
not in a very detailed manner. The final version also contains a Policy Matrix that mentions Public Administration Reform. It 
requires an acceleration of the reform, especially concerning agencies which directly relate to the poor as well as improved 
information dissemination. Regarding the local level, it contains the same text as the I-PRSP Policy Matrix.  
In consequence, the policies on administrative reform and governance laid out in the CPRGS are wide-ranging but imprecise. 
Targets and indicators regarding governance are limited to the commune level, and thus they do not reflect all the policies men-
tioned in the strategy's main text and in the policy matrix. The first draft had integrated the broad PTF list of targets and indica-
tors, but the subsequent drafts contained a much more limited range of indicators, referring to democracy at the commune level 
only and not mentioning corruption. 
Source: Socialist Republic of Vietnam (2001), (2002a), (2002b), (2002c), (2002d); PTF (2001c) 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1 lists Vietnam's development objec-
tives. Whereas Part A comprises the Economic 
Objectives, Part B covers the Social and Poverty 
Reduction Objectives. For each goal, the targets 
and indicators are defined and reporting frequency 
and responsible agencies are identified. Appendix 
2 gives an overview over the Medium-term Mac-
roeconomic Framework for the period of 2002- 
 
 
2004. Finally, Appendix 3 consists of the Policy 
Matrix and Time Frame for Implementation. 
Box 7: Gender in the PRSP Process 
The importance of the cross-cutting issue gender  increased during the CPRGS drafting process. This box focuses on changes 
made regarding goals in both the section directly related to gender equality and the education sector. 
1. I-PRSP 
The gender component in the I-PRSP is weak. Promotion of gender equality appears only twice in the strategy: first in the 
section on mobilising resources and second in the policy matrix at the end, in which participation of women at all levels of 
leadership is also called for. Women only appear as subgroups of the poor. The I-PRSP states very generally that favourable 
conditions should be created to enable the poor, especially women and children, to access training, employment opportuni-
ties, social services and credits.  
2. First Draft – Gender Equality and Enhancement of the Role of Women 
The gender issue enjoys greater importance in the First Draft. It is more specific about the participation of women in deci-
sion-making processes. It aims at increasing the proportion of women in Party Committees and in the National Assembly, as 
well as in elected bodies. It further targets a higher proportion of female leaders in the government. The First Draft also in-
cludes the objective that land use titles should be granted equally to both women and men. Monitoring progress in education 
is to include measurement of  the ratio of children in education to illiterate adults, disaggregated by gender. 
3. Second Draft – Gender Equality and Enhancement of Women’s Role 
The second draft specifies the aims outlined in the First Draft. It states that the number of women in elective and government 
bodies is to be increased at all levels. It also quantifies a target for the increase in participation of women in agencies: more 
then 3-5% in the next 10 years. The Second Draft includes a new aim: to reduce the vulnerability of women to family vio-
lence. Women are also accorded greater importance in the education sector. Two new goals are added: “Eliminate the gender 
gap at primary and secondary education by 2005” and “Eliminate illiteracy for 95% of under 40 year-old women by 2005 
and 100% by 2010”.  
4. Final Version – Gender Equality and Advancement of Women 
The final version adds the target of increasing the number of female entrepreneurs. The goal “Job Creation”  includes the 
statement that the share of female workers is to raise to 50% of total new jobholders by 2010.  
The increasing importance of the gender issue in the different CPRGS versions can be explained by the commitment and 
efforts of the National Committee for the Advancement of Women (NCFAW). The NCFAW formed a task force responsible 
for strengthening the gender equality focus of the CPRGS. Members of the Task Force participated in regional CPRGS con-
sultations and provided some summarized  comments on gender issues to the Drafting Committee. They undertook a consul-
tation process that included eleven Committees for the Advancement of Women, National Assembly Deputies and provincial 
representatives of the Women’s Union. They collected and analysed feedback from the consultation and wrote specific rec-
ommendations.  
Their “state of the art” consultation, as one interview partner put it admiringly, led to the growing importance of the gender 
issue in the CPRGS. An international workshop (South-East Asia) on the issue of gender and PRSP held in Hanoi on March 
13-14 and organised by the World Bank, added further to the growing importance of gender in the CPRGS. 
Source: Socialist Republic of Vietnam (2001), (2002a), (2002b), (2002c), NCFAW, 2002 
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5.2 Content Assessment on the Basis of 
the Principles: Comprehensive, Based 
on a Long-term perspective, Results-
orientated and Prioritised 
Is the Strategy Comprehensive and Based 
on a Long-term Perspective? 
The CPRGS is a comprehensive strategy in that it 
recognises the multi-dimensional nature of pov-
erty and embraces all policies relevant for poverty 
reduction. It covers all three dimensions of pov-
erty outlined in Chapter 2: opportunity, empow-
erment and security.  
In Part II of the CPRGS, the strategy provides the 
conceptual basis for pro-poor growth. Economic 
growth is linked to social equity through the inte-
gration of the adapted Millennium Development 
Goals. As outlined in Part III, policies related to 
economic opportunities include creation of a fa-
vourable business environment by strengthening 
the legal system, promotion of SOE-reform, pub-
lic administrative reform and maintenance of mac-
roeconomic stability. Fiscal policies are to be 
improved by implementing an active monetary 
policy and pursuing global economic integration. 
In Part IV, human development policies are out-
lined to achieve social equity. These include poli-
cies in the areas of basic infrastructure, education, 
health and the environment. Empowerment of the 
population is sought at the grassroots level 
through measures aiming at increasing participa-
tion. Security is to be achieved by developing 
social safety nets. This focuses on developing 
policies to ensure equal access to basic social 
services, to expand social protection, to enable the 
poor to participate in product and labour markets, 
to help children and the elderly in especially diffi-
cult circumstances, to develop an effective system 
of emergency and social relief solutions, and to 
increase participation. 
The strategy also takes cross-cutting issues into 
account. Gender equity and environmental protec-
tion are specific goals in the CPRGS: Environ-
mental Protection and Gender Equality and 
Women’s Empowerment (Part II of the strategy). 
Specific sections in the strategy are dedicated to 
both issues. They are also integrated into other 
parts of the strategy, though only gender empow-
erment is an integral part of sectoral policies to be 
measured by gender-specific indicators: “Raise 
the share of female labours to 50 % in total new 
jobs by 2010; eliminate gender gap at primary 
and secondary education by 2005; eliminate illit-
eracy for 95 % of illiterate under-40-year-old 
women by 2005 and 100 % by 2010.“ 
Furthermore, the strategy is embedded in a coher-
ent policy context. The overarching plan currently 
in effect is the Ten-year Socio-Economic Devel-
opment Strategy 2001-2010, which lays out Vie t-
nam's development path, with the Poverty Alle-
viation Strategy as the subsequent strategy for 
targeted poverty reduction.  
The CPRGS was developed in addition to these 
existing plans because the latter did not qualify as 
a basis for concessional loans from the World 
Bank and IMF. The plans do either not focus suf-
ficiently on poverty reduction or fail to integrate 
poverty alleviation targets that can be quantified 
and monitored.  
All strategies are linked, but tensions exist within 
strategies, and these are also reflected between 
strategies. The tensions identified - not surprising 
for a country with a legacy of central planning and 
pursuing a concept of ‘Socialist Market Economy’ 
- are the following: 
Economic protection versus economic integration 
All three strategies state that further integration 
into the international economy will be sought. 
However, the Socio-economic Development 
Strategy also sets out the goal of building an inde-
pendent, autonomous economy. There is a contra-
diction between protection of national industries 
on the one hand and foreign trade liberalisation on 
the other.  
State Economy versus Market Economy 
Although both strategies, the Socio-economic 
Development Strategy and the CPRGS, aim at 
developing the private sector, they also target 
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selective investments in sectors28 in which the 
Socio-economic Development Strategy assigns a 
leading role to state-owned enterprises. The role 
of the state – market regulator or producer of 
goods and services – remains unclear. 
Social Equity versus Economic Growth 
The Poverty Alleviation Strategy prioritises social 
equity, the Socio-economic Development strategy 
places economic growth at the centre of develop-
ment. The CPRGS seeks to balance economic 
growth and social equity by adapting and integrat-
ing the Millennium Development Goals. 
Top-Down versus Bottom-Up 
The targeted Poverty Alleviation Strategy sub-
scribes to a top-down approach. By comparison, 
the CPRGS adopts a bottom-up approach. It aims 
at directly strengthening the role of local author i-
ties and the population in allocating resources and 
implementing poverty alleviation projects. 
Given that the CPRGS is linked to the Socio-
economic Development Strategy and the Poverty 
Alleviation Strategy, which cover a ten-year pe-
riod, it may be concluded that the CPRGS is based 
on a long-term perspective. 
Is the Strategy Results-oriented and Priori-
tised?  
Four complexes have to be considered with regard 
to the principle of results orientation: First, goals 
and indicators have to be stated clearly; second, 
the strategy’s policies as well as its goals and in-
dicators have to be linked; third, a monitoring and 
evaluation system has to be established; fourth, 
responsibilities have to defined. 
                                                 
28 The related expressions in the CPRGS are more carefully 
worded and have changed throughout the drafting pro-
cess. The fourth draft states: “Selectively build some 
heavy industry facilities (oil and gas, metallurgy, manu-
factures, basic chemicals, fertilizer, construction mate-
rial...), information technology and telecommunication 
industries.” ( p.76), the final draft avoids sectoral target-
ing altogether. 
First, the strategy includes clearly formulated 
goals, targets and indicators29 which define the 
results to be achieved. The CPRGS comprises two 
sets of development goals. The first is a set of 
economic goals, whereas the second is a set of 
social development objectives based on MDGs 
adapted to the Vietnamese context. By integrating 
the two sets of goals, links are forged between 
macroeconomic development and poverty reduc-
tion in the CPRGS. The general linkages between 
growth and poverty reduction are explained in the 
CPRGS. The social impact assessments of pro-
posed measures are, however, still weak. In the 
interviews, potential negative impacts of trade 
liberalisation or SOE reforms on poverty were 
noted as examples in this context.  
Vietnam was able to use recent poverty assess-
ments and thematic studies as a basis for formula t-
ing the CPRGS goals (see Chapter 4.3.2). Our 
interviews with different stakeholders confirmed 
that this material facilitated and improved the 
setting of goals, targets and indicators, and conse-
quently contributed to improved orientation to-
wards results. 
Second, the goals have to be linked to policy mea-
sures if they are to be reached. The Policy Matrix 
in Appendix 3 of the strategy lists the proposed 
measures. However, the Policy Matrix does not 
include measures for each goal formulated in Ap-
pendix 1. Furthermore, the measures are not al-
ways reflected in the indicators. For example, in 
the area of environmental protection policy meas-
ures are linked to poverty reduction outcomes. 
They target a healthy environment for the poor, 
including wastewater and rubbish treatment sta-
tions, latrines in rural areas, and developing natu-
ral resource management with respect to the poor. 
However, the indicators used to measure progress 
towards the goal of environmental protection do 
not reflect the policy measures and refer only 
generally to forest coverage and levels of biodi-
versity.  
                                                 
29 See Socialist Republic of Vietnam (2002c), pp.27-32, 
Appendix 1, pp.90-97. 
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Third, progress towards the set objectives is to be 
tracked and ensured by introducing a monitoring 
and evaluation system. CPRGS indicators are to 
be used to monitor and evaluate policy implemen-
tation and progress in poverty reduction. The mo-
nitoring system will make it possible to collect 
quantitative and qualitative data, which, when 
analysed, can be fed back into the decision-
making process. Hence, monitoring and evalua-
tion will help to improve the implementation and 
reformulation of the CPRGS to achieve the de-
sired results. (For an assessment of the indicator 
framework and the prospects for implementing the 
monitoring and evaluation system see Chapter 
6.3.1.) 
Fourth, results orientation was improved by de-
veloping an institutional framework for imple-
menting the CPRGS. Different institutions will be 
responsible for implementing the CPRGS: line 
ministries, provincial governments and overarch-
ing co-ordinating bodies that still have to be set 
up. Nevertheless, not all of the competences of the 
newly established bodies are defined clearly, and 
this could negatively affect the achievement of 
results. 
To ensure a realistic and feasible strategy, meas-
ures to achieve the stated goals have to be costed. 
Hence, results orientation is closely linked to the 
last content principle, prioritisation.  
Only in the fourth draft and in final version of the 
CPRGS are prioritisation and costing included in 
detail. The chapter on ‘Resource Mobilisation and 
Allocation’ is divided into three parts. Whereas 
parts one and two relate to the Five-year Devel-
opment Plan 2001-2005, the third part attempts to 
estimate overall medium-term budget expendi-
tures and, finally, expenditures for 2003-2005 for 
selected poverty-related sectors,  based on the 
support provided by the World Bank’s ‘costing 
mission’. 
It appears that insufficient progress has been made 
in linking the Five-year Development Plan with 
the state budget and the development of an 
MTEF. The figures are obviously incomplete and 
not consistent. Five-year Plan and budgetary data 
have never been systematically linked in Vietnam, 
and medium-term budgetary planning is still in an 
early stage. Obviously, the budgetary data avail-
able are not sufficient to establish a meaningful 
MTEF. The World Bank ‘costing mission’ was 
unable to close this gap within the few weeks of 
its work. Much more systematic work on public 
expenditure planning and management is required 
(see Chapter 6.1.3). 
6 Challenges for Implementing the 
CPRGS 
Implementation of the CPRGS will require devel-
opment of a series of action programs that are to 
be elaborated in the near future. In some areas, 
these action programs have already been devel-
oped, in other areas the CPRGS (as well as the 
Ten-year-Socio-economic-Strategy) mention only 
the targets to be achieved, but not the ways and 
means in which they are to be achieved. We have 
identified four critical areas in which we see bot-
tlenecks to the implementation of the strategy: 
?? Implementing structural reforms 
?? Institutionalising participation 
?? Monitoring and feedback of results 
?? Harmonising donor contributions 
All four areas are covered in the CPRGS. How-
ever, it appears that more work has to be done to 
clarify the concrete steps that need to be taken in 
these areas, both by the GOV and the donors, to 
achieve the ambitious targets for growth and pov-
erty reduction. 
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6.1 Implementing Structural Reforms  
6.1.1 SOE Reform and Private Sector 
Promotion 
This area is critical for the achievement of growth 
and employment, and thus poverty reduction tar-
gets, because of its close link to further integration 
of Vietnam into the world economy, i.e. to trade 
and FDI policies. Vietnam is no longer in a pos i-
tion to pursue ‘self-reliant’ growth policies with-
out regard to their effects on its integration into 
the world market. The question of the competi-
tiveness of Vietnamese goods and services in lo-
cal as well as in export markets is pivotal. In view 
of its planned accession to the WTO, Vietnam has 
little time left to adjust its legal and political 
framework as well as the structure of its enter-
prises. In some sectors, Vietnamese products and 
services are competitive. In many other sectors, 
however, Vietnamese enterprises still have a long 
way to go to achieve international competitive-
ness. 
Despite recent successes in the creation of new 
enterprises, based on the new Enterprise Law 
adopted in 2000, Vietnam lags behind most com-
petitors in terms of the numbers, size and techno-
logical standards of enterprises, state and private 
alike. Stepped-up international competition will 
pose a severe threat to the existence of enterprises 
and thus to employment creation as well. 
The SOE reforms outlined in the CPRGS and the 
more detailed action plan of the government as 
well as the government’s recent activities in pr i-
vate sector promotion (Resolution of the fifth 
Plenum of the CPV in April 2002) do not fully 
grasp the challenges ahead. As yet there is no 
clear strategy on how to achieve competitiveness 
in critical sectors in the medium term. The gov-
ernment’s drive for modernisation concentrates on 
investments in state enterprises, which are sup-
posed to play a leading role in core sectors of the 
economy. However, there are no clear targets as to 
when these enterprises are to achieve competi-
tiveness. In the private sector there is a severe lack 
of the resources needed to finance modernisation. 
It will not be sufficient to multiply the number of 
SMEs and household enterprises for the sake of 
employment creation, as in the past, because the 
environment in which these enterprises have to 
operate will be more competitive than in the past. 
The CPRGS does not set out clear guidelines on 
how to reconcile the multiple targets of integra-
tion, competitiveness and employment creation. 
This incoherence will most probably lead to de-
lays in the implementation of measures related to 
those targets. 
6.1.2 Banking Reform 
Reform of the banking system is not an end in 
itself. Modernisation of enterprises, growth and 
employment generation require a smoothly func-
tioning financial sector capable of mobilising 
private savings (which are now to a large extent 
channelled into the real estate sector) as well as 
provision of enterprises with short- and long-term 
funds. Due to a large volume of non-performing 
loans and an under-developed culture of commer-
cial lending in the banking sector, this function 
cannot as yet be met. 
Furthermore, despite advances made in the rural 
finance system in recent years, rural areas are still 
not yet sufficiently supplied with banking ser-
vices, and this is an urgent prerequisite for the 
development of disadvantaged rural areas, and in 
particular for the establishment of  rural SMEs 
that can create increased off-farm employment. 
The government's banking reform programme, as 
laid out in the CPRGS and agreed on with the 
IMF and the World Bank in the framework of the 
PRGF/PRSC-credits, is advancing with some 
delays, particularly as regards  reform of the four 
state-owned commercial banks. Insufficient pro-
gress in this area will slow down the development 
of urban enterprises as well as the rural economy. 
This will make Vietnam more dependent on the 
mobilisation of foreign capital to meet growth and 
poverty reduction targets. 
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6.1.3 Public Expenditure Reform 
One important bottleneck for the implementation 
of the CPRGS, and, more generally, for further 
poverty reduction in Vietnam is the lack of trans-
parency and accountability of the Vietnamese 
public expenditure system. An efficient system of 
generating public revenues will expand the gov-
ernment's capacities to invest in poverty allevia-
tion activities. A fair and predictable system of 
taxation will reduce the financial burden for poor 
people. Public expenditure has to be prioritised in 
such a way as to maximise its effects. This is a 
necessary first step to prioritise expenditures for 
the CPRGS. Thus, a transparent and accountable 
fiscal system will make it easier to base the strat-
egy on realistic and precise costing. 
A large number of international donors emphasise 
that the current lack of accountability and trans-
parency could be an important bottleneck for the 
implementation of the CPRGS. Most donors still 
do not consider budget funding a realistic option 
for the near future. 
Overall Budget Transparency 
In 1999, the Vietnamese Government published, 
for the first time, its financial accounts (from 
1997) along with the 1999 budget plan. The 
budget data are still in a highly aggregated form 
and do not contain several off-budget accounts. 
Financial transactions between SOEs and the 
banking sector, which are future liabilities to the 
public sector, are also included either. Further-
more, little information from sub-national levels 
of government is available at the centre, and not 
all communal expenditures are included in the 
national budget. There are estimates that, at best, 
75% of de facto budgetary transactions are cov-
ered by the budget. All in all, it can be said that 
"Vietnam has still some distance to go to meet the 
minimum standards of the IMF Fiscal Transpar-
ency Code."30 
                                                 
30 GoV-Donor Working Group on Public Expenditure 
Review (2000), p.10. 
Revenue Sources at Different Administra-
tive Levels  
Government revenues as share of GDP have fallen 
in recent years, partly because of a slowing econ-
omy, but also because of weaknesses in tax ad-
ministration. Since lower revenues constrain pro-
poor expenditures, reforming the tax system is 
essential for poverty reduction. Measures aimed at 
broadening the tax base and making the system of 
taxation more simple, fair and transparent are 
announced in the CPRGS. A strengthened tax 
administration may reduce revenue losses by ap-
plying taxes consistently and avoiding discretion-
ary exemptions.  
A fundamental problem of the Vietnamese public 
revenue system is its lack of fiscal decentralisa-
tion. Sub-national administrative levels have de 
facto no revenue-raising power of their own. Ta-
xes are assigned to lower levels, but only in an 
accounting sense. The centre determines the rate 
structure of all taxes and collects taxes through the 
General Taxation Department (GTD). There is an 
incentive for provinces to underestimate revenues, 
because provinces are able to retain collections in 
excess of budget estimates. This system favours 
better-off provinces, since the latter have better 
capacities to broaden the gap between estimates 
and reality. So poor provinces are even more dis-
advantaged, and their options to decide on in-
vestments are limited. The resources for districts 
and communes in poor provinces hence often fail 
to cover the costs of delivering social services. At 
the Quang Binh consultation workshop, partic i-
pants criticised the limited power of communes to 
influence the allocation of resources. 
National Programmes and support from interna-
tional donors play an important role funding pov-
erty alleviation activities in poor provinces, 
whereas province investment resources are very 
limited. National Programmes cover services con-
sidered to be of national importance, such as hun-
ger eradication and poverty reduction (Programme 
133, the former HEPR, now called the Poverty 
Alleviation Strategy), family planning, provision 
of clean drinking water, etc. Local governments 
are responsible for implementing National Pro-
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grammes, though the allocation of resources re-
mains at the central level.  
One of the measures proposed by the Ministry of 
Finance is to increase untied budget allocations 
and support through National Programmes so as 
to strengthen provincial autonomy. But this kind 
of measure would even further increase depend-
ency on the centre. Furthermore, it could lead to 
an non-transparent "money bidding" mechanism 
and "contract implementation [that] are often 
discussed and decided in secret rooms," as the 
MPI has already noted critically with regard to 
National Programs 133 and 135. 31 Currently, the 
GoV does not appear to be willing to assign real 
revenue raising powers to the provinces through 
locally based taxes. The CPRGS does not provide 
for any such step, calling instead merely for "in-
creasing the sense of initiative and creativity at 
sectoral and local levels in the task of managing 
their finances with their assigned budgets". 32 
Due to the lack of fiscal decentralisation, local 
governments, especially from poor provinces, 
depend to a large extent on local fees and so-
called "voluntary" contributions for local services, 
such as water supply, electricity or education. In 
some communes, these charges account for more 
than 50% of overall revenues.33 The 1997/98 
VLSS suggests that in poorer communes those 
fees and contributions are higher than elsewhere. 
The 1999 PPA of Ha Tinh calculated the taxes for 
three hypothetical households, noting that "poor" 
households contribute 39%, "middle" households 
35% and "rich" households 28% of their income.34 
Instead of being levied progressively, some con-
tributions are levied per head, a fact which under-
                                                 
31 MPI: "Residents' participation in State management", 
handout of the presentation at the Quang Binh consulta-
tion workshop, February 2002. 
32 CPRGS, Second Draft, part 3, II.1. 
33 See: GoV - Donor Working Group on Public Expenditure 
Review (2000), p.23. 
34 See Action Aid Vietnam (1999), p.46. 
lines the assumption of a disproportionate tax 
burden, as the PER points out.35  
Expenditure at Different Administrative 
Levels 
There are inconsistencies in the CPRGS public 
expenditure data provided by the MoF, the MPI, 
and sector ministries because of differences in 
estimates of capital spending and the classification 
of capital and recurrent expenditures. Moreover, 
sector ministries do not classify expenditures from 
ODA according to budget codes. Different classi-
fication systems are used for budget allocations 
and treasury releases on the one hand and actual 
expenditures by spending agencies and the MoF 
on the other, and this makes it impossible to com-
pare budgeted and actual spending at a disaggre-
gated level. More co-operation and information 
sharing between line ministries, the MoF and the 
MPI on a uniform classification for recurrent and 
capital spending would improve budget transpar-
ency and make possible a realistic costing of the 
CPRGS. 
Prioritising public expenditure is difficult, because 
the MPI is in charge of prioritising capital spend-
ing, whereas the MoF is responsible for recurrent 
spending. Insufficient co-operation between the 
two ministries aimed at ensuring an appropriate 
balance still seems to be an important problem. 
Too low recurrent expenditures lead to bottle-
necks in operation and maintenance, e.g. a signif i-
cant proportion of irrigation capacity is not used 
and routine maintenance of roads is insufficient. 
The separation of recurrent from capital spending 
hinders any consistent prioritisation of the annual 
plans of sector ministries. Sector ministries have 
to submit planning for recurrent expenditures to 
the MoF, whereas planning for capital expendi-
tures are submitted to the MPI. Hence, finalisation 
of annual sectoral plans demands close co-
operation between the three ministries involved. 
                                                 
35 See GoV - Donor Working Group on Public Expenditure 
Review (2000), p.23. 
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Since the sector ministries do not receive reports 
on actual expenditures in their sectors, they are 
unable to evaluate and review policies. These 
problems in prioritising public expenditure in 
general highlight the difficulties that occur in pr i-
oritising policies of the CPRGS and linking it to a 
realistic expenditure plan. 
Inefficient and non-transparent allocation of  re-
sources was repeatedly mentioned by participants 
of the Quang Binh consultation workshop. This 
criticism points to weaknesses in the system of 
redistribution between poorer and better-off prov-
inces. One representative of a poor province 
stressed that rich provinces receive more money 
from the central level, because the budget alloca-
tion mechanisms leave room for negotiations, and 
"rich provinces speak loudly." The criteria for 
redistributing funds among provinces are indeed 
unclear, and apart from offic ial norms, other crite-
ria may be used by the MoF during the budget-
negotiating process. The need for a new redistri-
bution system between poorer and better-off prov-
inces was emphasised in several interviews. The 
CPRGS, however, is not very specific on this 
issue. 
Lack of Fiscal Transparency and Account-
ability: a Focus on the Local Level 
At local administrative levels, Decree 29, the 
Grassroots Democracy Decree, requires publica-
tion of the estimate and the final budget as well as 
of receipts and expenditures of various funds and 
projects that may not occur in the budget itself. 
Decree 225 provides for a mechanism for house-
holds to raise questions about communal financial 
issues. 
Despite these requirements set out in Decree 29, 
none of the six communes in which surveys were 
undertaken for the Public Expenditure Review 
(PER), have published its budget or actual reve-
nues and expenditures. The Poverty Task Force's 
paper on Governance estimates that 40% of com-
munes show very good performance and in a-
round 17% of communes implementation has not 
gone far beyond formality. The MoF acknowl-
edges these shortcomings and stresses that ensur-
ing the implementation of Decree 29 , a govern-
ance indicator in the CPRGS, will be one of the 
next steps in public expenditure reform. 
One reason for insufficient fiscal transparency 
may simply be a lack of capacity. Often, local 
level administrations are just not able to provide 
all of the budgetary information required. There 
are no paid civil servants at the commune level, 
and part-time employees without any specific 
training are in charge of the task.  
6.1.4 Public Administration Reform 
Reforming public administration is an important 
contribution toward removing bottlenecks in the 
implementation of the CPRGS. After all, it is to a 
large extent public administration that has to im-
plement the CPRGS. Ideally, public administra-
tion can be held accountable for its actions, oper-
ates on the basis of transparent decision-making 
processes, bases is activities not on arbitrary mea-
sures but on the rule of law, and enables civil so-
ciety to participate in public affairs. Ensuring 
accountability, transparency, predictability and 
participation would considerably strengthen the 
prospects for successful implementation of the 
CPRGS.36  
Achievements of Public Administration 
Reform to Date37 
In 1995, measures aimed at reforming the public 
sector in Vietnam were announced for the first 
time as a "Public Administration Reform" (PAR). 
Administrative reform is led by the Government 
Committee on Organisation and Personnel 
                                                 
36 Transparency, accountability, predictability and participa-
tion are four main pillars of good governance the Poverty 
Task Force refers to; see: Poverty Task Force (2001c), 
p.1. 
37 See Mc Carty (2001); Franz (2001); UNDP (2001b); 
Poverty Task Force (2001c). 
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(GCOP), an organ with ministerial rank. Few a-
chievements have been made thus far in reform of 
the legal basis for administration, public service, 
and the ministerial system. A reform of the Enter-
prise Law has made licence procedures and other 
administrative procedures for enterprises more 
efficient. A modern definition of 'public service' 
has replaced the term 'cadre'. Furthermore, minis-
tries have been reduced in number from 28 to 23, 
and the number of committees with ministerial 
rank has been reduced to 6. The number of pro-
vincial government departments has been reduced 
accordingly. 38 
A "PAR Master-Programme" was adopted in Sep-
tember 2001, identifying several shortcomings 
that need to be redressed: an inappropriate and 
sometimes contradictory legal framework, unclear 
assignment of responsibilities (between public and 
private sectors, but also within different adminis-
trative levels) and unclear organisational struc-
tures, as well as slow and inefficient performance, 
and in part reluctance, to fulfil assigned responsi-
bilities.39 As past experiences show, it may be 
expected that reforming the public administration 
will be a very slow process; in some areas this 
might even be a question of generations. Thus, the 
role played by PAR in the CPRGS – mentioned as 
important policy area, but without targets and 
indicators – may be too weak to ensure appropri-
ate implementation. 
The Leading Role of the Communist Party 
and the Concept of Consensus Governance 
According to the Vietnamese constitution, the 
Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) is the "guid-
ing force of the State and society." Even though 
the former central planning system has gradually 
been abolished, all control remains focused in the 
CPV. It exercises this control within a decision-
making paradigm that may be termed "consensus 
                                                 
38 See Franz (2001), p.4. 
39 Idem. 
governance."40 Theoretically, the Party stands 
above particular interests within society and State 
institutions and concentrates on maximising na-
tional welfare. Since the Party decides, following 
extensive consultations, what is best, no competi-
tion is necessary. With a view to embedding inter-
est groups in this system, the latter are allowed to 
act within a monopoly structure, with  the Party at 
the top. This system works as long as there is only 
one interest group per issue-area. This may be one 
reason why there is still no legal place for inde-
pendent Vietnamese NGOs alongside the tradi-
tional mass organisations. Thanks to consensus 
governance, no single institution wants to stand 
out with a clear opinion that might challenge a 
consensus. In consequence, clear responsibilities 
of single institutions, or even individuals, are 
mostly avoided in favour of collective decision-
making. Consensus governance means not iron 
control but a slow and careful decision-making 
process involving and assigning equal responsibil-
ity to many stakeholders. On the one hand, this 
has made Vietnam's fundamental economic and 
societal change possible, without challenging the 
leading role of the Party. On the other hand, un-
clear responsibilities and decision-making proc-
esses make it difficult to implement ambitious 
strategies like the CPRGS.  
The leading role of the CPV has a direct impact 
on decision-making processes within administra-
tions. There are actually two hierarchical struc-
tures within each administration: the official one 
and a ‘real’ one which reflects Party membership 
and rank of officials. The speed and quality of 
administrative procedures are deeply influenced 
by the Party rank of the officials involved. Vari-
ous documents record the need for CPV consulta-
tion or approval. Senior government officials, 
almost without exception, are at the same time 
CPV members. "The government is viewed as the 
structure through which Party agreed policy is 
implemented."41 
                                                 
40 Mc Carty (2001), p.4. 
41 Mc Carty (2001), p.4. 
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Weakness of Law Enforcement 
As yet there is no comprehensive legal system to 
synchronise and co-ordinate the making and im-
plementation of law, jurisdiction, legal education, 
legal information and legal dissemination activ i-
ties. For example, Vietnam has neither a compre-
hensive administrative law nor an administrative 
court. This leads to uncertainties as to whether 
one can rely on a decree or a law, even if it has 
passed the National Assembly. To be enforced, a 
law must be accompanied by implementation 
guidelines of the responsible ministry. But even in 
this case, consistent implementation and applica-
tion cannot be assured, since law-making or the 
goal definitions are rarely linked to clear respon-
sibilities for their implementation. How set goals 
are to be reached and what instruments are called 
for – e.g. by enforcement of a regulation – are 
issues that are often not addressed. Because of 
these shortcomings in the legal system, civil ser-
vants sometimes are unable to act in accordance 
with the rule of law, as is required of them. 
Unclear Responsibilities and Inefficient 
Organisational Structure at the Central 
Level and at Sub-national Levels 
Currently, there are 23 ministries, 6 organs of 
ministerial rank and 25 central offices under the 
direct authority of the Prime Minister. This num-
ber of institutions at the central level would call 
for a clear assignment of responsibilities, clear 
decision-making processes and a transparent 
power structure to function appropriately. But 
central institutions often lack rules of procedure, 
and if there are such rules, they mostly lack suffi-
cient precision. This is also the case with regard to 
the assignment of responsibilities among institu-
tions, and the consequence is that either none of 
the institutions feels responsible or several deal 
with the same task at the same time. 
Since co-ordination between ministries was al-
ready weak during the PRSP drafting process (see 
Chapter 4), the same shortcomings may be ex-
pected when it comes to implementing the 
CPRGS. Nevertheless, drafting, implementing, 
monitoring and feeding back results into a 
re-drafting of the strategy is an ongoing process 
that is also a learning process for every stake-
holder involved. It appears that the drafting proc-
ess has already changed some national stake-
holders' views, as the process forces them to share 
ideas, to discuss and to identify inter-sectoral links 
and take the broader context into account. This is 
progress that is not measurable but nevertheless 
important. 
At sub-national levels, the same shortcomings 
exist that were identified for the central level: a 
lack of or inadequate preciseness of rules of pro-
cedure within institutions as well as unclear as-
signment of responsibilities between institutions. 
Moreover, the lower the administrative level, the 
lower the level of civil servants qualifications. As 
mentioned above, at commune level, there are no 
civil servants at all but only part-time employees. 
Lack of Adequate Decentralisation 
The relation of power between the centre and the 
provinces is ambiguous. Officially, provinces still 
have little authority, since little headway has been 
made with decentralisation. However, "consensus 
governance fosters a lack of clarity about respon-
sibilities down to the lowest levels."42 Combined 
with weak control mechanisms on the part of the 
centre, government influence on provinces is de 
facto limited, and this is even more the case with 
its influence on districts and communes. Ministe-
rial branches at sub-national levels, so-called de-
partments, have to report to both the People's 
Committee at the same administrative level and 
the respective ministry at the central level. This 
makes decision-making processes even lengthier 
and power relations less transparent. A clear as-
signment of author ities between the centre and 
sub-national level would make this double report-
ing system (the so-called double control or sub-
mission) superfluous. 
                                                 
42 Mc Carty (2001), p.16. 
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Decentralisation that strengthens sub-national 
administrative levels may improve the prospects 
for sustainable implementation of the CPRGS. 
Competent and flexible provincial, district and 
communal administrations would be more respon-
sive to people's needs and demands, and such 
administrations would be better able to adapt the 
strategy to local conditions and decide on prior i-
ties. However, assigning responsibilities to sub-
national levels could have the opposite effect, as 
long as this does not go hand in hand with a 
strengthening of know-how and personnel and 
financial capacities. The CPRGS recognises the 
need to "implement more vigorously the decen-
tralisation of public administration ... while 
strengthening the capacity of the local administra-
tive apparatus..." 
All in all, decentralisation may have a positive 
effect on the implementation of the CPRGS only 
if responsibilities between the centre and sub-
national levels are more clearly defined, control-
mechanisms established, and decentralisation 
implemented as required in the CPRGS itself.  
Omnipresence of 'Petty Corruption' 
So-called 'petty corruption' seems to be a part of 
day-to-day administrative procedures. Lower-
level civil servants receive very low wages, and 
thus it is a common practice to increase incomes 
by, for instance, levying contributions arbitrarily 
or diverting project resources. This is a heavy 
burden for poor people. Furthermore, it hampers 
implementation of the CPRGS at the local level. 
Since the regulatory framework is imprecise and 
non-transparent, it is in some cases even difficult 
to distinguish between corrupt and legal practices. 
Corruption is not taboo in the Government's list of 
shortcomings, but cases of corruption or disobedi-
ence to superiors are mostly dealt with through 
internal channels – this lack of transparency aids 
the State in its desire to cultivate an image of itself 
as leading the way in fighting corruption. Some-
times, cases of corruption and punishment are 
made public to set an example. But this can not be 
called a systematic way of fighting corruption. 
In conclusion, the paradigm of consensus govern-
ance leads to unclear decision-making processes 
and non-transparent power relations. Inefficient 
and ineffective administrative procedures increase 
vulnerability and reduce opportunities for poor 
people, and they also have direct impacts on the 
implementation of the CPRGS. The PAR and the 
CPRGS's chapter on administrative reform men-
tion shortcomings and measures to be taken. Nev-
ertheless, it is questionable whether government 
will be able to reform itself, since there the need 
for the GoV to reform its public administration is 
not as urgent and direct as it was in the case of 
economic reforms when "doi moi" started out. 
6.2 Institutionalising Participation 
Despite the fact that Vietnam is governed by a 
one-party system, it does have certain elements of 
participation. Following the sixth Party Congress 
in 1986, the Vietnamese Government introduced 
four dimensions of participation that were to en-
hance the country’s development: people know, 
people discuss, people do, people check. 
Implementing the CPRGS requires institutiona l-
ised participation for three reasons: first, partic i-
pation is crucial for gathering information as the 
necessary basis for designing pro-poor develop-
ment policies. Second, participation enables peo-
ple to develop ownership in poverty alleviation 
programmes. Their involvement empowers them 
to develop their own initiatives to overcome pov-
erty. Third, participation in policy dialogues im-
plies exchanging information. This exchange dis-
seminates best practices and leads to greater 
transparency in the decision-making process. The 
result will be improved government accountabil-
ity. This process, in turn, will improve the gov-
ernance of development activ ities. 
The CPRGS drafting process has given rise ad hoc 
participatory processes in which civic engagement 
of different stakeholder groups at various levels 
can be observed. The challenge is to institutiona l-
ise these forms of dialogue to ensure sustainable 
implementation of the strategy. 
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6.2.1 Gaps in the System of 
Representation – the Limited 
Number of Stakeholders  
Due to the dominant position of the Communist 
Party, the number of stakeholder groups in Vie t-
nam is limited. The Party considers NGOs and 
private-sector representatives as a potential threat, 
since they have begun to strive for representation. 
As a result, the number of stakeholder groups has 
been restricted. 
Looking at the landscape of stakeholder-groups, it 
becomes apparent that the government, closely 
intertwined with the Party, dominates develop-
ment activities – followed by donors and interna-
tional NGOs. The private sector and civil society 
are only slowly emerging among stakeholder 
groups. Despite the country’s rapid integration in 
the world economy, the private sector has only 
recently found full acceptance. At the fifth plenary 
session in April 2002, the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party reaffirmed the important 
role of the private sector. It committed itself to 
“encourage and facilitate the development of the 
private economic sector.”43 and recognized it as 
equal to the state sector. However, independent 
private sector organisations have not yet been 
authorised.  
Vietnamese civil society organisations are limited 
to informal interest groups. At the local level, 
vocational or interest groups have been formed, 
including clubs for duck raising, fishery, educa-
tion services, and even for female -headed house-
holds in Ha Tinh province. Their influence, how-
ever, is limited to the local level. NGOs at the 
national level exist, but they are forced to work on 
an informal basis. Vietnam lacks a legal frame-
work for civil society organisations, and thus they 
can play no more than a limited role. However, 
the CPRGS provides for a greater role for NGOs. 
In Appendix 3, it states the aim to: “encourage 
NGOs and socio-political organisations to take 
                                                 
43 Communist Party of Vietnam (2002). 
part in poverty reduction by providing a legal 
framework for NGOs.”44 
Mass organisations such as the Fatherland Front, 
the Farmer’s Union and the Youth Union are well 
represented down to the local level. However, 
they cannot be considered as civil society organi-
sations since they are closely intertwined with 
government and Party. The interviews revealed, 
however, that the nature of some mass organisa-
tions can be considered as similar to civil society 
organisations. In particular, the Women’s Union 
represents the interests of its members in part 
thanks to its ability to consult with its members at 
every administrative level, including the village 
level. 
The Parliament only appears on the margin. It has 
only limited power in policy-making. It has no 
influence on the budget, it lacks professional 
members and is unable to rely on support units to 
conduct research activities in preparation for deci-
sions set to be voted on. However, since the elec-
tions in September 2002, the number of profes-
sional staff in the parliament has increased to 
20 % of its members, and the parliament has taken 
greater control over the budget. 
Lastly, the poor themselves are underrepresented. 
The poor have limited opportunities to articulate 
their interests. As noted above, interest groups of 
the poor at the local level do not extend beyond 
the village level. Civil society organisations at the 
national level lack a legal basis. Furthermore, 
members of Parliament have no incentive to rep-
resent the poor. The poor are also underrepre-
sented in government institutions, in particular 
women and ethnic minorities, who suffer dis-
proportionately from poverty. One representative 
of the Committee for Ethnic Minorities and 
Mountainous Areas Quang Binh (CEMMA) con-
firmed that not a single ethnic minority worker is 
employed in government institutions beyond the 
commune level in Quang Binh Province. To 
counter this situation, the CPRGS aims at increas-
                                                 
44 Socialist Republic of Vietnam (2002d), Appendix 3. 
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ing the representation of women and ethnic mi-
norities in government bodies.45 
Although recent changes have opened the way for 
new political players, one can conclude that the 
number of stakeholder groups is still limited. This 
situation leads to the exclusion of interests of 
weaker population groups in decision-making. 
6.2.2 Differences in What is Meant by 
Participation 
Before participation can be institutionalised, 
stakeholders need to agree on the level of partic i-
pation they want to institutionalise. Different un-
derstandings of participation imply that different 
levels of participation are sought for. The inter-
views have shown that everybody agrees on the 
importance of participation for implementing the 
CPRGS, but that there are difference in what is 
understood under participation. 
External Development Partners 
Some stakeholders consider participation as a 
useful tool in designing meaningful poverty re-
duction programmes for the poor, for example in 
the form of participatory poverty assessments. 
Others, especially multilateral donors, stress the 
fact that participation is crucial for reducing cor-
ruption. Looking in the same direction, some 
stakeholders, including the GTZ, understand par-
ticipation as one way to further institutional re-
form and to advance democratisation. Yet another 
group, headed by international NGOs, holds pos i-
tion more concerned with the grassroots level. 
These NGOs understand participation as empow-
ering people to fight for their rights, thereby 
achieving greater control over their lives.  
Vietnamese Stakeholders 
The way in which participation is understood var-
ies within the government. The central govern-
ment is afraid of people’s dissatisfaction at the 
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grassroots-level, which has historically endan-
gered the government’s power. It is therefore ea-
ger to increase participation at the local level in 
order to address people’s needs. The provincial 
government in Son La is striving for participation 
because this improves governance through a better 
relationship between government and people. 
However, the traditional top-down thinking is still 
widespread. One representative of CEMMA at the 
central level stated that: “Not every official at the 
provincial level understands that they must pro-
vide democracy to the people.” This statement 
reveals that democracy is becoming a target that 
must be achieved through its provision. One rep-
resentative of the provincial government in Ha 
Tinh confirms that participation “is a very impor-
tant wish from the central government.” The mass 
organisations we interviewed did not have any 
clear concept of participation. They referred to it 
in the context of their organisations only and sta-
ted that participation was ensured thanks to their 
hierarchical structures.  
Obviously, participation is not deeply rooted in 
official thinking. Institutiona lising participation is 
hindered by the fact that the concept of participa-
tion has not yet been fully accepted by the ad-
ministration and that there are still different un-
derstandings of participation, which extent to data 
gathering, democratisation and empowerment. 
In a consensus-based society like the Vietnamese, 
the only consensus that might realistically be 
reached is therefore the least common denomina-
tor. Indeed, the CPRGS limits participation to the 
local level. Furthermore, indicators of good gov-
ernance refer only to information sharing and 
monitoring46. The Policy Matrix in Appendix 3 of 
the CPRGS, however, also includes participation 
in implementing rural infrastructure projects. Al-
though participation in decision-making is empha-
sised (“Enhance Grassroots Democracy and 
Strengthen Dialogue between Local Governments 
and Poor Communes”), no indicators have been 
developed to measure participation. Given the 
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legacy of central planning, participation in deci-
sion-making may for this reason not be considered 
as a target and, as a result, be given less attention 
than other policies. 
6.2.3 Varying Levels of Participation 
6.2.3.1 Intra-government Participation 
Intra-government participation is very weak. Gi-
ven the comprehensive nature of the CPRGS, 
many policies laid out in the strategy will have to 
be implemented by different line ministries at 
different levels. It is therefore important for them 
to become committed to overall national goals of 
poverty reduction and to develop ownership in 
implementing the parts of the CPRGS for which 
they are responsible. 
However, the lack of horizontal participation (see 
Chapter 6.1) reduces the opportunities open to line 
ministries to develop ownership. At the national 
level, however, the lack of intra-government par-
tic ipation has been partly compensated for by over 
20 partnership groups, including the Poverty 
Working Group, in which co-ordination has been 
taking place. 
There have been hardly any mechanisms estab-
lished to achieve vertical intra-government par-
ticipation. Although regional consultation work-
shops were carried out in the context of drafting 
the CPRGS, they were limited to four workshops 
for 61 provinces and two cities; they were organ-
ised on an ad hoc basis and financed by donors. 
Parliamentarians have not contributed to the de-
sign of development policies through their local 
knowledge, and local governments have not 
joined the policy dialogue, for example through 
their representations in national fora. 
6.2.3.2 Civic Engagement at the Local 
Level 
Unlike to civic engagement at the central level, 
which is almost non-existent in Vietnam, civic 
engagement at the local level has been increasing 
significantly in connection with the Grassroots 
Democracy Decree (GDD). Impressive achieve-
ments can be observed in the areas of empower-
ment, sustainable poverty reduction and improved 
governance, although significant challenges still 
remain. 
Following openly expressed dissatisfaction with 
misconduct of local officials, the Vietnamese gov-
ernment issued Decree 29 in 1998, the GDD. It 
provides instructions to increase participation in 
decision-making processes on local planning, 
infrastructure works and budget matters. It estab-
lishes mechanisms for accountability and trans-
parency (See Box 8 for contents of the Decree). 
The decree has not yet been applied in the whole 
country. First evaluations show that provinces are 
implementing the Decree in different ways. 
Whereas the Province Son La has used the GDD 
to introduce Village Development Planning in the 
spirit of bottom-up development (see Box 9 9), Ha 
Tinh province has limited participation to certain 
programmes. 
Donors attach great importance to the Decree 
because they see it as an important tool to reduce 
corruption. One interview partner even stated that 
the implementation of the whole CPRGS depends 
on the progress made in implementing the GDD. 
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The strengths  of the GDD can be grouped around 
three areas: 
1. Empowerment 
The interviews have shown that an attitude of self-
reliance is emerging, in contrast to the customary 
reliance on state allocations from the central level. 
One commune-level interview partner stated: 
“Everything depends on the people. The develop-
ment will come first from the people, second from 
the local government officials and third from the 
central government and their support pro-
grammes.” People feel that they have more power 
in initiatives that concern their lives. One inter-
view partner summarised: “ The Decree changed 
the way decisions are made. People can partici-
pate in developing master plans. They have the 
right to decide what they can contribute and what 
assistance they need. ” 
2. Sustainable Poverty Alleviation Activities 
As a result of the GDD, people’s awareness of 
their opportunities in building and maintaining 
infrastructure has risen. The Village Development 
Planning carried out in Son La has led to a feeling 
of ownership that has caused people to contribute 
their labour to infrastructure projects. In Muong 
Lum, a commune in Son La, all inhabitants of the 
commune dedicate each 20th of the month to road-
building activities. Remote villages have agreed to 
provide bamboo for upgrading the irrigation sys-
tem, even though they will never be able to bene-
fit from it directly. The willingness to contribute 
labour to commune projects increases the effec-
tiveness of the use of government funds in the 
construction and maintenance of projects and 
leads to sustainable poverty alleviation. 
 
Box 8: The Grassroots Democracy Decree 
The Decree consists of four core-areas: 
1. Information 
The decree obliges local authorities to provide information on a wide range of matters, including the local budget, socio-
economic and land-use plans and outcomes of investigations regarding corruption. This section also defines the means 
of information, such as reports, posters, mass media and meetings between the population and members of the People’s 
Council. 
2. Consultation 
Before the People’s Committee is allowed to decide on certain matters, citizens must be consulted. The areas in which 
consultation is necessary include socio-economic and land-use planning, national projects on health, potable water and 
sanitation and the appointment of candidates for communal elections. The means used for consultation consist of ques-
tionnaires, village meetings, meetings of the mass organisations and a box set up to collect people’s opinions. 
3. Decision-making 
The Decree defines activities on which a majority of citizens must agree before they can be implemented. These include 
policies and the extent of contributions to infrastructure development, budget expenditure, rural internal laws to regulate 
communal life and the supervisory board for construction works. Under the leadership of the Party, the People’s Com-
mittee develops a tentative project plan that is discussed at village meetings in which the heads of households partici-
pate. Decisions can only be taken if two thirds of the people (households) are present. Minutes need to be taken. When 
meetings are not possible, the opinions of households may be solicited on paper slips. 
4. Control 
The Decree extends the areas in which the People’s Committee is accountable to the people. These comprise the budget, 
expenditure, land use and corruption. The Decree grants people the right to complain about corruption. Mass organisa-
tions are entitled to attend meetings of the People’s Council, and representatives of the people are allowed to attend as 
observers. The People’s Councils have to hold meetings to settle complaints. People’s Inspection Committees have to be 
set up to supervise government activities. 
Source: Grassroots Democracy Decree; see also KAS, 2001 
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3. Better Governance 
Joint decision-making processes have improved 
the relationship between government officials and 
the population. One interview partner at the prov-
ince level in Ha Tinh acknowledged that both the 
people and the government need to work together 
to achieve sustainable poverty alleviation. Simi-
larly, a local survey47 found that the GDD has 
increased trust in the administration. Furthermore, 
implementation of the Decree has increased the 
management capacity of local officials. Enhanced 
relationships between the government and the 
people as well as improved capacity at the local 
level have led to better governance. 
                                                 
47 See KAS (2001). 
Given these achievements, the importance of the 
GDD becomes clear. However, implementation 
has revealed challenges that will need to be ad-
dressed. They are structured according to the four 
dimensions of participation as defined by the 
Vietnamese Government: people know, people 
discuss, people do, people check. 
People Know 
Bottlenecks arise in the areas of generating and 
disseminating information. Commune-level offi-
cials complained about unclear information on 
how to implement laws. Lack of knowledge in 
areas subject to consultation makes it more diffi-
cult to process information. One member at the 
consultation workshop in Quang Binh added: 
“The responsible administration does not know 
how to disseminate information and to whom.” 
Even if it did know, the budget lacks funds for 
Box 9: Participatory Village Development Planning in Son La 
The Province Son La has introduced participatory Village Development Planning as part of the process of implementing the 
Grassroots Democracy Decree. Every year, the community assesses the present situation in the village and suggests necessary 
activities. Village development plans provide the basis for socio-economic development plans at the commune, district and 
province level, and to make this possible, funds are allocated from different sources, including National Programme 135. 
Institutionalising Village Development Planning has changed the planning system from the traditional top-down planning to 
bottom-up development.  
The planning process is summed up below: 
Village level 
At village meetings, which are attended by one or two representatives of each household, people  
– Evaluate the achievements of the past year 
– Identify opportunities and challenges in the coming year 
– Set development objectives 
– Identify activities and conditions to achieve the objectives  
– Prioritise activities 
– Define contributions from the inhabitants that are acceptable to the village 
Commune level 
– Commune level administration integrates the Village Development Plans 
District, Province Level 
– Relevant government departments approve the plan 
– Government officials assist in implementing the plan 
Source: Interviews; Le Viet Thai (2001) 
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printing information. The dissemination of infor-
mation is hindered further by the remoteness of 
villages that do not yet have access to the electric-
ity grid. Travel costs are not reimbursed, and the 
salary levels of local officials are so low that they 
are reluctant to travel to remote villages to pass on 
information. Other participants of the workshop 
complained about the poor quality of the mass 
media. Furthermore, poor areas are often inhab-
ited by ethnic minorities who do not speak Vie t-
namese. Language barriers add further to commu-
nication problems. 
To counter this situation, the CPRGS lists a num-
ber of measures, including improvement of the 
mass media, using of community’ radio and video 
facilities, dissemination of information directly to 
households and increased incentives for govern-
ment officials to provide information.48 
People Discuss 
In the context of Village Development Planning in 
Son La, people discuss development goals in the 
commune and prioritise investments to achieve 
them. One problem is the participation of house-
holds. The level of participation varies. Language 
barriers and low levels of education, combined 
with geographical remoteness, cause some people 
to stay at home. They feel that they cannot con-
tribute to the process. Government officials at the 
consultation workshop in Quang Binh complained 
that women are underrepresented in village meet-
ings because of care responsibilities. In Son La, 
the participation of women varies in terms of eth-
nic minorities – whereas women play a strong role 
within the Thai community and are well presented 
in village meetings, the representation of women 
in village meeting of H’mong communities is 
weak. In response, the CPRGS aims at fostering 
gender equity and enhancing the partic ipation of 
women at all levels of leadership.49 
                                                 
48 Socialist Republic of Vietnam (2002c), p.58. 
49 Socialist Republic of Vietnam (2002c), Appendix 3. 
Another problem is the lack of capacity at the 
local level. The budget does not include funds for 
the training necessary to carry out participatory 
planning. If the relatively small sum50 cannot be 
provided by donor projects, this puts a serious 
strain on the local budget. Another bottleneck is 
the attitude of local officials. The legacy of top-
down planning makes it difficult for some offi-
cials to embrace bottom-up development as re-
quired by the GDD. Another shortcoming is the 
lack of knowledge among people. People need to 
understand the causes of their problems in order to 
make informed decisions. For example, if the 
population is suffering from health problems, their 
representatives may decide to upgrade the health 
station, even though the cause of their illnesses 
may be a lack of sanitary systems.  
Intransparent government structures are another 
challenge for participatory planning. As described 
in Chapter 6.1, the budget is not transparent. Dis-
tricts and Communes do not know how much 
funding is available to realise investments. This 
fact impacts negatively on the planning process, 
because stakeholders need to plan without a basis 
- let alone the fact that people lack the knowledge 
to cost projects. As a result, the list of proposed 
investments exceeds the budget available. In con-
trast to transparent decision-making processes at 
village level in Son La, it remains unclear what 
the project selection criteria of the Province are. 
One donor representative stated: “If poverty re-
duction was to be successful, clear roles and re-
sponsibilities would need to be assigned.” First 
signs of this process can be observed in the 
CPRGS’ chapter on the GDD: “Clarify functions 
and strengthen the management, monitoring and 
inspection capacity of government agencies.” 
In Ha Tinh, another bottleneck became apparent: 
the lack of confidence among people. One repre-
sentative of the provincial administration said that 
people are unable to participate because “they do 
                                                 
50 Le Viet Thai, 2001, estimates the training costs at 170 
000 VND (approximately USD 11) for each village per 
year for the first years and at 100 000 VND (approxi-
mately USD 6) in the following years. 
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not know how to do it.” Participation would lead 
to committee meetings that are too large to decide 
on anything. As a result, people are excluded from 
participating in one of the most important pro-
grammes for poverty alleviation for poor com-
munes, the National Programme 135. In the case 
of provincial poverty alleviation programmes, 
participation is limited to choosing items from a 
list of proposed infrastructure investments.  
People Do  
Although people contribute up to 50% of the cost 
of infrastructure projects, they still face some 
difficulties in participation. The first is the lack of 
skills that limits job opportunities, for example in 
constructing roads, schools, electricity lines etc. 
The CPRGS aims at countering this situation by 
giving priority to programmes that employ the 
local workforce.51 
The second difficulty is the limited capacity to 
mobilise resources. In some cases, the poor are 
unable to spare resources, as expressed in the PPA 
of Ha Tinh. The widening social gap makes it 
more difficult to extract the same contribution 
from households. In poor communes, cash is a 
limited resource, and thus inhabitants are unable 
to contribute capital. The budget of the communes 
is also very small. One participant at the consulta-
tion workshop in Quang Binh complained that the 
communal level has limited influence on the allo-
cation of resources. “The District and the Prov-
ince could always ask for more money from the 
level above, the commune cannot.” Inappropriate 
bureaucratic procedures divert further resources 
from scarce local budgets. Examples include the 
need to produce independent feasibility studies 
and construction plans and the difficult adminis-
trative procedures involved in reimbursement for 
the production and transport of stones.52 
The third difficulty is lack of capacity on the part 
of local officials. Poor communes often suffering 
                                                 
51 Socialist Republic of Vietnam (2002c), p.48. 
52 Le Viet Thai (2001). 
from “brain drain,” because young people move to 
cities to find jobs. One communal official in Son 
La stated that participation in implementing projects 
creates new challenges for administration, which 
is forced to learn by doing. Without knowledge 
about simple things such as the composition of 
cement, communes can easily be cheated by con-
tractors. 
People Check 
One potential problem is that monitoring is lim-
ited to the commune level. If the inspection com-
mittee discovers mismanagement that has been 
caused by external factors, it is entitled to com-
plain at the district level. However, it remains 
unclear what steps need to be undertaken by offi-
cials at levels above the commune. As a result, 
corruption at the district or province level are less 
likely to be prosecuted. One other problem may 
be due to the fact that the membership of the in-
spection committees is not defined53. As a result, 
some sections of the local population may be ex-
cluded from “checking” activities. 
In conclusion, the main bottlenecks regarding 
civic engagement at the local level are lack of 
knowledge, lack of resources, low administrative 
capacity at the local level and the intransparent 
administrative system. In some cases, one can add 
lack of political will. The GCOP survey found 
that in around 17 % of communes implementation 
has not gone beyond formality. As one interview 
partner stressed, hierarchical top-down planning is 
still deeply rooted in the minds of government 
officials. 
Ethnic Minorities 
The issue of ethnic minorities deserves special 
attention. Several factors such as language barri-
ers, varying levels of education and geographical 
remoteness have prevented ethnic minorities from 
                                                 
53 The Grassroots Democracy Decree grants people the 
right to monitor activities of the government by establish-
ing supervisory committees. 
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benefiting from or taking part in the enhanced 
forms of local democracy. Because most poor 
communes are inhabited by ethnic minorities, 
special attention needs to be paid to involving 
them in local participation, if sustainable poverty 
reduction is to be achieved. The CPRGS aims to 
encourage them to take part in the economic de-
velopment process.54  
Not everybody in government shares this opinion. 
One provincial official stated that in the case of 
ethnic minorities, a top-down approach is neces-
sary. This attitude appears especially problematic 
because in some provinces ethnic minorities are 
not represented in the administration above the 
commune level. Ethnic minorities risk remaining 
excluded from decision-making processes, and 
this may mean they will lag even further behind 
the country’s development. 
In summary, the goals of participation will be 
reached only in part, because, first, participatory 
data-gathering is limited, second, ownership is 
being developed but only at the local level and 
among a limited number of stakeholder groups at 
the national level and, third, governance at the 
local level is improving, though significant chal-
lenges remain at higher administrative levels. 
6.3 Monitoring and Feedback of Results  
The third critical area identified for implementing 
the CPRGS is establishment of a monitoring and 
evaluation system. Monitoring comprises tracking 
the implementation of the CPRGS, evaluating the 
impact on poverty reduction and, finally, feeding 
the results back into the decision-making process. 
Hence, monitoring and evaluation is an integral 
part of the PRSP-cycle because it will ensure an 
orientation towards results. Feedback of results 
will improve the implementation of the strategy 
and provide the basis for reformulation of poverty 
reduction policies. Consequently, monitoring sup-
ports good governance for poverty reduction be-
                                                 
54 Socialist Republic of Vietnam (2002c), Appendix 3. 
cause its facilitates priority setting and increases 
transparency.  
As outlined in the CPRGS, a monitoring and 
evaluation system must be developed and imple-
mented to track the indicators listed in the strat-
egy. In the process of drafting the CPRGS, the 
section on monitoring and evaluation improved 
considerably. Nevertheless, three main problem 
areas can be identified for the future implementa-
tion of the CPRGS monitoring system. They relate 
to the indicator framework, data collection meth-
ods and institutional arrangements.  
6.3.1 Establishing a Full Indicator 
Framework 
For each goal formulated in the CPRGS, indica-
tors are outlined on the basis of which monitoring 
and evaluation needs to be carried out. Conse-
quently, establishing a fully defined and quanti-
fied indicator framework is fundamentally impor-
tant for the CPRGS monitoring system. Although 
Vietnam has already taken important steps to-
wards formulating indicators, especially in the 
process of adapting the MDGs for Vietnam, four 
main difficulties remain:  
Formulating Adequate Indicators  
Linkages between proposed policies and poverty 
reduction outcomes need to be more clearly de-
fined and reflected in the indicators. Some indica-
tors neither fully reflect the measures proposed to 
reach the goal, nor do the indicators focus on pov-
erty reduction outcomes. The lack of adequate 
indicators for some of the goals limits the analysis 
of progress made in reaching them. 
Although poverty data are available in Vietnam, 
ex ante social-impact analysis remains a cha l-
lenge. Especially in the area of the proposed mac-
roeconomic and structural reforms, the indicators 
do not reflect expected impacts on poverty reduc-
tion.  
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Formulating Quantified Indicators  
Another shortcoming is that some of the indica-
tors listed in the strategy still lack clear quantifica-
tion against which the achievements can be meas-
ured. Goal 8, “Improving Living Standards, Pres-
ervation and Development Ethnic Minority Cul-
tures,”55 is an example in which neither the targets 
nor the indicators have been quantified.  
Formulating Disaggregated Indicators  
In the Vietnamese context, future progress in pov-
erty reduction will particularly depend on poverty 
reduction in disadvantaged areas and among spe-
cial population subgroups. Consequently, formu-
lating and monitoring disaggregated indicators is a 
very important task.  
Indicators for different population subgroups like 
ethnic minorities or gender specific indicators 
have been included in the strategy, such as goal 4: 
“Education universalisation,” goal 7: “Develop 
culture and information, improve the spiritual life 
of people," goal 8: “Improve living standards, 
preserve and develop ethnic minority cultures," 
and goal 11: “Gender equality and women’s em-
powerment.” However, goal 10, “Reduction of 
vulnerability,” is one example where no disaggre-
gated indicators have been set. 
One finding of the regional consultative work-
shops and interviews at the province level is that 
the next step in implementing a monitoring and 
evaluation system could be the formulation of 
regionally adjusted indicators. Specific local im-
pact indicators will allow for monitoring and 
evaluating of the implementation of the CPRGS in 
the specific local context, thereby helping to in-
crease ownership of implementation. As inter-
views with stakeholders at sub-national levels 
showed, due to limited capacity at these levels, a 
only a limited number of indicators should be 
                                                 
55 See Annex 1. 
monitored. This has to be taken into account in 
formulating a set of local indicators.  
Formulating a Complete List of Indicators 
and Clarifying the Significance of the Indi-
cator Framework  
Finally, one question that arises is the extent to 
which the list of indicators is complete and speci-
fies the goals and the measures used to reach them 
and consequently provides a framework for im-
plementing the strategy.  
The example of goal 11: “Ensure good govern-
ance for poverty reduction” illustrates the prob-
lem: The indicators listed in the CPRGS only refer 
to the implementation of the Grassroots Democ-
racy Decree at the commune level. The policy 
matrix, however, outlines the implementation of 
the public administration reforms as the measure 
needed to achieve goal 11. Implementation of the 
Grassroots Democracy Decree at the commune 
level is not mentioned. Obviously, the indicators 
only have the character of selected benchmarks, 
because they do not cover all measures. Activities 
through which the GoV or the international deve l-
opment partners seek to contribute to reaching 
goal 11 cannot only be concentrated on the com-
mune level. In implementing the strategy, both the 
GoV and the donors have to cla rify the extend to 
which the CPRGS indicator framework has to be 
taken into account or additional indicators have to 
be added.  
6.3.2 Collecting Data  
Poverty monitoring that takes all dimensions of 
poverty into account requires integration of com-
plementary data collected with the aid of different 
methods. The CPRGS mentions the need to gather 
quantitative and qualitative information. Census 
and household surveys as well as administrative 
records and information systems will be used in 
the monitoring and evaluation system. Participa-
tory monitoring of qualitative indicators is – in 
contrast to quantitative data collection – not yet 
institutionalised. 
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For Vietnam, which is highly experienced in qua-
litative data collection and statistical analysis, the 
two most important issues in this context are:  
Definition of Poverty Lines 
First, data collection undertaken by different insti-
tutions are based on different definitions of pov-
erty. Vietnam has developed a Household Sample 
Survey with technical assistance from interna-
tional donors; on this basis the GSO calculates an 
internationally comparable poverty line. On the 
other hand, the MOLISA uses a different poverty 
line calculated from data obtained through the 
administrative recording system (see Box 1). 
In the interviews various stakeholders noted a 
need to harmonise the different poverty measure-
ments. Since both poverty lines are used in the 
CPRGS, a single poverty line could be adapted 
only in the medium to long term. The government 
has not yet decided which poverty line it will use. 
Possibly, both will be used, according to the pur-
pose in question: the MOLISA poverty line to 
allocate government assistance and the GSO sur-
vey to measure progress in poverty reduction. 
Because the two poverty lines are used for differ-
ent purposes, they do not necessarily conflict. 
However, the fact that they are used in parallel 
will require additional efforts to compare results 
and to integrate them in one single monitoring 
system. 
Integrating and Institutionalising Partici-
patory Monitoring 
The second critical issue is to further integrate and 
institutionalise qualitative and participatory data 
collection methods to complement the present, 
quantitative approach to data collection.  
Using participatory tools 56, it would be possible to 
come up with relevant monitoring and evaluation 
information for national goals and targets. As part 
of the poverty monitoring system,  participatory 
assessments could provide qualitative data com-
plementary to the existing household surveys, 
thereby increasing the scope of monitoring and 
focusing on the perspectives of the poor. A com-
prehensive understanding of qualitative changes 
in poverty and the impact of the CPRGS could be 
achieved for different locations and different 
population subgroups. 
Understanding participatory monitoring in a wider 
context, participation in monitoring will assist in 
building ownership of the process of implementa-
tion. It is therefore not limited to using PRA tools 
to track qualitative indicators at the grassroots 
level but also includes participation in budget 
formulation and monitoring, expenditure tracking 
and delivery of public services.57 INGOs empha-
sised that participation in monitoring has to be 
ensured because it strengthens empowerment of 
people. “Information sharing is power sharing” 
and participation in monitoring government ac-
tions will be an instrument essential to improving 
transparency and accountability. This will 
strengthen dialogue among different stakeholders, 
and – under the condition of institutionalised 
feedback mechanisms – it will consequently lead 
to increased capacity for civic engagement in pol-
icy-making (see Chapter 6.2). 
The CPRGS recognises tracking of qualitative 
indicators and “people’s consultations” as one 
part of the monitoring and evaluation system. 
However, participatory monitoring is not yet insti- 
 
                                                 
56 The PTF gives a detailed description of participatory 
monitoring, including a list of key questions, principles, 
management and resourcing as well as a timetable of par-
ticipatory assessments of policy and programme impact 
on ethnic minorities. See PTF (2001f), pp.27-31. 
57 For more details see: World Bank (2001c), chapter: Or-
ganizing Participatory Processes in the PRSP, pp.42–53. 
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tutionalised. The question arises who will be re 
sponsible for carrying out independent participa-
tory monitoring that takes into account the fact 
that civil society is still without a legal frame-
work. The CPRGS assigns independent agencies 
like universities and NGOs responsibility for par-
ticipatory monitoring. Some INGOs assume that 
mass organisations might possibly play an impor-
tant role here. The MOLISA emphasises the im-
portance of participatory monitoring to strengthen 
ownership and improve the results  of the moni-
toring carried out in the administrative system at 
the local level, where it already provides training 
in participatory assessment. The MOLISA could 
therefore play an important role in implementing 
and disseminating participatory monitoring in the 
future. 
Bilateral donors, including Germany, assess the 
lack of participatory qualitative indicator tracking 
as a major deficit of the CPRGS monitoring sys-
tem. Multilateral donors, especially the World 
Bank, envisage integrating participatory monitor-
ing into the overall monitoring system in the me-
dium term. The experiences already gained from 
participatory poverty assessments could be used 
and integrated into the poverty monitoring system. 
Activities could build on ongoing work and exist-
ing partnerships. 
Box 10: Poverty Mapping in Vietnam – An Example for the Use of Monitoring Data as a Tool for Decision-making 
The MOLISA produced a set of district-level poverty maps based on the national poverty line and the MOLISA data collec-
tion system. These poverty maps are being already distributed in Vietnam to serve as a tool to focus discussion among pol-
icy-makers at all administrative levels about poverty and the reasons for changes in the poverty situation.a 
In addition, the World Bank is planning a training project for the MARD, the MOLISA, the MPI and the GSO on poverty 
mapping. This project is based on the use of data from the 98 VLSS. The World Bank project has 4 objectives: First, genera-
tion of district-level poverty maps; second, identification of household-level variables, agroclimatic characteristics, and mar-
ket access variables that are correlated with poverty in Vietnam; third, capacity-strengthening of the MARD, the MOLISA, 
the MPI and the GSO in poverty mapping and using geographic information systems (GIS); fourth, dissemination of methods 
and results among analysts and policy-makers aimed at increasing acceptance, understanding and use of results. 
The method used combines household surveys and census data to construct a poverty map using poverty estimations for 
disaggregated geographical units. This approach involves two steps: first, household survey data is used to estimate poverty 
as a function of household characteristics such as household composition, education, occupation, housing characteristics, and 
asset ownership. Second, census data on these same household characteristics are inserted into the equation to generate esti-
mates of poverty for small geographic areas.  
The results of this exercise can be used for monitoring and policy analysis purposes. Policy-makers (and researchers) can in 
this way quantify suspected regional disparities in living standards and identify which areas are falling behind in the process 
of economic development. Second, it facilitates the targeting of poverty alleviation programmes. Furthermore, it may explain 
geographic factors correlated with poverty, such as mountainous terrain or distance from major cities.  
The method is regarded as a useful tool for identifying indicators that connected with poverty and identifying trends in pov-
erty changes, because it is updated whenever new data become available. Poverty maps can serve as a basis for discussion 
that facilitates the dialogue between different stakeholders. Whereas its value as a discussion basis can be easily seen, coming 
up with valid models for decision-making requires a large amount of high-quality data and great analytical and technical 
capacities. It is yet to be proven whether reliable and timely information will be able to be produced and provided to deci-
sion-makers.  
As explained above, the MOLISA has already produced poverty maps using its own data base. Where and to what extent the 
two Vietnamese poverty maps will complement each other and efforts in this field will be able to be integrated into one 
monitoring and evaluation system remains to be seen. 
Sources: Minot, N. / B. Baulch (2001a), (2001b), Interview with Mr. Liem, GTZ/MOLISA; Interview with Mr. Swinkels, 
World Bank 
a MOLISA is supported by GTZ through the project Capacity strengthening for the National Poverty Alleviation 
Strategy in Vietnam 
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6.3.3 Institutional Arrangements: 
Responsibilities, Capacity, Data 
Quality and Co-ordination 
Institutional arrangements have to be established 
to guarantee high quality, systematic monitoring, 
evaluation and feedback of results. To monitor 
progress in a comprehensive way, the different 
data sources of the national statistical system must 
be integrated in the CPRGS monitoring and 
evaluation system in order to generate the neces-
sary disaggregated performance and impact data . 
Therefore, disseminating results and establishing 
feedback mechanisms at all levels is a central task 
within the monitoring system. Close co-ordination 
between the agencies involved in monitoring and 
evaluation is a central condition for integrating the 
lessons learned in the ongoing process of CPRGS 
implementation and policy adjustment.  
Four complexes have to be considered when look-
ing at the institutional set-up: assigning respons i-
bilities, strengthening capacities, ensuring data 
quality and improving co-ordination. 
Responsibilities 
The responsibilities of different agencies are out-
lined in the CPRGS. In Appendix 1 the responsi-
ble reporting agency and the reporting frequency 
are listed for each indicator. 
An inter-ministerial group will be established 
under the MPI in co-operation with the MOLISA, 
the MARD and other agencies at the central level. 
This working group will be responsible for super-
vising and co-ordinating the implementation and 
the monitoring system of the CPRGS. The line 
ministries at the central and at lower administra-
tive levels will have to establish additional units to 
meet the new monitoring requirements. Some 
bilateral donors expressed concerns about nega-
tive effects of parallel monitoring structures not 
sufficiently integrated in the administrative sys-
tem at all administrative levels. Others, however, 
stressed that these kinds of units are currently 
necessary. 
The GSO will be responsible for collecting the 
majority of statistical macroeconomic perform-
ance data as well as for carrying out and analysing 
the Household Sample Survey. The GSO is to 
undertake its tasks in close co-operation with the 
MPI and other related ministries and institutions. 
The MPI is responsible for co-ordinating the dif-
ferent agencies and preparing the annual progress 
reports. As outlined in the strategy, the MPI will 
collect information regarding resource mobilisa-
tion and allocation for implementing the CPRGS 
on a annual basis. However, more work is re-
quired to track public expenditures and better 
assess the effectiveness of such spending in im-
proving priority-setting for public action to reduce 
poverty.58 
The line ministries are responsible for sectoral 
monitoring and evaluation. As provided for in the 
strategy, these agencies are to integrate the 
CPRGS objectives and mechanisms into their 
annual action plan. Monitoring results from these 
annual action plans will be fed back to the MPI. 
Poverty monitoring undertaken by the MOLISA is 
based on the MOLISA’s administrative reporting 
system. Because the CPRGS indicators are based 
on both poverty measurements, both the MOLISA 
and the GSO are responsible for monitoring the 
progress towards goal 1: “Poverty Reduction,” 
goal 2: “Provision of essential infrastructure” and 
goal 3: “Job creation."59 
The MOLISA is continuing to monitor its targeted 
Poverty Alleviation Strategy. It will be especially 
important to evaluate the activities carried out in 
the framework of the strategy in order to propose 
changes at achieve greater effectiveness in the 
new context of the CPRGS. The MOLISA plans 
to implement seven pilot poverty monitoring units 
at the provincial level. Some of the expected results 
are high-quality poverty data and im pact monitoring 
                                                 
58 See IMF / IDA (2001c), p.3. 
59 See Socialist Republic of Vietnam (2002d), Appendix 1 
B. 
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of selected government programmes as well as 
donor-supported projects. The information ob-
tained will have to be fed into the national poverty 
monitoring system.  
The role of sub-national administrative levels 
became more prominent during the development 
the CPRGS. The provincial administrative level 
will be directly responsible for monitoring certain 
implementation indicators such as resource mobi-
lisation and allocation and monitoring of the so-
cial and poverty reduction goals.60 Furthermore, 
the province levels will be involved in sectoral 
monitoring through the line ministries. 
If participatory monitoring is to be institutiona l-
ised, the local level would be the most appropriate 
one to carry out this task. Finally, as mentioned 
above, the local level will be responsible for for-
mulating and monitoring indicators that are have 
been adapted to the specific local conditions. 
The role of the mass organisations in the monitor-
ing and evaluation system is not defined in the 
CPRGS. As mentioned already, the mass organi-
sations could play a role in participatory assess-
ments since they are present at the local level. 
                                                 
60 See Socialist Republic of Vietnam (2002d), Appendix 1, 
pp.90-97. 
The role of research institutions: Building part-
nerships with national and international universi-
ties and other research institutions can be an inte-
gral part of the monitoring and evaluation system. 
A PTF study suggests the integration of in-depth 
sectoral studies and impact assessments carried 
out by national and international experts into the 
monitoring system61. The CPRGS mentions these 
potential contribution of research institutions. 
As stated in the CPRGS, national and interna-
tional NGOs could contribute to the monitoring 
and evaluation system by organising consultative 
processes with the population. 
One potential role of international donors in the 
CPRGS monitoring system could be to further 
support capacity-building and provide technical 
assistance for Vietnamese agencies involved. For 
example, the World Bank, UNDP and SIDA are 
co-operating with the GSO, while the GTZ is 
working together with the MOLISA. In addition, 
the international development partners could carry 
out participatory assessments as long as they are 
not institutionalised as a part in the monitoring 
system. 
 
                                                 
61 See PTF (2001g), p.26. 
Box 11: Census and New Household Survey 
The new Household Survey constitutes the core component of the national monitoring system. It was developed with techni-
cal support from the World Bank (SIDA and UNDP), building on existing household surveys. It will be conducted by the 
General Statistics Office (GSO) biannually from 2002 to 2010. The household survey samples approximately 30,000 house-
holds and consists of a core questionnaire and special topic modules. Consumption status is estimated from the core ques-
tionnaire. The special topic modules vary from survey to survey, depending upon topics, which may change within a longer 
time-frame. A “special topic” could concern agriculture and household businesses, access to and utilisation of health and 
education services, environmental information, access to infrastructure, interaction with institutions and government. 
A population census is carried out once every ten years, with an intermediate census being conducted every five years. The 
most recent census covers the situation in April, 1999. The census provides general information on household characteristics. 
The agricultural census provides information for rural areas only. As an important part of the national statistical system, the 
census provides information for policy evaluation at the aggregated national level. 
Source: PTF (2001g), pp.20-21 
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If donors align with the CPRGS, they will carry 
out their activities in the framework of the 
CPRGS goals, on the basis of which project moni-
toring and evaluation will have to be undertaken. 
Consequently, the question arises how donor-
funded project and programme monitoring can 
contribute to the national monitoring system.  
Currently, project monitoring does not contribute 
to overall poverty monitoring, because it is not 
linked with the administrative data collection sys-
tem. Even if poverty impact monitoring of project 
activities is undertaken, the question of integration 
of results in the wider framework of the CPRGS 
monitoring and evaluation system is still unclear. 
Donors will thus have to decide how to design and 
implement a communication system to feed le s-
sons learned in projects at different levels into the 
monitoring system and the policy dia logue. 
Furthermore, donors will play an important role in 
CPRGS monitoring and evaluation when co-
operating with the GoV in Sector-Wide-
Approaches (SWAps). As explained for the for-
estry sector in Annex 2, a sector-wide monitoring 
and evaluation system will be established as an 
important tool for co-operation within a coherent 
policy framework. An important challenge ahead 
will be to fully integrate the SWAps monitoring 
into both the respective line ministry (in the case 
of the forestry sector into the MARD) and the 
CPRGS monitoring and evaluation system.  
Capacity 
The CPRGS calls for further decentralisation of 
administrative functions and service provision. 
Consequently, strengthening monitoring capaci-
ties at the sub-national level is very important. In 
addition to the weaknesses in human capacity 
explained above, time and resource limitations 
have to be considered in this context. For exam-
ple, transportation costs and the time needed to 
reach remote areas as well as insufficient technical 
equipment needed for systematic data collection 
and processing limit monitoring capacities, espe-
cially at the local level. 
Data Quality 
Closely linked to the lack of capacity is a third 
problem that concerns the negative incentive 
structure regarding data quality. Data quality is 
low, partly due to the limited capacities of the 
institutions involved, but also for structural rea-
sons. The legacy of central planning is still mani-
fest in the fact that individuals tend more to try to 
reach the targets set by the authorities than to take 
personal responsibility for the accuracy of data. 
Co-ordination 
The fourth main bottleneck is the weak vertical 
and horizontal co-ordination and flow of informa-
tion within the administrative system (see Chapter 
6.1.4). 
To monitor progress in a comprehensive way, the 
different data sources must be integrated in the 
monitoring and evaluation system. Dissemination 
of results and establishment of feedback mecha-
nisms at all levels is therefore a central task that 
requires close co-ordination between the agencies 
involved in monitoring and evaluation. This is a 
central condition for integrating the lessons 
learned into the ongoing process of PRSP imple-
mentation and policy adjustment. As interview 
partners from a bilateral donor organisation noted, 
limited co-ordination is one of the main monitor-
ing problems in Vietnam. Each ministry has its 
own data collection system, but information shar-
ing is very limited.  
Provincial-level officials pointed to difficulties in 
accessing data from other agencies. Furthermore, 
they articulated the concern that each project and 
programme has established its own data base, and 
each of these exist in parallel. Due to weak co-
ordination among different agencies, the usability 
of results is limited. Institutionalising feedback of 
experiences from national and donor-funded pro-
jects into the decision-making process is consid-
ered to be another challenge. 
In sum, a framework for the CPRGS monitoring 
and evaluation system has been established. Con-
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siderable experience has already been gathered 
with regard to the national statistical system. 
However, challenges remain for the CPRGS 
monitoring and evaluation system. These concern 
meeting the requirements of data quality as well 
as the complexity of co-ordinating different agen-
cies and integrating complementary data. The 
most important tasks for the future are capacity-
building for the agencies involved and support for 
co-ordination and co-operation between the dif-
ferent stakeholders, which is a precondition for 
implementing the CPRGS monitoring and evalua-
tion system. 
6.4 Harmonising Donor Contributions  
The alignment of donor assistance is expected to 
be one main outcome of the PRSP process as well 
as a requirement for the implementation of the 
PRSP. In part, the PRSP approach has been de-
signed to overcome poor donor co-ordination, 
weak country ownership of aid, and the fragmen-
tation of governmental programmes and agencies 
caused by frequently divergent aid delivery 
mechanisms, management policies and proce-
dures. 
In Vietnam, the structures and processes of ODA 
delivery are changing as a consequence of the  
PRSP process.62 Driven by both the GoV and the 
international donor community, development part-
ners are increasingly willing to co-ordinate and 
harmonise their activitie s. The donor community 
is ready to align its assistance to the CPRGS as a 
means of increasing the effectiveness of donor 
activ ities, reducing the administrative burden of 
ODA delivery, and reducing the transaction costs 
of development assistance for Vietnam.  
However, harmonisation, broadly defined as the 
alignment of donor activities, faces some chal-
                                                 
62 These changes in ODA delivery were initiated by the 
CDF and supported by harmonisation efforts within the 
DAC and the UN. 
lenges. The “architecture” of ODA and the ability, 
willingness, and speed involved in adapting it to 
new requirements differ widely among donors. 
Donor-specific procedures have evolved reflecting 
different needs and approaches concerning the 
best means of delivering, managing and control-
ling development aid. 
6.4.1 Need for Harmonisation 
Harmonisation of ODA can be defined as a pro-
cess of increasing country-level alignment of do-
nor activities with activities of other donors as 
well as with activities of the GoV. It comprises 
co-operation, i.e. information sharing, joint policy 
dialogue, joint programme planning, and, gener-
ally, fosters fewer but larger donor projects using 
joint funding mechanisms. In addition to co-
operation, harmonisation is concerned with stan-
dardising procedures and practices regarding pro-
ject design, implementation, and evaluation. Pro-
grammatic approaches such as the CPRGS are 
supposed to be an effective mechanism to pro-
mote harmonisation and programme-based ap-
proaches of aid delivery.  
Vietnam needs programme-oriented and harmo-
nised ODA for two reasons. First, harmonisation 
can lower the transaction costs of ODA delivery 
for Vietnam. Transaction costs of scarcely co-
ordinated and project-oriented ODA have turned 
into a heavy burden on the administrative capacity 
of the GoV. Until the early 1990s, the only donors 
active in Vietnam – except for assistance from 
communist countries – were the UN system and 
Sweden. Large-scale bilateral inflows started at 
the beginning of the 1990s and rose rapidly there-
after. In 1993, ODA disbursements totalled about 
US$ 250 million, six years later they were five 
times as large. By late 1999, 45 official donor 
agencies (and 350 international NGOs) were wor-
king in Vietnam. About 1,400 ODA-financed 
projects were underway. During the same period, 
the value of signed donor commitments was on 
average about twice as large as the level of dis-
bursements, an indicator of how severely the 
 Peter Wolff et al. 66
GoV’s capacity to manage ODA was being 
strained.63 A study by UNDP64 on aid transaction 
costs in Vietnam was unable to provide any pre-
cise measure of transaction costs, but it was able 
to use anecdotal information to show that they are 
substantial. 
Second, harmonisation can raise the effectiveness 
of ODA. The early years of donor involvement 
were a period of uncoordinated and sometimes 
duplicative activity. Most donors had little experi-
ence in Vietnam, and the GoV had little experi-
ence in co-ordinating rapidly growing ODA in-
flows. Since the establishment of sector-wide 
partnership groups, the CDF process, and the 
drafting of the PRSP, a common framework for 
programme-oriented ODA has evolved as a basis 
for donors to align their activities and improve 
effectiveness. 
The CPRGS provides a framework for program-
based donor assistance. Many donors have ex-
pressed their willingness to use the CPRGS as a 
guide for their Country Assistance Strategies 
(CAS), provided it meets their expectations in 
terms of quality (prioritisation, costing, action 
orientation).65 The World Bank regards its new 
CAS 2003-2006 as a “business plan” under the 
CPRGS. Other donors, i.e. the Asian Develop-
ment Bank, voiced reservations during the proc-
ess, arguing that the completion of the CPRGS 
will take more time to become a sound basis for 
donor CAS in the near future. They developed 
their CAS in consideration of  an early CPRGS 
draft, among other existing national strategies and 
plans.66  
                                                 
63 See MPI / UNDP (2001), p.ii. 
64 Cited in Grant Thornton (2001), p.ii. 
65 CIDA (2002), p.1. 
66 ADB (2002), p.1. 
6.4.2 Four Dimensions of Harmonisation 
Standardisation of Procedures 
A group of like-minded European countries 
(Netherlands, UK, Finland, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland) in particular is willing to standardise 
donor procedures and practices of aid delivery. 
The same goes for a group of multilateral and 
bilateral Development Banks which are harmonis-
ing their procedures in Vietnam as part of a joint 
international effort. To enhance ownership of aid, 
it is their ultimate goal to adapt aid procedures to 
the GoV system. These initiatives could pave the 
way for other donors. However, several donors 
argue that as long as the GoV system is not suit-
able to be used as a basis for harmonisation, do-
nors might first harmonise among one another at 
the country level. Then, accompanied by measures 
to increase capacity and transparency of the GoV 
system, donors could harmonise with the GoV 
system over time. 
Programme Orientation 
Increasing programme orientation of aid is a first 
step in the harmonisation of development co-
operation. This would mean that donors move aid 
activities away from isolated projects funded by 
single donors and align their assistance to a re-
cipient country’s programme. Several steps in-
volved in advancing of aid delivery in the direc-
tion of programme orientation can be distin-
guished. Isolated projects are a non-harmonised 
form of aid delivery without programme orienta-
tion. 
On the other side of the scale, Sector-Wide Ap-
proaches (SWAp) secure a high degree of pro-
gramme orientation. A SWAp is a mechanism 
used by donors and the recipient country to sup-
port the integrated development of a sector.67 In 
SWAps, donors align their assistance to a country-
owned sector policy, which is jointly implemented 
                                                 
67 OECD (2001), p. 69. 
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by the government and the donor community un-
der the leadership of the government of the recip i-
ent country. In its most developed form, it com-
prises a single expenditure programme, integrat-
ing donor funds as well as common management 
and reporting procedures to disburse and account 
for all funds. Not all donors are willing to support 
SWAps, because they are reluctant to pool funds. 
However, even if fund pooling is generally desir-
able to increase country ownership and to fully 
integrate donor support into a unified budgetary 
framework, fund pooling is not a precondition for 
a SWAp. There are other forms of SWAps in 
which donors deliver aid in a co-ordinated but 
financially individual way (See the case study on 
the Forest Sector Support Program & Partnership, 
Annex 2). 
However, project aid, the conventional form of 
aid delivery, is still widespread in Vietnam and 
has several advantages:  
– Impact evaluations make it possible to assign 
specific achievements directly to a respective 
donor, and this is a political advantage for donors 
as regards their accountability to taxpayers. 
– Donor-specific project design and manage-
ment creates options for different solutions to 
a given problem. 
– It makes possible better control over aid de-
livery and limits possibilities for corruption. 
– Aid delivery can be highly independent of 
recipient country capacities and influence and 
is therefore feasible even under unfavourable 
framework conditions. 
On the other hand, SWAps have some advantages 
compared to project aid: 
– Increased significance of aid, compared with 
small, single projects. 
– Higher effectiveness, since SWAps provide 
stronger leverage for the policy dialogue 
needed to assure favourable conditions for aid 
delivery. 
– More ownership and self-responsibility of the 
recipient country in programme formulation, 
design, and management. 
– Outcome orientation instead of input orientation. 
Box 12: Partnership Groups in Vietnam 




– Civil Society and Community Participation 
– Urban Forum 
Economic Management 
– State-owned Enterprises Reform and Equitisation 
– Banking Reform 
– Trade Policy 
– Public Financial Management 
Human and Social Development 
– Education Forum 
– Health 
Rural and Regional Development 
– Forest Sector Support Programme and Partnership 
– The Partnership to Support the Poorest Communes 
– Food Security 
– Natural Disasters Mitigation 
– Water Resources 
Infrastructure 
– Transport 
– Ho Chi Minh City Official Development Assistance 
Partnership (ODAP) 
Public Management and Administration 
– Public Administration Reform 
– Legal Needs Assessment 
Source: World Bank / Partnership Groups (2001) 
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– Increased sustainability of development out-
comes if parallel structures (e.g. project man-
agement units) are avoided. 
– More possibilities for efficient division of 
labour between grassroots level project im-
plementation and policy dialogue with the 
central government. 
Partnership Groups  
Considerable progress in the institutionalisation of 
harmonisation processes, programme-orientation, 
joint policy dialogue and joint funding has been 
achieved by the establishment of partnership 
groups in Vietnam. They evolved after the Prime 
Minister appealed to the donor community at the 
mid-term CG meeting in 1998 to act in a greater 
spirit of partnership. In his view, too much ODA 
was still ad hoc and donor-driven, and failed to fit 
into the framework of a coherent national strategy. 
Most donors were prepared to engage in partner-
ship groups, because they had recognised that the 
old approaches were not producing the expected 
results and that specific problems like a lack of 
strategic vision, gaps, duplication and high trans-
action costs, and focus on inputs rather than out-
puts were reducing the effectiveness of ODA. 
Therefore, even before the PRSP process was 
launched, donors in Vietnam had agreed to col-
laborate with the GoV and with each other, align-
ing their assistance to the GoV’s own planning 
framework. The PRSP process reinforced these 
harmonisation efforts.68 
More than 20 government-donor partnership 
groups have been established in various sectors. 
Many partnership groups have broadened their 
membership to include international NGOs. In 
addition, there are also some NGO and donor fora, 
which may develop into formal working groups. 
 
                                                 
68 CIDA (2002), p. 6. 
Partnerships develop at different speeds and have 
a variety of purposes. Some start with information 
sharing or look for common technical analyses, 
while other partnerships agree on principles in 
finding solutions, develop a shared action plan, or 
even result in joint tasks and funding of members. 
The size, leadership (GoV or donors), and success 
of partnerships diverge among partnerships and 
may change over time. 
The overall assessment of harmonisation in the 
partnerships is encouraging. The GoV and donors 
agree that co-ordination has improved substan-
tially in the recent years. In addition, improved 
donor harmonisation is supposed to be a main 
outcome of the PRSP process in the near future.  
But donors note that the quality of partnership 
varies widely. Some miss results orientation in 
sector dialogues and object to the high transaction 
costs of co-ordination in terms of time and capac-
ity. Some donors see room for improvement in the 
governments ownership, while others recognise 
good leadership on the Vietnamese side.  
In consequence, the established partnership 
groups have to take notice of a number of key 
characteristics that influence their success:69 
– ownership, 
– commitment, 
– wide, multi-level support: group members 
need support for the partnership process from 
all levels in their respective organisations, 
– mission: a clear, agreed mission and focus 
that is built around the vision for a specific 
sector makes groups more effective and sub-
stantive, 
– funding, 
– technical knowledge, and 
– flexibility: groups should be willing to adapt 
their structures and form to a changing envi-
ronment. 
                                                 
69 See World Bank / Partnership Groups (2000). 
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There is no blueprint for a successful partnership 
group, but rather a variety of models suited to 
different circumstances. For example, degree of 
formalisation does not correlate with prospects for 
success. While the forestry partnership group 
works successfully with formalised structures (see 
case study in Annex 2), a similar degree of for-
malisation did not lead to satisfying results in the 
environment partnership. On the other hand, the 
partnership group on banking reform has informal 
structures but has made considerable progress in 
defining its tasks and providing funding. 
The experience made since 1998 has shown that 
there are still challenges facing working groups 
and partnerships in Vietnam:70 
– Deepening partnerships where appropriate: 
each donor should focus its capacity on a lim-
ited number of partnerships to avoid work 
overloads and ensure commitment. This also 
helps partnerships to remain small and oper-
able, 
– Maintaining a focus on development out-
comes rather than the process, 
– Measuring the effects of the partnership ap-
proach, 
– Enabling organisations that have limited ca-
pacity to engage fully in partnerships – over-
extension can lead to partnership fatigue, 
– Building commitment and understanding at 
all levels in organisations engaged in partner-
ships in Vietnam, 
– Rationalising/changing partnerships when 
they do not meet a development need. Some 
partnerships have even ceased to exist be-
cause they did not produce sufficient results. 
A possible enlargement of the partnership ap-
proach is the development of partnerships at pro-
vincial level. The Ho Chi Minh City ODA part-
nership is already well formalised and is leading 
to co-ordinated ODA activities under a common 
framework. 
                                                 
70 See World Bank / Partnership Groups (2000). 
Fund Pooling 
Fund pooling is the most critical part of harmoni-
sation for many donors. It can increase aid effec-
tiveness and ownership by the GoV. But the will-
ingness and ability to pool funds vary widely 
among donors.  
Several forms of financial collaboration can be 
distinguished: 
1. Financing supervised by donors: 
– individual project funding is the conventional 
form of financing aid 
– individually funded projects co-ordinated 
within a programme framework/SWAp  is a 
first step towards programme orientation (e.g. 
FSSP Programme Framework in Forestry 
Partnership, see case study in Annex 2). 
– project co-financing/project basket funding 
with/without a SWAp. This form allows larger 
projects to ensure the significance of aid.  
– (sub-) sector-wide basket funds/trust funds  to 
finance a SWAp. 
2. Financing supervised by GoV: 
– funds earmarked for special purposes 
– sector budget funds 
– general budget funds 
Donor-specific project funding within a common 
policy framework can be a first step towards fund 
pooling. Many donors oppose forms of fund pool-
ing in which the supervision of funds is beyond 
their control. They argue that a crucial precondi-
tion for fund pooling, accountability and transpar-
ency of the Vietnamese budgetary system, is not 
sufficiently met. This was confirmed by the World 
Bank’s Country Financial Accountability Assess-
ment of October 2001 which stated: “At present, 
there is clearly a certain degree of fiduciary risk 
in the use of public resources, given that the 
budget process is not yet transparent, public ac-
cess to government financial information is lim-
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ited, and effective legislative oversight is not fully 
in place yet.” 71 Therefore, only a few donors are 
engaged in budget funding so far, with the World 
Bank and the ADB taking the lead. The Poverty 
Reduction Support Credit of the World Bank, co-
financed by several bilateral donors, is an example 
for general budget funding. According to its CAS 
2003-2006, the World Bank is willing to increase 
its budget funding considerably, if the GoV shows 
overall good performance in implementing the 
CPRGS.   
Donors are generally willing to co-finance activ i-
ties wherever proper control of expenditures (i.e. 
external auditing and the application of interna-
tional accountability standards) is possible. Ex-
amples for co-financed, programme-oriented aid 
include the Northern Mountains Poverty Allevia-
tion Project, which is financed by the World Bank 
and co-financed by DFID and the Central Region 
Livelihood Improvement Programme of the Asian 
Development Bank, and also co-financed by 
DFID. Fund pooling, mainly for technical assis-
tance activities, has emerged in the Public Expen-
diture Management Reform Program, which is led 
by the World Bank and has been joined by a 
group of like-minded bilateral donors, and for the 
Public Administration Reform Program, led by 
UNDP. 
Thus, against the background of limited trust in 
the GoVs budgetary system, pooled funding for 
SWAps, managed as a trust fund applying interna-
tional accountability standards which allow for 
greater control of expenditures, is generally con-
sidered as an appropriate financing instrument by 
most donors in Vietnam at present. Since reform 
and capacity-building measures in the budgetary 
system will yield results only in the medium term, 
and sectoral Medium Term Expenditure Frame-
works will be developed only gradually, extra-
budgetary funding mechanisms will most proba-
bly continue to serve as a basis for programmatic 
donor approaches. 
                                                 
71 World Bank, (2001e), p.21. 
6.4.3 Requirements for German 
Development Co-operation 
The process of harmonising donor contributions, 
reinforced by the PRSP process, is a challenge for 
the forms and modalities of aid delivery of the 
entire donor community. PRSP requires from 
donors, generally speaking, not to do different 
things, but to do things differently.  
Most donors do not plan any major changes in the 
sectoral distribution of aid or in the thematic focus 
of their assistance. The comprehensiveness of the 
CPRGS in terms of sectoral and thematic cover-
age allows most donors to continue with their 
priority areas. The need for alignment is seen 
mainly in the following aspects: 
?? Projects and programs have to be aligned to 
the targets and indicators of the CPRGS, as 
well as to the actions as laid out in the policy 
matrix. Donors will have to adjust to the re-
sults orientation of the CPRGS. 
?? Decisions will have to be made with regard to 
participation in partnership groups and 
SWAps, including the respective funding 
mechanisms. Only large donors will have the 
capacity to cover a broad range of sectors. 
Smaller donors will have to be selective to 
make a significant contribution. 
Active participation in partnerships and SWAps 
will entail an increasing degree of harmonisation 
and joint procedures, from program design in a 
joint policy dialogue to joint monitoring and eva-
luation activities. It is expected that this will lead 
to lower transaction costs for the GoV as well as 
for donors. However, during the process of devel-
oping partnerships and the CPRGS, transaction 
costs have been in fact higher than beforehand, 
due to the great number of dialogue and co-
ordination meetings required. In the medium term, 
the desired cost reduction effects will only materi-
alise if fragmented donor activities are scaled 
down and parallel structures are avoided. 
All this is also relevant for German Development 
Co-operation (DC) in Vietnam. Other donors see 
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German DC as rather fragmented, with its central-
ised decision-making structure and locking up of 
funds in relatively small projects leading to a cer-
tain degree of inflexibility on the ground. Fur-
thermore, it is noted critically that the wealth of 
experiences gained in projects is not well commu-
nicated by German DC, its participation in joint 
donor activities being rather limited. This is of 
importance insofar as approaches to finding solu-
tions in all kinds of areas, from community-based 
development to the development of M&E sys-
tems, are increasingly being discussed and shaped 
in the framework of joint donor-GoV dialogue. 
Germany is generally not well represented in 
these discussions, since the ‘technical’ and sec-
toral expertise in German DC is geared to project 
implementation and not to conceptual policy dia-
logues. 
In terms of sectoral and thematic coverage, Ger-
man DC appears to be well positioned. With its 
emphasis on three thematic areas (economic re-
form and creation of a market economy, rural 
development/resource protection, health), there is 
no general difficulty in aligning projects and pro-
grams to the targets and indicators of the CPRGS. 
When there is a clear link to the targets of the 
CPRGS, projects still have their function, as long 
as they are well integrated in the GoV’s programs 
as well as in partnerships and /or SWAps. 
The poverty orientation of German DC is deter-
mined by its general alignment with the CPRGS. 
In that sense, measures aimed at building capaci-
ties for improved public expenditure management 
and accountability, for example, have in principle 
the same degree of poverty focus as targeted pov-
erty alleviation measures. Additional funds from 
German DC's ‘Action Program 2015’ should, 
therefore, be allocated to support the alignment of 
the country portfolio as a whole (by financing 
German contributions to the PTF or to joint M&E 
activities, for example) and not (only) for targeted 
poverty alleviation measures. The latter would be 
a misunderstanding of the ‘holistic’ PRSP ap-
proach. 
Against this background, the following proposals 
relate mainly to the organisation and management 
of German DC. Our interviews indicated that in 
this area adjustment needs with regard to a more 
programme-based and collaborative approach are 
greater than they are on thematic or sectoral is-
sues. 
First, the decision-making powers and capacities 
of the main German institutions operating in Vie t-
nam should be enlarged. The harmonisation proc-
ess reinforces the need for flexibility on the spot, 
because sector policy dialogue, programme design 
and implementation are becoming less distinct 
(than in the traditional project approach). In addi-
tion, country-wide donor co-ordination increases 
the workload for the German institutions in the 
Vietnamese capital. Therefore, enlarged decision-
making powers as well as more professional staff 
in Vietnam, especially of the BMZ, would be 
desirable in the long run. Given the budget con-
straints of BMZ on the one hand and the large 
know-how and experience in many areas of aid 
implementation possessed by GTZ and KfW on 
the other hand, German implementing agencies in 
Vietnam should be given more responsibility to 
develop and manage sector programmes. 
Second, the German engagement in partnerships 
should be selected strategically. Strategic selec-
tion of few areas can create comparative advan-
tages in expertise visible for and appreciated by 
other donors. The Netherlands and Finland, for 
example, are recognised by other donors as pro-
viding leading expertise in the forestry sector. 
Even though their overall aid budget in Vietnam is 
small compared to Germany's, the German aid 
profile is less visible for many donors. In addition, 
a focus on a limited number of partnerships helps 
to keep partnerships small and operational.  
Third, management of the participation of German 
institutions in partnerships and SWAps should be 
improved. BMZ, in collaboration mainly with 
GTZ and KfW, should clarify responsibilities on a 
case-by-case basis. A clear assignment for each 
selected partnership should ensure continuous and 
significant commitment to the work of the part-
nerships, including a mandate for the respective 
agency to speak within defined limits for German 
DC.  
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Fourth, project experiences should be communi-
cated more effectively in partnerships and in pol-
icy dialogue. Many donors regret that German 
project experiences are not sufficiently fed into 
policy design processes. They regard the experi-
ence of German assistance as valuable, because its 
institutions often undertake pilot work, accumu-
late expert knowledge and are therefore in a posi-
tion to provide first-hand expertise on the feasibil-
ity of new approaches. 
Fifth, participation of German technical and fi-
nancial co-operation in SWAps should be co-
ordinated. The opportunities for co-operation be-
tween GTZ and KfW should be used to enhance 
the leverage of German assistance in the sector 
policy dialogue and design as well as to improve 
effectiveness and significance of German contri-
butions. 
7 Conclusion 
In the end, the question remains whether it was 
worthwhile for Vietnam to embark on the exten-
sive PRSP process, which extended over a period 
of more than two years and demanded consider-
able effort by government agencies as well as by 
donors. Not being a HIPC country, and having no 
urgent need for balance-of-payments financing 
from IMF and World Bank, Vietnam made this 
choice voluntarily. 
It appears that it is still too early to answer this 
question. The final draft of the Vietnamese 
CPRGS of May 2002 is certainly a laudable do-
cument. It is broader in scope than the existing 
strategies in that it attempts to integrate macro-
economic and sectoral policies, giving them a 
stronger pro-poor orientation than beforehand. It 
is also more outcome-oriented than previous stra-
tegies in that it contains a broad set of targets and 
indicators that are useful as a basis for policy eva-
luation. It is still an open question, however, how 
this strategy will be implemented and what role it 
will play in the Vietnamese policy process. Thus,  
only after a year or two of implementation will a 
final judgement on its value added be possible. 
The study has analysed four areas that might pose 
problems in the implementation process: 
– continuing structural reforms,  
– institutionalising participation, 
– establishing a monitoring system, 
– harmonising external assistance. 
In all of these areas considerable challenges re-
main which are crucial for successful implementa-
tion of the strategy:  
The pace of structural reforms has been slow in 
recent years and has met with considerable resis-
tance from groups that are interested in maintain-
ing the status quo. 
Participation is still a new concept in Vietnamese 
policy-making. There have been some impressive 
innovations at the grassroots level, but only little 
effort has been made at higher political levels to 
include the emerging civil society in public af-
fairs. 
The assessment of policy implementation will 
require a far more elaborate monitoring system in 
order to be able to feed back results into the policy 
process and make the appropriate policy correc-
tions. 
The donor community has announced a greater 
effort towards better co-ordination and harmonisa-
tion of external assistance on the basis of the 
CPRGS. It remains to be seen whether the higher 
costs of donor co-ordination will finally translate 
out into better results in terms of higher efficiency 
and effectiveness. 
Taking into account these potential bottlenecks, 
completion of the CPRGS can be seen as the first 
phase in a process that will have to be continued. 
This first phase has entailed considerable learning 
effects for both Vietnamese authorities and do-
nors. The discussions in the preparatory phase of  
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the drafting of the document as well as during its 
completion have improved the understanding of 
poverty in Vietnam as well as of the mechanisms 
of policy implementation. This has increased the 
quality of the policy dialogue between Vietnam 
and the donors and thus set the stage for aligning 
donor contributions to the Poverty Reduction Stra-
tegy. 
Against this background, the concept of owner-
ship , central to the prospects for the implementa-
tion of the strategy, has to be put into perspective. 
Ownership is not static; it develops over time. In 
the early stages of the PRSP-process, only a small 
group of bureaucrats and donor representatives 
were involved in the discussions related to the 
strategy. During the completion phase of the strat-
egy paper a wider group of government, non-
governmental and donor representatives became 
involved, widening the scope of discussion and 
entering into a process of ‘mainstreaming’ the 
poverty focus of the strategy within the Vietnam-
ese administration. This phase has started only 
recently and, as the field studies at the local level 
have shown, ‘mainstreaming’ has barely reached 
the sub-national levels.  
It will be imperative, therefore, to develop an 
implementation concept for the CPRGS that in-
cludes the provincial, district and communal lev-
els as well as the emerging civil society in Vie t-
nam. The traditional central planning approach, 
some legacies of which still exist in Vietnam, is 
ill-suited to a strategy that will have to embrace 
all groups and levels of society if it is to succeed 
on the basis of national ownership. Thus, the 
CPRGS should not be misunderstood as yet an-
other plan to be implemented on the orders of the 
Hanoi authorities. Its success will be based less on 
the achievement of, for example, quantitative FDI 
and ODA targets discussed in the chapter on ‘re-
source mobilisation’ of the CPRGS, than on the 
efficient use of resources by relying on local and 
private initiative. It  appears that the PRSP-
discussion in Vietnam has contributed to develop-
ing the awareness for such a de-centralised ap-
proach. It will be a long way, however, to transla t-
ing it into practice. 
One challenge involved in putting the CPRGS 
into practice is the strategy’s comprehensiveness. 
Although comprehensiveness is an asset, as it 
outlines the linkages between policy areas and 
their potential effects on poverty reduction, it 
involves a danger of overburdening the admini-
stration with a long list of tasks without sufficient 
prioritisation and costing. In the next phase of 
implementing the CPRGS, it will therefore be 
necessary to concentrate on the sectoral level and 
to develop sectoral ‘action plans’ that clearly de-
fine ‘road maps’ for implementation as well as 
responsibilities for carrying out relevant activities. 
Only with a higher degree of action-orientation 
will the CPRGS be more than just a reference 
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Annex 1: Development Objectives of Vietnam 
A Economic Objectives 
 
Objectives, Targets Monitoring indicators Reporting 
Frequency 
Reporting Agency 
Target 1. Growth of the Economy 
GDP in 2010 to double GDP 
In 2000 
– Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
– Use of Gross Domestic Product (Savings - Consump-
tion) 
– GDP per capita 
– Income per capita of cities and provinces 
– Consumer Price Index 
Annual GSO 
Value-added in industry and con-
struction to grow by 10.0-10.5 % on 
average during the period 2001-
2010  
– Gross Production Output growth rate of industry and 
construction 




Growth rate in agriculture, forestry 
and fishery to grow by 4.0-4.5 % 
during the period 2001-2010. 
– Gross Production Output growth rate of agriculture 
– Value-added growth rate of agriculture, forestry and 
fishery 
– Value and volume of total food production 
– Food production volume per capita 
Annual GSO 
Value-added of services to grow by 
7.0-8.0 % on average during the 
period 2001-2010 
– Total retail sales of goods and services 
– Value-added growth rate of services  
Annual GSO 
Export growth rate to more than 
double GDP growth rate 
– Export value 
– Import value 
Annual GSO 
By 2010: the GDP share of agricul-
ture will be 16-17 %; industry 40-
41 % and services 42-43 % 
– GDP share of agriculture 
– GDP share of industry  
– GDP share of services 
Annual GSO 
By 2010: the share of the total 
labour force in industry will be 23-
24 %; agriculture 50 %, services 26-
27 % 
– Share of total labour forcein agriculture 
– Share of total labour force in industry 
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Target 2. Resource mobilisation for poverty reduction 
To ensure that domestic saving 
exceeds 30 % of GDP, to mobilize 
VND 840 thousand billion (US$ 60 
billion) for development investment 
in the period 2001-2005, of which 
VND 220 thousand billion (US$ 
15,7 billion) from domestic private 
sector and US$ 11 billion from FDI 
– Share of saving as percent of GDP 
– Total capital investment mobilised annually 
– Total investment capital mobilized annually by eco-
nomic sectors 
Annual MPI 
Total funding for poverty reduction 
 
– Total funding mobilised for CPRGS 
– Total funding from CPRGS allocated to targeted 
programs 
– Total funding from CPRGS allocated for provinces, 
in detail, down to the district level 
Annual MPI 
Target 3. Effectiveness of Resource Utilisation 
Total funding for CPRGS, break-
down by targeted program 
– Total funding for CPRGS, breakdown by province, 
down to commune level 
– Total households receiving support from CPRGS, 
breakdown by province 
– Total new jobs created for the poor, breakdown by 
province, down to commune level 
– Total social welfare construction (clean water tanks, 
health clinics...) invested from the Poverty Reduction 
Fund, breakdown by province down to commune 
level 
– Percentage of people mobilised in the program rela-
tive to the requirement, details provided for every 
program and province 
– Percentage of financial resources mobilised for the 
strategy relative to the requirement, details provided 
for every program and province 
– Percentage of financial resources mobilised on time 
for every program and province 
Annual Provinces and 
Programs 
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B. Social and Poverty Reduction Objectives 
 
Objectives, Targets Monitoring Indicators Reporting 
Frequency 
Reporting Agencies 
1. Poverty reduction 
From 2000 to 2010, reduce interna-
tional and national-standard-based 
poverty incidence by two fifths and 
three fifths [?relatively]. 
From 2000 to 2010, reduce interna-
tional-standard-based food poverty 
incidence (2,100 Kcal per capita 
daily) by three fourths. 
By 2010, reduce national-standard-
based food poverty incidence (1,800 
Kcal per capita daily) by three 
fourths. 
– Rate of poor households at the poverty line, based on 
international standards. 
– Rate of poor households at the poverty line, based on 
national standards. 
– Number of households that escape from poverty. 
– Poverty depth. 
– Share of poorest quintile in total consumption. 
– Percent of food-based poor households living below 
the international standard poverty line. 
– Percent of poor households having daily food- ration 






GSO, MOLISA and 
provinces 
2. Provision of basic infrastructure services to extremely disadvantaged groups and urban poor people 
Provide basic infrastructure for 
80 % of poor communes by 2005 










Provide essential infrastructure, 
especially water supply and envi-
ronmental hygiene, for poor areas in 
cities and towns   
– Percentage of poor communes with car accessible 
roads leading to commune centre. 
– Percentage of poor communes with small-scale irri-
gation works. 
– Percentage of poor communes with health stations. 
– Percentage of poor communes with primary schools, 
kindergartens and infant schools. 
– Percentage of poor commune-clusters with junior-
secondary schools. 
– Percentage of poor communes with markets or inter-
commune markets. 
– Percentage of poor communes with cultural model 
post offices. 
– Percentage of communes with radio stations. 
– Percentage of poor households in urban areas with 
access to essential infrastructure. 
Ensure that 80 % of urban and 60 % 
of rural population will have access 
to clean and safe water by 2005; 
85 % of rural population to have 
access to clean and safe water by 
2010. 
– Percentage of poor households with access to clean 
water. 
– Percentage of poor rural communes and poor urban 
districts with clean and hygienic safe drinking water. 
Expand the national transmission 
grid to 900 poor commune centres 
by 2005. 








cerned agencies and 
provinces 
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3. Job creation 
Provide additional jobs to 1.4-1.5 
million people per annum. Raise the 
share of female workers of total new 
jobholders to 50 % by 2010. 
– Number of jobs created annually. 
– Number of new jobs created annually. 
– Ratio of female workers in total newly created jobs. 
– Number of jobs in non-state sector. 
– Number of new jobs in non-state sector 
– Percent of landless poor households that have found 
jobs. 
– Percent of poor households with access to credits and 
loans for job creation. 
– Percent of labourers by sectors (agriculture, industry 
and services) 
Increase the share of trained work-
ers in the total workforce to 40 % in 
2010. 
– Ratio of trained workers in total labour force. 
– Total workers trained annually 
Increase the ratio of rural working 
time utilization of people of work-
ing age to about 80 % by 2005 and 
85 % by 2010. 
– Rural labour utilization rate 
Reduce urban unemployment rate to 
about 5.4 % in 2004 and to less than 
5 % by 2010. 







GSO, MOLISA and 
Provinces 
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4. Education universalization 
Increase primary school net enrol-
ment rate 97 % (junior secondary 
school NER to 80 %) by 2005 and 
to 99 % (junior secondary NER to 
90 %) by 2010. 
 
– Primary school net enrolment rate. 
– Junior secondary school net enrolment rate. 
– Rate of kindergarten enrolment at the age of 3-5. 
– Primary education completion rate. 
– Rate of junior secondary universalisation. 
– Literacy rate among people aged of 15-24. 
– Rate of class repeat and drop-out. 
(These indicators are classified by gender and ethnic 
groups) 
By 2010, strive to improve quality 
of education and increase at primary 
level. 
– Children with full-day schooling. 
Eliminate gender gap in primary 
and secondary education by 2005 
and the gap among ethnic minorities 
in primary and secondary education 
by 2010. 
– Net enrolment rates at primary, secondary and tert i-
ary education levels by gender. 
– Literacy Rat for females and males aged 15-24. 
– Net enrolment rate of ethnic children compared to 
that of Kinh children at primary and secondary levels 
in 2010. 
Eliminate illiteracy for 95 % of 
illiterate under-40-year-old women 
by 2005 and 100 % by 2010. 








Ministry of Education 
and Training 
GSO and provinces 
5. Reduce Birth Rate, Child Mortality Rate and Child Malnutrition Rate 
Maintain the trend reduction in the 
birth rate in order to reach the aver-
age substitution level for the whole 
country by 2005; in remote and poor 
areas by 2010. 
– Population growth rate. 
– Prevalence of contraceptive use/availability 
Reduce infant mortality rate to 
30 ‰ by 2005 and less than 25 ‰ 
by 2010; reduce under 5 year-old 
mortality rate to 36 ‰ and less than 
32 ‰ by 2005 and 2010 respec-
tively. 
– Infant Mortality Rate. 
– Under 5 Mortality Rate. 
 
Reduce under 5 year old malnutri-
tion rate to 25 % in 2005 and less 
than 20 % in 2010. 
– Under 5 Malnutrition Rate  
 
Rapidly reduce the rate of children 
of low weight at birth (less than 
2,500 grams) to 7 % in 2005 and to 
5 % in 2010. 
– Percentage of births of low-weight (less than 2,500 
grams) children. 














GSO, MOH, National 
Committee for Popula-
tion and Family Plan-
ning and Provinces 
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6. Reproductive health, HIV/AIDS, epidemics and other social diseases 
Reduce the maternal mortality rate 
to 80/100,000 live births by 2005 
and to 70/100,000 live births in the 
whole country by 2010 (the rate for 
mountainous areas is 100/100,000). 
– Maternal mortality rate . 
– Skilled attendant at delivery. 
 
Maintain the achievement of polio 
eradication; minimise the number of 
people sickened by cholera, typhoid, 
hemorrhagic fever, malaria, and 
plague, etc. 
– Proportion of children sickened by cholera, typhoid, 
hemorrhagic fever, malaria, plague, etc. 
 
Contain the rate of HIV/AIDS 
transmission 
 
– Proportion of HIV/AIDS infected people age 15-49. 
– Proportion of children infected by HIV/AIDS. 
Control and move towards restrain-
ing social diseases. 








MOH, GSO and Prov-
inces 
7. Development of culture and information, improve the spiritual life of people 
By 2005, strive for 80 % of house-
holds to attain the status of cultured 
family; 50 % of villages, hamlets, 
urban districts to attain national 
culture standards; 78 % of com-
mune, districts with cultural houses 
– Percent of households attaining cultured family 
status. 
– Percent of village, hamlet, urban districts attaining 
the national culture standard. 
– Percent of communes and districts with cultural 
houses. 
Ensure that more than 90 % of 
households can see Vietnam Televi-
sion programs and that more than 
95 % can hear the Voice of Vietnam 
radio by 2005. 
– Percent of households that can see Vietnam Televi-
sion programs. 
– Percent of households that can hear the Voice of 
Vietnam radio. 
Increase the amount of broadcasting 
and television time in ethnic lan-
guages. 
– Amount of time broadcasting ethnic languages. 
 
Annual Ministry of Culture 
and Information GSO 
8. Improve living standards, preserve and de velop ethnic minority cultures 
Preserve and develop the reading 
and writing ability of ethnic lan-
guages. 
– Rate of ethnic language illiteracy. 
Ensure the entitlement of individual 
and collective land- use rights in 
ethnic minority and mountainous 
areas. 
– Rate of ethnic peoples with land-use right titles for 
all sort of land. 
– Rate of ethnic peoples relying on shifting cultivation. 
Increase the proportion of ethnic 
minority people in authority bodies 
at various levels. 
– Percent of ethic peoples represented in elected bodies 




Annual MOTE, General Land 
Office, GCOP and 
Provinces 
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9. Sustainable Environmental Protection 
Extending forest cover to 38 % by 




Ensure that there are no slums and 
temporary houses in all towns and 







Ensure that 100% of all waste-water 
is treated in towns and cities by 
2010 
 
Ensure that 100% of solid waste is 
collected and disposed of safely in 
all towns and cities by 2010 
 
By 2005, air and water pollution 
must attain national standards 
– Forest cover. 
– Proportion of country under protected forests (“sp e-
cial use”). 
– Representation of species diversity in the protected 
forests 
– Percentage of households living in slums and tempo-
rary houses. 
– Percentage of towns and cities with over 5 % of land 
area covered by slums 
– Percentage of towns and cities with zero % of land 
area covered by slums 
– Percentage of towns and cities with over 10 % of 
temporary houses 
– Percentage of towns and cities with zero % tempo-
rary houses. 
– Percentage of towns and cities collecting and safely 
disposing 100 % of solid waste 
 
 
– Percentage of towns and cities collecting and safely 
disposing 100 % of solid waste 
 
 
– Water and air quality. 
– Rate of poor households with hygienic latrines. 
– Rate of poor households with access to hygienic 
water 
Annual MARD, GSO, MOSTE 
and Provinces 
10. Reduce vulnerability 
Improve significantly the income of 
the poor. By 2005, increase the 
average income of the lowest ex-
penditure quintile to140 % of that in 
2000 and up to 190 % by 2010. 
– Average income of the lowest expenditure quintile in 








cerned agencies and 
Provinces 
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Improve the access of the poor to 
basic social services, production 
services and resources 
Expand the official social safety net 
(health insurance, social insurance, 
etc.) and diversify the voluntary 
safety net (school insurance and 
insurance of crops, diseases, pro-
duction equipment, agricultural 
extension, etc.) 
 
– Rate of poor people with access to basic social ser-
vices in rural and urban areas. 
– Rate of poor people receiving support in production 
services. 
– Percent of people participating in official and volun-
tary insurance system. 
– Percent of the disabled, dependent elderly people 
living alone and other policy-qualified people receiv-
ing social welfare. 
– Percent of poor people receiving essential support 
(e.g. shelter, re-current and emergency relief sup-
port). 
– Number of social welfare centres. 
– Number of charity funds. 
– Percent of poor people with health insurance. 
Ensure job security 
 
– Percent of people benefiting from unemployment 
insurance  
– Percent of redundant workers benefiting from sup-
port policies such as training, credit, etc. 
Fully resolve the problem of child 
labour and street children. Protect 
them from economic exploitation 
and sexual abuse. 
– Percent of children cared for who are in difficult 
situations (orphans, disabled children, street children 
and child labourers). 
Develop strategy for natural disaster 
relief and prevention. By 2010, 
reduce by half the rate of poor 
people falling back into poverty due 
to natural disasters and other risks. 




11. Gender Equality and Empowerment for Women 
Increase the number of women in 
elective bodies and in government 
bodies at all levels (national, pro-
vincial, district and commune). 
Increase the participation of women 
in agencies and sectors at all levels 
by an additional 3-5 % in the next 
10 years. 
– Percent of females in the Party’s Central Committee. 
– Percent of females in the National Assembly. 
– Percent of female representatives in people- elected 
agencies. 
– Percent of female leaders in ministries and central 
agencies and institutions. 
– Percent of female entrepreneurs. 
Ensure that the names of both hus-
band and wife appear on land-use 
right certificates by 2005. 
– Percent of land titles granted in both husband and 
wife names. 
 
Reduce the vulnerability of women 
in family violence 








Office; Party´s Central 
Committee Office, 
GCOP and related 
agencies 
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12. Good governance for poverty reduction 
Ensure grass-roots democracy -  – Percent of communes having staff to monitor the 
poverty reduction strategy  
– Percent of communes that are provided with informa-
tion on poverty reduction programs. 
– Percent of communes with complaints and lawsuits. 
Percent of petitions to be settled. 
– Percent of communes with no social evils. 
– Percent of communes with libraries of law. 
– Number of coaching and propagating courses on 
State laws and policies. 
Ensure budget transparency – Proportion of communes that publicise their budget 
revenue and expenditure 
Annual and 





GSO, GCOP, Ministry 
of Judicary and Prov-
inces 
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Annex 2 
 
Case Study: The Forest Sector Support Programme & Partnership, an Example for a 
Formalised Partnership Approach 
In the Vietnamese C-PRGS the forestry sector is recognised as a productive sector contributing to poverty 
reduction. The forestry sector is closely linked to poverty in two ways. First, it provides income generation 
possibilities and supports subsistence needs. Second, reforestation slows environmental degradation and 
consequently improves food production and living conditions of poor people. 
The Government of Vietnam (GoV) and international donors established a partnership in this sector to con-
tribute more effectively to poverty reduction and environmental protection. This partnership has chosen a 
formalised approach of co-operation, that will be presented in this paper as an example for GoV-donor part-
nerships. 
Background and Institutional Arrangements 
In July 1998, the Government of Vietnam initiated the 5 Million Hectare Reforestation Programme 
(5MHRP). Following an agreement at the CG Meeting in 1998, a Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) was 
signed in December 1999 between the Ministry for Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) and 15 
representatives of the donor community, among them Germany. The MoA expresses the commitment of the 
partners for continued collaboration towards a common sector objective: "Sustainable management of forests 
and the conservation of biodiversity to protect the environment, improve the livelihoods of people, and en-
hance the contribution of forestry to the national economy". A Partnership Steering Committee (PSC) and a 
5MHRP Partnership Secretariat were established. 
As a separate process, MARD prepared a new Forestry Sector Strategy up to 2010. A Vietnam Forest Sector 
Support Programme and Partnership (FSSP&P) was developed to provide a framework and support. With an 
increasing number of partners joining the FSSP&P the Government has been faced with an increasing task of 
administration and co-ordination. Consequently, the structure has been adjusted with the formation of an 
independent FSSP Co-ordination Office under MARD, which is, in fact, an upgraded version of the 5MHRP 
Partnership Secretariat the mandate of which expired end of March 2002.1  
                                                 
1 See MARD / FSSP&P (2002). 
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The FSSP Co-ordination Office develops the FSSP process further by introducing and using a Common 
Work Programme, a Monitoring and Evaluation System, a Forest Sector Manual and an improved Trust 
Fund arrangement. Its establishment is a temporary measure aiming at facilitating the process and supporting 
the related departments and institutions in building their readiness to implement co-ordination and monitor-
ing activities, e.g. through information dissemination. (Life span: approx. 4 years); 
The Partnership Steering Committee (PSC) is chaired by MARD, includes representatives of the Office of 
the Government, MPI, MoSTE, MoLISA, MoET and CEMMA, and signing International Partners, as well as 
one or more representatives of the Provincial Reference Groups and one representative of national grassroots 
organisations. 
The Technical Executive Sub-Committee provides direct guidance (day-to-day, month-to-month) to the 
implementation of the Memorandum of Agreement as executive arm of the PSC. 
 


















Ministries /  
other        
Partnerships  
MARD 







5MHRP      
Office 
Technical Executive 
Sub - Committee 











1 Deputy Director* 
1 Planning Officer* 
   cum translator 
1 Int'l M&E Expert** 
1 Accountant* 
1 Secretary* 
day to day 
guidance  
*   provided by MARD 
**  provided by Int'l        
donors  
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Financing 
The experiences from the 5MHRP Partnership led to the establishment of a Trust Fund to finance the FSSP 
Co-ordination Office. It is a grant offered by the community of international donors in support of MARD 
(which provides between 5 - 10% of the estimated costs in cash). The budget of the FSSP Co-ordination 
Office will be around 250,000 US$ per year. It is an income source of the State budget, managed and utilised 
in accordance with the State Budget Law by the FSSP Co-ordination Office. The office director is the ac-
count owner. The PSC selects an independent external auditor who reviews consistency between planning, 
budgeting, cost norm and expenditures. The auditor will carry out annual audits.2 
The financial contribution from the MARD may be judged a rather symbolic act but it can be seen as an im-
portant step towards taking these arrangements seriously with a perspective to integrate the work of the FSSP 
Co-ordination Office into the MARD in due time. As yet, the Trust Fund has no further task than to finance 
the FSSP Co-ordination Office and opinions diverge whether this Fund will broaden its tasks in order to fi-
nance sectoral activities in the future. 
In the opinion of Dutch and Finnish representatives, the Trust Fund will only be a first step in the process of 
fund pooling. For both, the ultimate aim is a non-earmarked funding feeding directly into the Vietnamese 
overall budget. As lack of transparency and accountability do not yet allow this step, intermediate steps 
could be a direct budget support of the MARD with earmarking of funds for specific purposes, or - which 
seems to be the most probable development - the development of a sector-wide basket fund, separated from 
the state budget (see figure 2). Germany has clear reservations regarding a sector-wide basket fund. Partic i-
pating in a basket fund arrangement is generally not excluded by BMZ, but at the current early stage of im-
plementation not considered as a necessary and appropriate way to proceed within the partnership. Generally 
spoken, the long-term aim of budget funding is not regarded as a realistic and desirable option. Not only is 
the Vietnamese fiscal and administrative system not transparent and accountable enough, but it is also gener-
ally questioned whether budget funding is the most effective and efficient approach of development co-
operation. 3 Hence, it is rather the current programme framework that seems to be well suited for the German 
position. 
Added Value of the FSSP&P 
Currently, FSSP&P is a programme framework within which every donor can contribute according to its 
capacities, expertise and its specific instruments of development co-operation. "Whereas the World Bank's 
strength lies in upscaling activities, institutions like the GTZ are strong in piloting", as van Ijssel, Dutch co-
chairman of the PSC puts it. An important contribution by GTZ and KfW is the establishment of a Forest 
Sector Manual, one of the current core objectives of the FSSP&P. KfW is involved in an initiative to harmo-
nise loan disbursement procedures with the World Bank, ADB and JBIC for all loans exceeding 5 Mio US $, 
as called for in the FSSP&P Memorandum of Agreement. Other donor agencies head for sub-sector trust 
funds (a conservation trust fund, for example), co-financed projects or other forms of co-operation. 
                                                 
2 See MARD (2002). 
3 See German Embassy (2001). 
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The Partnership's broad goal is defined as the "sustainable management of forests and the conservation of 
biodiversity to achieve protection of the environment, improved livelihoods of people in forest dependent 
areas, and enhanced contribution of forestry to the national economy:"4 This definition points to the variety 
of activities the sector spans: establishing an appropriate legal and institutional framework (to strengthen the 
commercial sector's role, for example); adopting macro and micro land-use planning systems, restructuring 
state-owned forestry enterprises; accomplishing planning and implementation of sustainable forest manage-
ment (with special regard to different functions of different types of forests); developing sustainable use and 
conservation of indigenous forest flora and fauna and integrating it into biodiversity conservation; develop-
ing an appropriate research, extension, education and training system; supporting marketing and processing 
of forest products at a sustainable rate. 
All these activities need to be co-ordinated in an appropriate policy framework on the basis of common goals 
and objectives to achieve synergy effects and avoid overlapping or gaps. The common framework objectives 
allow for more than a targeted approach as the original 5MHRP-Partnership used to be. This joint policy 
dialogue with the MARD increases the impact on the sector policy, whereas the influence of single donors 
would be more limited. 
A sector-wide M&E System is an important tool for co-operation within a coherent policy framework. It 
provides a comprehensive picture of the forestry sector, and feeds the results of past and current activities 
into the policy dialogue as a basis for adjusting policy and improving future actions. The international donors 
sector-wide monitoring improves transparency. It is therefore a precondition for budget support. A common 
sector-wide M&E System should become the overall tool for MARD in forestry in the future. Under the 
FSSP Partnership, a common M&E system is in the process of being established. Finland finances an inter-
national M&E expert who works in the FSSP Co-ordination office. 
Currently, no department within MARD would be able to co-ordinate all the activities within the FSSP Part-
nership and within the MARD itself. One approach to overcome this bottleneck could have been support for 
capacity building as a first step and development of the partnership within MARD institutions as a second 
step. But the 'hands on' approach that has been practised so far turns out to be successful in strengthening 
capacities and raising awareness during the co-operation process. All interview partners underlined that the 
co-operation improved considerably towards a constructive and open dialogue between the donors and the 
GoV. 
Open Questions  
Nevertheless, open questions remain regarding the benefits of the formalised partnership approach in the 
forestry sector. 
The FSSP Partnership runs the risk to be donor-driven and hence to be unsustainable in the long run. As yet, 
MARD's financial contribution to the forest sector financing is rather small (about 30%) and capacities 
within the MARD are insufficient. On the other hand, donor commitment is quite high and the partnership  
progresses quite fast. Instead of supporting the 10-year Forest Development Strategy of the GoV, the FSSP 
Partnership - driven by donors - runs the risk of setting the agenda in the sector. Hence, donors should be 
careful not to dominate the process and to support capacity strengthening within MARD during the process. 
                                                 
4 See FSSP (2001). 
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Every institution set up for the partnership needs to have a clear time frame within which it can be integrated 
into existing governmental structures in order to avoid parallel structures. 
Administrative capacity is quite low at provincial and lower levels, so involvement and ownership at these 
levels is still insufficient. The time-consuming and resource-absorbing co-ordination process simply over-
burdens some representatives at sub-national levels. Moreover, some goals appear very ambitious and it will 
require a huge effort to plan, implement, monitor and evaluate them, which could lead to a concentration of 
activities at national level. Again, this risk has to be taken into account and decentralised levels should in-
creasingly be involved in the process. 
Conclusion 
Even though interview partners underlined FSSP&P being all in all a very successful approach, it cannot be 
called a model partnership for other sectors. Forestry may differ from other sectors in that it is concerned 
with less delicate political topics than other sectors (such as public administration reform or public financial 
management) and the sector is relatively clearly to define. More informal partnerships, such as in banking 
reform, show that individual solutions have to be found for each sector and partnership. Generally spoken, 
there is no such thing as the perfect partnership approach. 
German development co-operation has been involved quite actively in the 5MHRP Partnership and the 
FSSP&P. This involvement allowed to influence the discussion and basic common agreements like the 
Memorandum of Agreement. The current partnership framework enables Germany to be involved in the 
sector policy dialogue while keeping its project-based instruments of development co-operation. Initiatives 
towards a sector-wide basket fund may not be favoured by BMZ but further gains in effectiveness and effi-
ciency due to fund pooling should be considered.  
However, due to the specific organisational structure of German development co-operation it is difficult to 
effectively co-ordinate its agencies' contribution to the Partnership. Only ministerial representatives are 
authorised to take part actively in a policy dialogue. But the sectoral expertise remains with the implement-
ing agencies KfW and GTZ. A satisfactory management of the co-ordination between the BMZ and imple-
menting agencies is still to be developed. 
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Advantages: Less costly for donors, reduced 
overhead costs, increased Vietnamese owner-
ship, no parallel structures 
Disadvantages: Risk of fund diversion or ineffi-
cient allocation due to lack of transparency and 
accountability in the current Vietnamese ad-
ministrative and  fiscal system 
Individual Project Funding  
 
Advantages: Results/ Impact of each project 
clearly measurable at micro-level, opportuni-
ties for fund abuse limited 
Disadvantages: Sector-wide effectiveness and 
influence on sector policy limited, hence sus-
tainability of impact limited 
Current Initiatives 
Past 
Possible Future Steps  Sector - wide Basket Fund 
 
Advantages: Further step towards common 
and co-ordinated sector policy, improves syn-
ergy effects, less time-consuming and re-
source-absorbing co-ordination work for  
MARD 
Disadvantages: impact of each activity less 









Advantages: Co-operation based on a common 
set of objectives, allows flexibility but assures 
sector-wide impact and avoids overlapping or 
gaps 
Disadvantages: Cost of time-consuming and 
resource-absorbing co-ordination process 
could exceed benefits, risk of donor-
domination and centralisation; impact of each 














drafting the PRSP 
– Start interview with introduction of interviewers, purpose of our study, aim of the interview 
 
No. Questions Related Questions 
1 What is your role in the PRSP process ?  What was your contribution and involvement? Has your contribution been sufficiently reflected in the PRSP? How effective were the 
arrangements for consultation and feedback (information flow)? 
2 What was the role of other Vietnamese par-
ticipants in developing the PRSP?  
Did Vietnamese agencies take the lead? To what extent were local agencies involved? Have the poor been sufficiently involved?
3 What was the role of the donors?  What was the contribution of the donors? How can these contributions been improved? How was the co
was the co-ordination between donors and Vietnamese agencies? 
4 What do you think about the content of the 
PRSP? 
Is the multi-dimensional nature of poverty taken into account? Are all relevant sectors for poverty reduction included (cross
issues)? Are the goals realistic? Do the financial resources meet the demands? Are policies costed? Do unquantified targets cause pro
lems? Are targets suited to measure poverty? What is the quality of data?  
5 What have been your experiences with poverty 
alleviation activities in Vietnam?  
What lessons have you learned through past and current poverty alleviation programmes, particularly at the local level? Did you observe 
problems with the implementation of such programmes at the local level? Do you thi
each other? What are your suggestions for improvement?  
6 What are the next steps? –  
7 What problems do you expect regarding the 
implementation of the C-PRGSP? 
Is the current administrative system suited to implement PRSP? What role will participatory planning play?
planning make public services more responsive to local needs? How do you assess the poverty monitoring system?
population take part in monitoring poverty alleviation measures? What role can local administrative levels play in the poverty monitoring 
system? Is the local capacity sufficient (human, financial, technical resources – data collection, data analysis, dissemination and use of 
results)? How can the system be improved? Will the monitoring system make public services more responsive to local needs (impact on 
decision making)? Will the co-ordination between different agencies and sectors be improved?
Will co-ordination between the Vietnamese Agencies improve? 
8 Will the PRSP make a difference? What will be the changes caused by PRSP? What will be the changes/the requirements for your institution?
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Annex 4: Overview of Interviews and Working Groups  
 
No Date Place Organisation Interview Partner 
01 19.02.2002 Hanoi German Embassy Mr. Jost Kadel 
02 19.02.2002 Hanoi GTZ/MOLISA Dr. Liem 
03 20.02.2002 Hanoi CIEM  Mr. Chu Tien Quang 
04 21.02.2002 Hanoi GTZ Office Dr. Monika Midel 
05 22.02.2002 Hanoi KfW Dr. Klaus Müller 
06 22.02.2002 Hanoi GTZ/Ha Tinh Mr. Riethmüller 
07 25.02.2002 Hanoi KAS Mr. Prohl 
08 25.02.2002 Hanoi JICA Mr. Kuniaki Amatsu, 
Ms. Luong Mai Dzung 
09 25.02.2002 Hanoi GTZ/CIEM  Dr. Peter Sturm 
10 26.02.2002 Hanoi Action Aid Dr. Ramesh Khadka, 
Mr. Pham Van Ngoc 
11 26.02.2002 Hanoi WWF Mr. Craig Leisher 
12 27.02.2002, 
01.03.2002 
Quang Binh DFID Ms. Jane Rintoul 
13 28.02.2002 Quang Binh Working Group Agriculture and 
Rural Development  
– 
14 28.02.2002 Quang Binh Working Group Health and Educa-
tion 
– 
15 28.02.2002 Quang Binh Working Group Public Expendi-
ture Management 
– 
16 28.02.2002 Quang Binh World Bank Ms. Nisha Agrawal 
17 01.03.2002 Quang Binh Working Group Governance Par-
ticipation 
– 
18 01.03.2002 Quang Binh Working Group Monitoring and 
Evaluation 
– 
19 01.03.2002 Quang Binh Working Group Natural Disasters 




Quang Binh GTZ/GFA Mr. Wiemer 
21 02.03.2002 Quang Binh GTZ/Quang Binh M&E Staff Member Food Security Project Quang 
Binh 
22 02.03.2002 Quang Binh JBIC Ms. Hiroko Higuchi 
23 04.03.2002 Quang Binh DPI Mr. Hung 
24 04.03.2002 Quang Binh Quang Binh Women’s Union S Ms. Hoang Thi Ai Nhien 
25 04.03.2002 Quang Binh DARD Mr. Nguyen Xuan Dung 
26 04.03.2002 Quang Binh Committee on Ethnic Minorities Mr. Dang Van De 
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27 05.03.2002 Hanoi Plan International Mr. Mark Mc Peak, 
Mr. Le Quang Duat 
28 05.03.2002 Hanoi CIDA Mr. Dean Frank 
29 05.03.2002 Hanoi ADB Mr. Alessandro Pio 
30 06.03.2002 Hanoi GTZ Office Ms. Kathrin Freitag 
31 06.03.2002 Hanoi JBIC Mr. Takao Shimokawa 
32 06.03.2002 Hanoi EC Mr. Andrew Jacobs 
33 07.03.2002 Hanoi SIDA Mr. Karl-Anders Larsson 
34 07.03.2002 Hanoi IMF Dr. Susan J. Adams 
35 08.03.2002 Hanoi DFID Ms. Cathy Welch, 
Mr. Steve Ray 
36 08.03.2002 Hanoi UNDP Ms. Lisa Ng Bow et al. 
37 11.03.2002 Hanoi Catholic Relief Service Ms. Leisher   
38 12.03.2002 Hanoi Ministry of Finance Ms. Nguyen Thi Hong Yen 
39 12.03.2002 Hanoi World Bank, DFID Ms. Carrie Turk 
40 13.03.2002 Hanoi MARD Mr. Do Van Hoa-  
41 13.03.2002 Hanoi MOET Dr. Bui Ngoc Son 
42 14.03.2002 Hanoi MOH Dr. Nguyen Hoang Long  
43 14.03.2002 Hanoi Brot für die Welt Ms. Martina Appuhn 
44 15.03.2002 Hanoi Allianz-Mission Dr. med. Jochen Fiebrantz 
45 15.03.2002 Hanoi CEMMA Dr.Le Kim Khoi,  
46 19.03.2002 Hanoi Department for International De-
velopment Co-operation Finland 
Mr. Tom Tuomasjukka 
47 19.03.02 Hanoi GTZ Mr. Klaus Kirchmann 
48 19.03.2002 Hanoi GTZ Dr. Curt Fischer 
49 19.03.2002 Hanoi French Embassy Mr. Philippe Orliange 
50 21.03.2002 Ha Tinh DPI Mr. Tran Nhat Thanh 
51 21.03.2002 Ha Tinh DOLISA  -  
52 22.03.2002 Ha Tinh Women’s Union Ms. Nguyen Thi Nguyet  
53 22.03.2002 Ha Tinh DARD Mr. Nguyen Ngoc Tuong 
54 23.03.2002 Ha Tinh Commune  -  
55 25.03.2002 Ha Tinh Youth Union  -  
56 26.03.2002 Ha Tinh District  -  
57 21.03.02 Son La Commune Muong Lung Mr. Men 
 
58 22. und 23.03.02 Son La Commune Suoi To, Distrikt Phu 
Yen u. Provinz (in ) Son La 
 -  
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59 22. und 23.03.02 Son La People’s Committee of the Bac 
Yen district 
 -  
60 24.03.02 Son La Hong Ngai Commune in Bac Yen 
District 
Mr. A Lenh, Mr. Guong A Thu 
61 25.03.02 Son La People`s Committee of Commune 
Chieng Luong/ Son La 
Mr. Hoi 
62 25.03.02 Son La District People’s Committee – Mai 
Son 
Mr. Ngoc 
63 26.03.02 Son La Tong Lenh People’s Committee 
(Commune) 
Mr. Hoa 
64 26.03.02 Son La People’s committee of Thuan Chau 
District 
Mr. Diu 
65 27.03.02 Son La GTZ Projekt Son La Mr. Phan Quoc Tuan 
66 27.03.02 Son La People’s committee of the prov-
ince of Son La 
Mr. Phong 
67 09.04.2002 Hanoi World Bank; M&E Mr. Rob Swinkels 
68 10.04.2002 Hanoi WWF Mr. Martin Geiger 
69 10.04.2002 Hanoi GTZ Administrative Reform Dr. Franz 
70 10.04.2002 Hanoi GRIPS (Graduate Institute for 
Policy Studies), Tokyo 
Prof. Izumi Ohno, 
70 11.04.2002 Hanoi Dutch Embassy; Co-chairman 
FSSP&P Steering Committee 
Mr. van Ijssel 
71 19.04.2002 Hanoi GTZ / MoLISA Poverty Allevia-
tion Project  
Mr. Liem 
72 25.04.2002 Hanoi CIEM  Members attending the Presentation and Discussion 
73 26.04.2002 Hanoi BMZ, GTZ, KfW, DED Members attending the Presentation and Discussion 
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Annex 5: Time Schedule of the Research Period in Vietnam 
 
Time Place Activities 
17.02.2002 Hanoi – Arrival in Vietnam 
18.02.2002 – 20.03.2002 Hanoi – General orientation and introduction 
– Testing of questionnaire material with counterpart 
– Interviews with national and international stakeholders and experts 
at central level 
– Analysis and interpretation of interview results 
– Organisation of trips to provinces 
28.02.2002 – 01.03.2002 Quang Binh – Participation in PRSP consultation workshop  
20.03.2002 – 28.03.2002 Provinces (Son La, Ha 
Tinh) 
– Interviews with national and international stakeholders at province, 
district and commune level: one part of the group at Ha Tinh prov-
ince, the other part at Son La province 
– Analysis and interpretation of interview results 
29.03.2002 – 02.04.2002 Hanoi – Return to Hanoi, Easter 
03.04.2002 – 25.04.2002 Hanoi – Interviews with national and international stakeholders 
– Analysis and interpretation of interview results 
– Finalising summary of findings 
25.04.2002  Hanoi – Presentation of results to CIEM and other Vietnamese stakeholders 
26.02.2002 Hanoi – Presentation of results to members of German development co-
operation: BMZ, GTZ, KfW, DED 
03.05.2002 Hanoi – Departure from Vietnam 
06.05.2002 – 31.05.2002 Bonn – Final draft period 
24.05.2002 Bonn – Presentation of report at the GDI 
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Annex 6: Geographical Map of Vietnam 
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Source: PWG (1999), p. 15. 
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